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A NORMAL ACCIDENT THEORY-BASED COMPLEXITY ASSESSMENT 
METHODOLOGY FOR SAFETY-RELATED COMPUTER SYSTEMS 
John J. Sammarco P.E. 
Computer-related accidents have caused injuries and fatalities in numerous 
applications.  Normal Accident Theory (NAT) explains that these accidents are inevitable 
because of system complexity.  Complex systems, such as computer-based systems, are 
highly interconnected, highly interactive, and tightly coupled.  We do not have a 
scientific methodology to identify and quantify these complexities; specifically, NAT has 
not been operationalized for computer-based systems.  
Our research addressed this by operationalizing NAT for the system requirements 
of safety-related computer systems.  It was theorized that there are two types of system 
complexity: external and internal.  External complexity was characterized by three 
variables: system predictability, observability, and usability  the dependent variables; 
internal complexity was characterized by modeling system requirements with Software 
Cost Reduction dependency graphs, then quantifying model attributes using 15 graph-
theoretical metrics  the independent variables.  Dependent variable data were obtained 
by having 32 subjects run simulations of our research test vehicle: the light control 
system (LCS).  The LCS simulation tests used a cross-over design.  Subject perceptions 
 
 
of these simulations were obtained by using a questionnaire.    Canonical correlation 
analysis and structure correlations were used to test hypotheses 1 to 3 − the dependent 
variables predictability, observability, and usability do not correlate with the NAT 
complexity metrics.  Five of 15 metrics proposed for NAT complexity correlated with the 
dependent data.  These 5 metrics had structure correlations exceeding 0.25, standard 
errors < 0.10, and a 95% confidence interval.  Therefore, the null hypotheses were 
rejected. A Wilcoxon signed ranks test was used to test hypotheses 4 to 6 − increasing 
NAT complexity increases system predictability, observability, and usability.  The results 
showed that the dependent variables decreased as complexity increased. Therefore, null 
hypotheses 4 to 6 were rejected.  Lastly, this work is a step forward to operationalize 
NAT for safety-related computer systems; however, limitations exist.  Opportunities 
addressing these limitations and advancing NAT were identified.  Lastly, the major 
contribution of this work is fundamental to scientific research – to gain knowledge 
through the discovery of relationship between the variables of interest.  Specifically, 
NAT has been advanced by defining and quantifying complexity measures, and showing 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
This section introduces the research motivation and presents an overview of the 
general problem area.  It describes the research significance and gives an overview of the 
research including the scope and limitations.  Background information follows to 
establish fundamental concepts and a common understanding of terms. 
Motivation 
There is an increasing trend of embedding computer technology into a wide variety 
of systems because this technology enables systems to provide new functionality, made 
possible only by computer control, to improve efficiency and to make the systems more 
cost competitive.  Thus, traditional hardwired electro-mechanical and analog systems are 
often replaced with computer hardware and software.  This widespread use increases our 
dependence on and exposure to computer-based systems.  More importantly, it impacts 
our safety because complex computer-based systems have inherent hazards.   
For example, computer-related accidents have caused mission failures, harm to the 
environment, injuries, and fatalities in numerous applications.  Over 400 computer-
related accidents, up to 1995, were documented (Neumann, 1995); it was estimated in 
1994 that about 2000 deaths were computer-related (MacKenzie, 1994).  
Systems utilizing computer technology are more complex.  As a result, new 
hazards are created that are difficult to recognize or mitigate with existing safety 
techniques.  This trend of utilizing computer technology will continue, due to global 
market pressures and our quest for "improved" systems providing more and new 
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functionality.  The following examples represent the spectrum endpoints of "high-tech” 
and "low-tech" systems. 
Hi-tech military weapon systems employ sophisticated computer technologies to 
provide unparalleled functionality.  The dependence on software to provide functionality 
is drastically increasing.  As early as 1981, 80 percent of US weapon systems employed 
computer technology (Leveson, 1986).  In 1960 the F-4 weapon system had only eight 
percent of its functions performed by software.  In 2000, the F-22 weapon system had an 
estimated 80 percent of its functions in software (Nelson, Clark, & Spurlock, 1999). 
Mining has traditionally been low tech; however, in recent years, people have 
begun using complex computerized mining systems.  As stated in the Wall Street Journal 
(Philips,  March 18, 1997) "Mining, that most basic of industries, is increasingly 
throwing down its old tools and picking up new technology.  It's a matter of survival."  A 
recent survey shows that over 95 percent of all longwall mining systems are computer 
based (Fiscor, 1998).  Computer technology is embedded in diverse mining systems 
including “driver-less” underground and surface haulage vehicles, continuous mining 
machines, hoists and elevators, and mine atmospheric monitoring systems. 
Complexity Hazards 
As computer utilization proliferates, escalating levels of system sophistication and 
complexity increase the likelihood of design errors and the introduction of new hazards. 
Noted researchers support this problem statement.  Littlewood (Littlewood & Strigini, 
1992) stated:  “The problems essentially arise from complexity, which increases the 
possibility that design faults will persist and emerge in the final product.” 
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Leveson expands upon the consequences of computer-induced system complexity:  
Many of the new hazards are related to increased complexity (both product and 
process) in the systems we are building.  Not only are new hazards created by the 
complexity, but the complexity makes identifying them more difficult (Leveson, 
1995).  
 
Computers are introducing new types of failure modes that cannot be handled by 
traditional approaches to designing for reliability and safety (such as redundancy) 
and by standard analysis techniques (such as FMEA).  These techniques work best 
for failures caused by random, wear-out phenomena and for accidents arising in the 
individual system components rather than in their interactions (Leveson, 2000). 
 
Today, systems embedded with computer technology are extremely complex.  New 
failure modes are resulting from complex interactions between components and 
subsystems.  For instance, mining is an industry sector experiencing a new complexity-
related hazard informally named ghosting:  the unexpected movement or startup of a 
mining system.  From 1995 to 2001, 11 computer-related mining incidents in the U.S. 
were reported by the Mine Safety and Health Administration; 71 computer-related 
mining incidents were reported in Australia (Sammarco, 2003).  The National Institute 
for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) has recognized the hazards associated with 
complexity and is funding this research to develop a complexity assessment methodology 
that enables the realization of simpler, safer computer-based systems (Sammarco, 2002). 
Normal Accident Theory and Complexity 
Perrow theorizes that accidents are inevitable with complex, tightly coupled 
systems because the complexity enables unexpected interactions that lead to system 
accidents (Perrow, 1999).  System designers are not able to understand or anticipate these 
interactions, nor are the end-users able to recognize, understand, or correctly intervene to 
stop or correct them.  Perrow's theory, named Normal Accident Theory (NAT), has much 
support (Ladkin, 1996) (Leveson, 2000) (Mellor, 1994) (Rushby, 1994) (Wolf, 2000), yet 
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only Wolf has operationalized the theory.  Wolf’s work is specialized for petroleum 
processing plants.  
NAT has not been operationalized for the safety-critical embedded computer 
system domain.  Operationalization involves quantification of empirical attributes or 
indicators by measurement or assignment of numbers and scales.  It also includes the 
translation of informal definitions to observable operations and processes. 
Research Hypotheses 
We theorized there are two types of system complexity.  The first type is internal; 
this is the complexity of a system’s structure and design.  The second type is external; 
this complexity is apparent in the externally visible behavior of a system.  Specifically, a 
complex system can have unfamiliar, unplanned, or unexpected behaviors as viewed by 
the human interacting with the system.  The human perceives system behavior as 
unpredictable.  Also, these behaviors could be difficult to observe and not immediately 
comprehensible by the end-user (Perrow, 1999).  As a result, the system's usability can 
decline.  Hence, system complexity can be indicated by an external component:  system 
behavior we characterized system behavior with three variables:  system predictability, 
observability, and usability.  These were the dependent variables for our research.  The 
NAT complexity metrics of internal complexity are the independent variables.  
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Hence, we hypothesized a negative correlation exists between NAT complexity, as 
measured by graph-theoretical metrics, and the externally visible behavior of a system. 
Six research hypotheses are presented.  
    
Hypothesis 1:  
 H0: There is not a correlation between NAT metrics and system predictability.  
 H1: NAT metrics are correlated to system predictability. 
Hypothesis 2: 
 H0: There is not a correlation between NAT metrics and system observability. 
  H1: NAT metrics are correlated to system observability. 
Hypothesis 3: 
 H0: There is not a correlation between NAT metrics and system usability. 
 H1: NAT metrics are correlated to system usability. 
Hypothesis 4: 
 H0: Increasing interactive complexity does not decrease system predictability. 
H1: Increasing interactive complexity decreases system predictability. 
Hypothesis 5: 
 H0: Increasing interactive complexity does not decrease system observability. 
 H1: Increasing interactive complexity decreases system observability. 
Hypothesis 6: 
 H0: Increasing interactive complexity does not decrease system usability.  
 H1: Increasing interactive complexity decreases system usability. 
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This research is the first to operationalize NAT for safety-critical embedded 
computer systems.  It develops a methodology for early identification and quantification 
of complexity at the system level.  Figure 1-1 depicts the research importance.  
 
Figure 1-1.  The broadly defined research importance. 
Scope 
The scope of this dissertation is limited to the life cycle stage of requirements, 
because most errors occur at these stages (Davis, 1993) (Lutz, 1996); errors are much less 
costly to correct early rather than later (Davis, 1993) (Nelson et al., 1999); requirement 
errors propagate to cause errors in later life cycle phases (Kelly, Sherif, & Hops, 1992).   
Dissertation Structure 
Chapter 2 presents the research objective of developing a complexity assessment 
methodology for system level requirements of safety-related computer systems.  The 
specific aims to realize this objective are also presented.  Chapter 3 contains a literature 
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survey of related work in the areas of NAT and complexity metrics.  Chapter 4 addresses 
the modeling of system requirements.  Criteria are established for selecting a modeling 
method that is appropriate for safety-related computer systems, and that enable 
measurement of the desired NAT attributes.  Based on these criteria, the Software Cost 
Reduction (SCR) method was selected for modeling system requirements.  The SCR 
method and associated tool set are described.  Chapter 5 presents the complexity metrics 
for NAT as applied in the context of safety-related computer systems.  Chapter 6 
describes the research vehicle:  the Light Control System (LCS), devised by the 
Fraunhofer Institute for Experimental Software Engineering in Germany.  The LCS was 
used as a case study to compare different approaches for requirements elicitation and 
specification.  Chapter 7 presents the research methodology, which uses a cross-over 
design in combination with the Discount Usability Engineering method.  This chapter 
also describes tests involving Human subjects.  They ran numerous PC-based system 
simulations of the LCS.   The data we collected enabled us to measure three dimensions 
of system complexity from the user’s perspective.  Chapter 8 presents the results of these 
tests as well as, the statistical testing of the six research hypotheses.  Chapter 9 discusses 
our interpretations of the data and our statistical test results.  Finally, Chapter 10 provides 
a research summary and discusses three primary conclusions.  
Background 
This section contains relevant background information to orient the reader, provide 
a foundation of basic safety concepts, clarify commonly misunderstood system safety 
concepts, and define key terms used in this dissertation. 
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Safety and Reliability 
Often, safety and reliability are incorrectly equated in the sense that if a system is 
reliable, then it is safe.  Reliability alone is not sufficient for safety.  For example, a 
reliable system may have unsafe functions and conditions, or neglect to provide all safety 
functions.  The result is a reliably unsafe system!   
Safety is "freedom from those conditions that can cause death, injury, occupational 
illness, or damage to or loss of equipment or property, or damage to the environment” 
(DoD, 1997) while reliability is "the probability that a piece of equipment or component 
[of a system] will perform its intended function satisfactorily for a prescribed time and 
under stipulated environmental conditions"(Leveson, 1995), pg 172.  Thus, a system 
could be reliable but unsafe, or a system could be safe but unreliable.  
What is a System? 
One of the first steps of a safety analysis is to define the system.  A conceptual view of a 
system is represented by the SHEL model:  a simple system model comprised of 
(S)oftware, (H)ardware, (E)nvironment and (L)iveware or humans as depicted by Figure 
1-2 (Hawkins, 1993).  This system abstraction is employed by this dissertation. 
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Safety must be from a system viewpoint.  Safety cannot be assured if efforts are 
focused only on part of the system because safety is an emergent property of the entire 
system.  Safety emerges once all subsystems have been integrated.  For example, the 
software can be totally free of “bugs” and employ numerous safety features, yet the 
system can be unsafe because of how the software interacts and operates with the other 
parts of the system.  In other words, the sum may not be as safe as the individual parts.  
The System Safety Approach 
System safety, as defined by the military standard MIL-STD 882D, is "the 
application of engineering and management principles, criteria and techniques to achieve 
acceptable risk, within the constraints of operational effectiveness, time and cost 
throughout all phases of the system life cycle" (DoD, 1997).  System safety received 
much scientific attention during and after World War II.  This was the time when most of 
our traditional safety techniques were developed to address new challenges posed by 
systems that were more complex due to the use of new technology (Leveson, 1995).  The 
traditional "fly-fix-fly" approach to safety did not work well with these complex systems. 
It was too dangerous, costly and wasteful to continue with this "after-the-fact approach", 
so the system safety concept was initiated as a "before-the- fact" process (Roland & 
Moriarity, 1982).  The key concepts are listed: 
1) Integrating safety into the design 
2) Systematic hazard identification and analysis 
3) Addressing the entire system in addition to the subsystems and components 
4) Using qualitative and quantitative approaches  
 
The system safety process is documented in MIL-STD-882, the most widely known 
safety standard.  Existing safety standards are built upon collections of expertise and 
experiences (lessons learned) involving fatalities, injuries and near misses.  In general, 
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standards also provide uniform, systematic approaches.  History has shown that standards 
are effective tools for safety (Leveson, 1992).  Many safety standards have been created. 
The Software Verification Centre of the University of Queensland in Australia has 
compiled an international survey of safety standards (Wabenhorst & Atchison, 1999). 
Hermann (Herrmann, 1999) presents detailed information concerning standards of key 
industrial sectors. 
Hazard Analysis 
Hazard analysis is a key component of the system safety approach.  A hazard is 
"any real or potential condition that can cause injury, illness, or death to personnel or 
damage to or loss of equipment or property, or damage to environment" (DoD, 1997). 
Many techniques, ranging from simple qualitative methods to advanced 
quantitative methods, are available to help identify and analyze hazards.  The System 
Safety Analysis Handbook (System Safety Society, 1997) provides extensive listings and 
descriptions.  Some examples of the more commonly used techniques are the Preliminary 
Hazard List (PHL), Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA), Hazard and Operability Study 
(HAZOP) and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA).  The use of multiple hazard 
analysis techniques is recommended because each has its own purpose, strengths and 
weaknesses.  Typically, each technique addresses certain aspects of safety; thus, one 
technique alone is not sufficient to identify and analyze all hazards of a system. 
To be effective, the hazard analysis process must be applied over the life cycle of 
the system in a continual and iterative manner.  That is, hazard identification and analysis 
must start at the conceptual stage of the system life cycle, when there are easier and less 
costly to address.  Hazard analysis continues on through the definition, development, 
production, and deployment stages.  The systematic approach to safety is captured in the 
Chapter 1: Introduction and Background 
 
 
John J. Sammarco, P.E 
 
1-11 
safety life cycle.  It enables safety to be “designed in” early rather than being addressed 
after the system’s design is completed. 
The Safety Life Cycle 
The use of a safety life cycle is required to ensure that safety is applied in a 
systematic manner, thus reducing the potential for design errors.  The safety life cycle 
concept is applied during the entire life of the system.  Hazards can become evident at 
later stages or new hazards can be introduced by system modifications.  Figure 1-3 
depicts the safety life cycle phases (International  Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), 
1997). 
The safety life cycle must be integrated within the overall product development life 
cycle because safety issues impact overall development issues and vice versa.  Secondly, 
an integrated approach minimizes the likelihood of addressing safety as an afterthought 
of the system design.  An example merging the safety life cycle of Figure 1-3 with the 
development life cycle is shown in Figure 1-4. 
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Figure 1-3.  The safety life cycle (International  Electrotechnical Commission, 1997). 
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Figure 1-4.  A merged safety and development life cycle (Sammarco & Fisher, 2001). 
Note:  PES is a programmable electronic system 
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Faults, Errors, and Failures 
There is confusion concerning faults, errors and failures; often the terms are used 
interchangeably.  Figure 1-5 depicts the relationship between a fault, error, and failure.  
 
Figure 1-5.  Fault, Error, and Failure Relationship. 
A failure is "the termination of the ability of a functional unit to perform a required 
function"(International  Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), 1998).  This definition is 
based on a performance of a function, so failure is a behavior occurring at an instant in 
time.  A fault is an abnormal condition.  Faults are random (hardware) or systematic 
(hardware or software).  Random faults are due to physical wear-out, degradation, or 
defects; random faults can be accurately predicted and quantified.  Systematic faults 
concern the specification, design, and implementation.  Software faults are systematic.  
Faults, both random and systematic, may lead to errors (Storey, 1996). 
An error is a system state that potentially can lead to a failure.  When a fault results 
in an error, the error is then a manifestation of the fault and the fault becomes apparent.  
Not all faults lead to errors or failures.  Some faults are benign or are tolerated such that 
failure does not occur.  Some faults are dormant such that an error state or failure does 
not occur because the proper conditions do not exist.  For example, a fault could reside in 
a section of software.  If that section of software is not used, then neither an error state 
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How Does Software Contribute to Complexity? 
Software is especially prone to complexity because it can be non-deterministic, 
contain numerous branches and interrupts, contain temporal criticality and consist of 
hundreds of thousands of lines of code.  Software does not exhibit random wear out 
failures.  Instead, software failures result from logic or design errors.  
Beizer (Beizer, 1990) gives an example illustrating an aspect of software 
complexity concerning the number of paths for a section of code.  Given that a section of 
software has 2 loops, 4 branches and 8 states, Beizer calculates the number of paths 
through this code to exceed 8000! 
Complexity and Safety 
Simplification is one of the most important design aspects for safety.  Complexity 
makes it more difficult to conceptualize, understand, specify, design, test, document, 
maintain, modify, and review the system.  Complexity also makes it more likely for 
errors, failure, and unplanned interactions to occur that may cause unsafe conditions.  It 
also increases demands on humans to operate and maintain the system.  As a result, 




Complexity:  a) having many varied interrelated parts, patterns, or elements and 
consequently hard to understand fully; b) marked by an involvement of many parts, 
aspects, details, notions and necessitating earnest study or examination to understand or 
cope with (Gove, 1996).  
Coupling:  A measure of the strength of the interconnectedness between system 
components. 
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Error:  A discrepancy between a computed, observed or measured value or condition and 
the true, specified or theoretically correct value or condition (International  
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), 1998). 
Failure:  The termination of the ability of a functional unit to perform a required function 
(International  Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), 1998). 
Fault:  An abnormal condition that may cause a reduction in, or loss of, the capability of 
a functional unit to perform a required function (International  Electrotechnical 
Commission (IEC), 1998). 
Hazard:  Any real or potential condition that can cause injury, illness, or death to 
personnel or damage to or loss of equipment or property, or damage to environment 
(Reason, 1999). 
Interactive complexity:  Complex interactions are those of unfamiliar sequences, or 
unplanned and unexpected sequences and either not visible or immediately 
comprehensible (Perrow, 1999). 
Measure:  A mapping from a set of entities and attributes in the real world to a 
representation or model in the mathematical world (Fenton & Pfleeger, 1997). 
Mistake (Human error):  A human action or inaction that produces an unintended result 
(International  Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), 1998). 
Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA):  A systematic method that includes risk analysis and 
the derivation of risk profiles in order to quantify the outcomes and their probability or 
likelihood (Kumamoto & Henley, 1996). 
Reliability:  Probability that failure time T is greater than operating time t ((Siewiorek, 
1998). 
     R(t) = P(T>t)     (1-1) 
     or  
     R(t) = e -8t      (1-2) 
    for an exponential probability distribution 
    where 8 = failures / (time or natural units) 
Risk:  The combination of the probability of occurrence of harm and the severity of that 
harm (International  Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), 1998). 
Risk assessment:  Assessment of the system or component to establish that the achieved 
risk level is lower than or equal to the tolerable risk level (Welch, 1998). 
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Safety:  Freedom from those conditions that can cause death, injury, occupational illness, 
or damage to or loss of equipment or property, or damage to the environment (Reason, 
1999). 
Safety-critical:  A term that describes any condition, event, operation, process or item of 
whose proper recognition, control, performance or tolerance is essential to safe system 
operation or use; e.g., safety-critical function, safety-critical path, safety-critical 
component (Reason, 1999). 
Software Error:  An incorrect step, process, or data definition; for example, an incorrect 
instruction in a computer program.  
Software Failure:   An event in which a system or system component does not perform a 
required function within specified limits (Welch, 1998). 
Software Fault:  A manifestation of an error in the software.  If encountered, a failure 
might result (Welch, 1998). 
Software Reliability:  The probability that software will not cause the failure of a system 
for a specified time under specified conditions.  The probability is a function of the inputs 
to and use of, the system as well as a function of the existence of faults in the software. 
The inputs to the system determine whether existing faults, if any, are encountered 
(Welch, 1998). 
Subsystem:  An element of the system that itself may be a system (Reason, 1999). 
System:  A collection of hardware, software, humans and machines interconnected to 
perform desired functions. 
System accident:  The unintended interaction of multiple failures in a tightly coupled 
system that allows cascading of the failures beyond the original failures (Perrow, 1999). 
System reliability:  The probability that a system, including all hardware and software 
subsystems, will perform a required task or mission for a specified time in a specified 
operational environment (Welch, 1998). 
System safety:  The application of engineering and management principles, criteria and 
techniques to achieve acceptable risk, within the constraints of operational effectiveness, 
time and cost throughout all phases of the system life cycle (Reason, 1999). 
Summary 
Escalating computer technology utilization is resulting in complex systems 
containing new types of hazards having the potential to result in accidents.  The 
complexity of these systems makes it more likely for errors, failure and unplanned 
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interactions that can cause accidents.  The generalized problem is that the nature of 
accidents has changed for complex, computer-controlled systems; however, our 
assessment methods have remained unchanged since their inception during World War II; 
thus, another approach as needed.  Our research is a first step to address this need by 
developing a methodology to assess and quantify NAT complexity at the system level. 
Finally, relevant background information was presented to provided a foundation of 
basic safety concepts, clarify commonly misunderstood relationships, and introduce 
terminology in order to provide a common understanding and enable effective 
communication. 
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CHAPTER 2 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVE AND SPECIFIC AIMS 
Our ability to understand and manage the complexities of computer-based systems 
has not kept pace with the technology=s utilization.  We are ill-equipped because a 
scientific methodology does not exist to identify and quantify the most important 
attributes of complexity that impact the safety of these systems.  As a result, computer-
related accidents causing mission failures, harm to the environment, injuries, and 
fatalities have occurred.  Neumann (Neumann, 1995) documented over 400 computer-
related accidents and MacKenzie determined that about 2000 deaths were computer-
related (MacKenzie, 1994).  
Accidents resulting from system complexity are explained by Normal Accident 
Theory (NAT).  This theory has much support (Leveson, 2000; Mellor, 1994; Rushby, 
1994; Sagan, 1993); however, only Wolf has operationalized NAT.  His research (Wolf 
2000) is specific to petroleum refining processes. 
Our research is a first step that operationalizes NAT for the requirements phase.  It 
is a step that transfers theory to practice by establishing concrete, quantifiable 
system-level complexity metrics so that complexities impacting safety can be identified 
and reduced before they are propagated to other development phases.  The ability to 
quantify complexity is extremely important. As Lord Kelvin stated: 
When you can measure what you are speaking about, and express it in numbers, 
you know something about it; but when you cannot measure it, when you cannot 
express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meager and unsatisfactory kind:  it 
may be the beginning of knowledge, but you have scarcely, in your thoughts, 
advanced it to the stage of understanding (William Thomson (Lord Kelvin), 1889). 
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Research Objective 
To develop a complexity assessment methodology for system requirements of safety-
related computer systems by operationalizing Normal Accident Theory (NAT). 
Specific Aims 
1. Identify the NAT attributes to operationalize with respect to system requirements.  
2. Identify a formal modeling method for system requirements that will afford 
quantification of the potential metrics. 
3. Identify potential metrics for each NAT attribute to be operationalized.  At least 
one metric, and ideally four metrics, should be identified for each of these NAT 
attributes. 
4. Determine which, if any of the potential metrics are useful measures or indicators 
of NAT complexity. 
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CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter discusses previous work in Normal Accident Theory (NAT) and 
complexity metrics, critiques the limitations and inadequacies of this research, and draws 
distinctions between prior work and the proposed research. 
Normal Accident Theory  
Perrow, an organizational theorist, is the originator of NAT.  His work began in 
1979 when he was advising a presidential commission investigating the accident at Three 
Mile Island. Basically, Perrow identified system complexity as the primary accident 
cause and identified system complexity attributes.  A system accident, as defined by 
Perrow, involves the unintended interaction of multiple failures in a tightly coupled 
system that allows a cascading of failures.  He concluded that these accident types were 
built-in or inevitable with complex, high technological systems; Perrow stated these 
accidents were a Anormal” occurrence because of complexity; hence, the theory was 
named Normal Accident Theory.  This theory identifies two important system 
characteristics, tight coupling and interactive complexity, make complex software driven 
systems especially prone to system accidents (Perrow, 1999).  Tables 3-1 and 3-2, 
respectively, list the system attributes for interactive complexity and tight coupling.   
Interactively complex systems have the potential to generate many nonlinear branching 
paths among subsystems.  These interactions can be unexpected, unplanned, 
incomprehensible, and unperceivable to system designers or system users.  Therefore, 
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abnormal outcomes are more likely and human interventions are less likely to mitigate 
the abnormal outcomes.  
Coupling is a measure of the strength of the interconnectedness between system 
components.  Tightly coupled systems have little or no slack; thus, they rapidly respond 
to and propagate perturbations such that operators do not have the time or ability to 
determine what is wrong.  As a result, human intervention is unlikely or improper. 
Table 3-1.  Tight Coupling Attributes  
Tight Coupling Attributes Comments 
Time-dependency Less tolerant of delays 
Sequences Invariant sequences 
Flexibility Equifinality or limited ways to reach the goal or 
implement a function  
Slack Little or no slack in system structure or behavior 
Substitutions Limited substitutions of system components, units, 
or subsystems. 
 
Table 3-2.  Interactive Complexity Attributes 
Complex System Attributes Comments 
Proximity Close proximity of physical components or process 
steps, less underutilized space 
Common-mode connections Many common-mode connections  
Interconnected subsystems Many interconnections 
Substitutions Limited substitutions of people, hardware, or 
software; exacting requirements 
Feedback loops Unfamiliar or unintended feedback loops 
Control parameters Multiple and interacting control parameters 
Information quality Indirect, inferential, or incomplete information 
Understanding of system 
structure and behavior 
Limited, incomplete, or incorrect understanding. 
 
Normal Accident Theory Limitations 
Perrow=s complexity theory has made inroads with notable computer science 
researchers (Leveson, 1995; Ladkin, 1996) although it is based in organizational theory.  
However, there are opportunities to refine and extend Perrow's work.  These 
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opportunities address the needs for complexity quantification, consideration of multiple 
perspectives, and rigorous scientific validation.  Also, Perrow acknowledges that the 
theory has not been extended to computer technology.  He states, "The metaphor of an 
accident residing in the complexity and coupling of the system itself, not in the failures of 
its components has seeped into many areas where I never thought to apply it.  I have 
listed these in Figure A.1  . . .” (Perrow, 1999; pg 354).  His figure lists software as a 
neglected or new area to consider. 
Quantification 
Hopkins (Hopkins, 1999) cites Aill-defined concepts@ and Athe absence of criteria 
for measuring complexity and coupling@ as significant limitations.  Kates notes the same 
limitations and stated, Athe absence of clear criteria for measuring complexity and 
coupling makes his [Perrow’s] examples seem anecdotal, inconsistent, and subjective 
(Kates, 1986).  Quantitative measures of interactive complexity and coupling would 
address these limitations and could serve to promote the theory.  
Linear and complex systems 
Perrow uses linear systems as a contrast to complex systems.  The opposite of a 
complex system is a simple system.  Simplification is very important for eliminating or 
reducing hazards. Leveson supports this by writing:  "One of the most important aspects 
of safe design is simplicity.  A simple design tends to minimize the number of parts, 
functional modes, and interfaces, and it has a small number of unknowns in terms of 
interactions with the system and with system operation." (Leveson, 1995; pg 405).  
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NAT does not address multiple projections (perspectives).  Complexity is 
multidimensional so, incorporating multiple projections could give added insight to the 
complexity problem.  
The perspectives of the system designers and users are important.  For example, 
consider a system with two operational modes, automatic and manual.  The user switches 
the system from the automatic mode to manual mode to clear "jammed" material from the 
system.  When placing the system back to automatic mode, the system resumes operation 
from its prior state in automatic mode.  As a result, the person is injured by rotating 
system components.  This is a system accident from the user's perspective because the 
system=s actions were unexpected and unplanned.  The actions did not fit the user=s 
mental model of operation.  The user expected and planned to have the system resume 
from the last state in manual mode, not the last state in automatic mode.  From the 
designer's perspective, there was no fault of the system because it behaved exactly as it 
was designed.  The designer's perspective is that the problem was operator error.  
Another perspective, possibly of management, is that the problem was human error, and 
more and better training is needed. 
Limited rigorous validation 
Perrow validated his theory with a wide variety of illustrative examples from 
chemical processing, aviation, marine transport, military defense systems, mining, and 
space missions.  Sagan validated the theory using case studies from nuclear weapon 
systems.  Wolf empirically validated the theory using a combination of quantitative and 
qualitative techniques. 
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Sagan conducted research to validate NAT by using case studies derived from 
nuclear weapon safety; the primary test case concerned the Cuban missile crisis of 
October 1962.  Sagan acknowledged that "the study of the commanding control of U.S. 
nuclear weapons and potential of accidental nuclear war is a tough test for the NAT" 
(Sagan, 1993 pg 49).  "In short the study is a tough test for the Normal Accident Theory.  
If the NAT does well here, it will be shown to be even stronger than previously 
estimated" (Sagan, 1993; pg 51).  Sagan concluded that there is strong support for NAT, 
a view counter to his initial beliefs. 
Wolf (Wolf, 2000) researched the validity and application of Perrow's theory to 
petroleum refineries.  These are high-risk technical systems having a high degree of 
process control.  Wolf defined a refinery system as a hierarchy of system units, links, and 
nodes.  Refinery complexity depends on the number of unit processes, links, and nodes. 
Links are the systems pipes that carry raw material, byproducts, final product, and 
wastes.  Nodes are points of connection and interconnection between unit processes and 
links.  They are also the points for control and monitoring of parameters such as flow, 
pressure, and temperature. 
At the system level, refineries employ three types of manufacturing processes: 
continuous, semi-continuous, and batch.  At the unit level, up to 15 distinct processes and 
a multitude of process technologies can exist. 
Wolf's empirical validation utilized a hybrid of quantified and qualified measures 
for a research sample of 36 petroleum refineries operating from 1992 to 1997.  He created 
a "refinery-specific" index of complexity based on refinery process knowledge.  This 
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index served to quantify and estimate the interactive complexity for a refinery.  The index 
of complexity was calculated using the following formula (Wolf, 2000) pg. 65: 
    Ciplant = 












== = = =










11 1 1 1  (3-1) 
where 
  Ciplant = Refinery complexity 
  n = Number of refinery unit processes 
  m = Number of nodes at process i 
  r = Number of parameters at node j 
  Qijk = Number of possible states of parameter k at node j for  
    process i 
  Qij = Number of possible states of all parameters at node j for  
    process i 
             Ci =  Number of possible states of all parameters of all nodes for  
    process i 
 
Ciplant is the index of complexity representing the maximum number of states in 
which the system could exist.  Thus Ciplant is an index of complexity useful for relative 
ranking of refineries with respect to complexity.  
The second component of Perrow's theory is coupling.  Wolf classified coupling 
based on a classification of the manufacturing process.  Continuous processes are more 
tightly coupled because they are generally invariant, time dependent, highly sequential, 
and have little slack.  Semi-continuous and batch processes are more flexible in terms of 
timing and sequencing so they are classified as less tightly coupled. 
Wolf's conclusions support the validity of Perrow's theory.  Refineries 
characterized by high complexity and tight coupling had more occurrences of accidental 
releases of hazardous materials and more fires and explosions.  However, two limitations 
are evident in this research.  
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First, the work is specific to refineries.  Thus the quantification measure, index of 
complexity, is not generalized to other applications, thus limiting its utilization across 
various application domains.  Second, his work is limited to a narrow application domain. 
Wolf validates Perrow’s theory for a special set of accidents encountered by refineries: 
untoward releases of hazardous material, fires, and explosions.  These are typically 
encountered in the refinery sector, further illustrating the limitation of his highly 
specialized research. 
Sharit (Sharit, 2000), another researcher utilizing NAT, developed a risk modeling 
framework incorporating NAT.  The model is used to identify system risks, potential 
human errors, and affords a better understanding of complex systems.  Sharit modeled an 
emergency health care system.  We differ with Sharit's view of complexity. 
He states "What determines a system's interactive complexity - and establishes 
whether it is complex or linear - is the presence of a number of system features or 
attributes" (Note: italics added for emphasis.)  Sharit is referring to the interactive 
complexity attributes listed in Table 3-1.  His statement infers the quantity of system 
features or attributes alone determines complexity; therefore, quantity determines 
complexity and all features or attributes have an equal contribution.  This view is 
analogous to counting lines of code to determine complexity.  Secondly, it infers that a 
single number can characterize the multiple dimensions of complexity.  
This research does not agree with these inferences and will address the following 
questions.  Do all attributes contribute equally to system complexity, and if not, which 
attributes contribute the most to complexity?  Secondly, this research quantifies 
complexity in multiple dimensions. 
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 Complexity Metrics 
The use of software complexity measures began in the 1970's as a tool to address 
rising costs of software development.  Software maintenance costs were up to 80 percent 
of software development costs.  Complex software was recognized to be harder and 
costlier to maintain.  Today, research in software measurement continues to be quite 
active.  Software complexity measures have broadened their applicability to predict 
testing costs, development time and effort, numbers of errors, and numerous quality 
attributes.  As the application scope has broadened, the number of complexity measures 
has mushroomed; Zuse (Zuse, 1991) characterizes 98 complexity measures. 
Ince (Ince, 1985) describes three categories of software complexity measures: 
lexemical counts, graph theoretical, and system design structure.  Adding the category of 
integrated results in the four categories described as follows: 
5. Lexemical counts:  Count the key language entities such as keywords and 
operators. 
6. Graph theoretical:  Graph based control models of the system are created and key 
graphic characteristics such cyclomatic complexity are calculated. 
7. System design structure:  The structure is defined in terms of internal and external 
coupling of subsystems and modules.  Internal coupling of modules is named 
cohesion or strength.  Highly cohesive modules are desirable because behavior is 
localized.  The external relationship among modules is called coupling.  Loose 
coupling gives a high degree of isolation which minimizes the interdependency of 
modules. 
8. Integrated:  Integrated metrics synthesize existing metrics as a multi-metric 
composite. 
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Lexemical counts  
The best known lexemical counts are Halstead's metrics, Table 3-3, and lines of 
code (LOC).  Halstead's metrics are based on the measurement of two parameters, 
operators and operands, where: 
n1 = number of unique or distinct operators 
N1 = total usage of all operators  
n2 = number of unique or distinct operands 
N2 = total usage of all operands. 
 
Table 3-3.  Halstead metrics. 
Metric  Formula 
Program length N = N1 + N2 
Program vocabulary N = n1 + n2 
Volume V = N * (LOG2 n) 
Difficulty D = (n1/2) * (N2/n2) 
Effort E = D * V 
 
 
Weaknesses in Halstead's metric are listed (Beizer, 1990): 
 
1. Halstead's metric depends on completed code. 
2. The metric ignores nested loops. 
3. Operators and operands are treated equally. 
4. There is no differentiation of operator types (i.e. if-then-else is counted the same as 
do-while even though, in general, loops are problematic). 
 
LOC, as the name implies, is a count of the lines of code.  This metric is fraught 
with problems such as what constitutes a line for counting (i.e., are comment lines 
counted?), programming language and style dependencies, and the erroneous notion that 
size and complexity have a causal relationship. 
Graph theoretical  
McCabe's cyclomatic complexity metric (McCabe, 1976) is one of the best known 
graph theoretical metrics.  Cyclomatic complexity is a measure of the number of 
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independent control paths for a software program.  As a general rule, if the complexity is 
greater than 10, redesign should be considered.  This metric is calculated as:  
 V (g) = e - n +2         (3-2) 
where:  
 e = number of edges 
 n = number of nodes 
 




∑ (g)n          (3-3) 
Cyclomatic complexity was extended by Vakil to examine and identify system 
mode transition complexities for a commercial aircraft auto-flight system (Vakil, 2000). 
He developed a “Hybrid Automation Representation” to model the mode transitions of an 
auto-flight system.  Cyclomatic complexity was used to analyze the mode transitions of 
this complex system.  Vakil found a correlation between mode transitions having high 
cyclomatic complexity and the apparent complexity, as identified from the perspective of 
pilots. 
McCabe's metric is not devoid of weaknesses (Beizer, 1990) (Fenton & Pfleeger, 
1997).  First, it assumes a linear relationship of total complexity because the complexity 
of each part is summed.  This effectively underestimates complexity because complexity 
increases nonlinearly (Beizer, 1990).  It also has a weakness concerning compound 
predicates.  Treating a compound predicate as a single construct yields a lower 
complexity number compared to separating it as series of constructs.    
System design structure  
Henry and Kafura's fan-in and fan-out metric and various coupling metrics are 
based on design structure.  Henry and Kafura's metric is based on the program dimension 
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of data flow where complexity is a function of fan-in and fan-out.  The complexity is 
calculated as follows:  
Information flow complexity M = L (fan-in x fan-out) 2   (3-4) 
 
where: 
 L = program length (McCabe's metric or LOC can be used) 
 Fan-in = number of calls into a module plus the number of data structures   
 retrieved by the module 
 Fan-out = number of calls out of a module plus the number of data structures  
 updated by the module 
 
The results from this metric can be quite misleading.  For instance, if either fan-in 
or fan-out is zero, then the complexity calculation result is zero.  Similarly, if a group of 
simple modules has high reuse, fan-in and fan-out would be quite large; thus, the program 
complexity calculation becomes quite high even though the overall program is simple.  
Other problems with this metric are detailed in a study by Shepard (McDermid, 
1990).  As a result of this study, a hybrid metric was created to overcome numerous 
problems with Henry and Kafura's original metric.  The hybrid metric, called Shepperd 
complexity is calculated as Shepperd complexity (M) = (fan-in x fan-out) 2. 
However, the results from this metric can also be quite misleading.  If either fan-in 
or fan-out is zero, then the complexity calculation result is zero. 
Coupling metrics 
Coupling metrics measure the degree of connectivity between the parts of the 
system.  Coupling contributes to complexity thus low coupling is desirable to reduce the 
likelihood of error propagation, facilitate comprehension, and reduce the likelihood that 
changes in one part of the system do not affect the other parts of the system. 
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Myers views coupling as a measure of independence or modularity (Myers, 1974). 
He defined six types of coupling and ordered them into a coupling scale.  The scale, from 
lowest to highest coupling, is data coupling (best), stamp coupling, control coupling, 
external coupling, common coupling, and content coupling (worst). 
Offutt et al. extended Myers work by quantifying coupling, increasing the scale 
granularity from six levels to 12, and by measuring coupling in various configurations 
(Offutt, Harrold, & Kolte, 1993).  Coupling could be measured between pairs of modules, 
from a key module to all other modules, and for the entire system.  Secondly, they 
addressed limitations of other metrics work by considering bi-directional coupling, and 
by giving prescriptive definitions for each coupling level.  
Although Offutt et al. have 12 levels of coupling, none of these the coupling 
attributes of NAT.  Secondly, the metrics work presented is for the subsystem of 
software; thus, additional research is needed for system-level metrics addressing NAT. 
Integrated complexity metrics  
Integrated complexity metrics synthesize existing metrics into multi-metric 
composites.  Coskun (Coskun & Grabowski, 2001) addressed the challenges of modeling 
and measuring complexity by using an integrated metrics approach.  Coskun's research 
targets embedded real-time systems for large-scale safety critical host systems.  For these 
systems, safety and reliability are obviously important.  
Coskun's approach utilizes an interdisciplinary complexity model encompassing six 
domains; from this complexity model, four types of complexity are measured.  The 
model utilizes the domains of mathematics, computer science, economics, psychology 
and cognitive sciences, social science, and system science.  For instance, the 
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mathematical domain includes Halstead's metric and McCabe's cyclomatic complexity; 
the economic approach includes metrics of resource consumption; the social sciences 
domain includes NAT. 
The metrics from these domains have different views, objectives, and measures. 
The multiple views afforded by the interdisciplinary approach are desirable because a 
single view can not capture an entire problem space.  The multiple objectives, and 
associated measures to realize these objectives, are somewhat problematic given the 
application to large-scale safety critical host systems where safety and reliability are very 
important as stated by the authors.  Specifically, some of the metrics don not apply to 
safety or reliability; these metrics address quality and cost objectives. 
Coskun’s research identifies four types of complexity:  architectural/ structural 
complexity, data processing/ reasoning/ functional complexity, user interface complexity, 
and decision support/ explanation complexity.  It is quite desirable to define and measure 
multiple types of complexity because a single measure can not capture the notion of 
complexity.  The four complexity types are related to various software layers; hence, 
Coskun's research does not address complexity at the system level.  Software metrics 
alone are not sufficient to address safety or reliability because these are emerging 
properties of the system. 
Complexity metric's limited success  
Although there is a plethora of complexity measures, there have been limited 
successes.  McDermid (McDermid, 1990) confirms this stating: 
Complexity is both a major problem and an enigma, as there are no easy and 
effective ways of measuring it. ... There has been a lot of work on software 
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complexity measures, but it is widely accepted that these are not adequate and in 
many cases are misleading... 
There are numerous reasons for the limited success of metrics; some reasons 
concern weaknesses that have been described in the previous sections.  Others provide 
more insight. 
Fenton’s (Fenton, 1994) analysis of software measurement identifies a fundamental 
flaw; most measurements lack a basis in measurement theory.  T. Capers Jones (Jones & 
Vouk, 1990) addresses inaccurate metrics.  He cites the root cause of inaccurate metrics 
as “the widespread tendency to use concepts without examining their validity.”  Existing 
metrics measure what we understand and what we are able to measure.  Also, much 
metric research has insufficient validation.  
While these criticisms of complexity measures may be valid, there is a much 
broader flaw:  many complexity measures exist for the subsystem of software, but they do 
not address the level of the entire system.  Software does not have physical properties and 
therefore by itself is not hazardous.  Also, each subsystem can be quite simple, but the 
interconnections among the software, hardware, and environment could result in a very 
complex system.  Hence, complexity must be addressed at the system level.  
Summary  
This literature review reinforces the validity of NAT but indicates the absence of 
research for the safety-critical system domain and scientific rigor, and it points out the 
limitations and inadequacies of metrics research.  
A review of work by Perrow, Sagan, and Wolf confirmed the validity of NAT. 
Perrow originated the theory and validated it with illustrative examples from chemical 
manufacturing, aviation, marine transport, military defense systems, mining, and space 
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missions.  His illustrative validation methodology is a weakness because it lacks the rigor 
of scientific quantification.  Sagan validated the theory using case studies of nuclear 
weapon systems.  Wolf's empirical research has the strongest scientific support; however, 
this research is limited to the petroleum process industry domain, so the metrics do not 
adequately transfer to the safety-critical systems domain.  A significant weakness of 
Wolf’s metrics concerns the coarse granularity of coupling metrics where the degree of 
coupling is assigned based upon the total manufacturing process. 
Finally, a review of the most common complexity metrics is given for the 
following categories: 
1.  Leximical counts:  Halstead’s metrics, LOC 
2.  Graph theoretical:  McCabe’s cyclomatic complexity 
3.  System design structure:  Henry and Kafura’s fan-in and fan-out, Shepperd      
complexity 
4.  Integrated metrics:  Coskun’s interdisciplinary complexity   
This review describes numerous problems with metrics that include measurement 
ambiguities, potentially misleading results, lack of a measurement theory basis, and the 
tendency to use concepts without validation.  Additionally, these metrics do not directly 
address interactive complexity and coupling in terms of NAT, and these metrics pertain 
to the software subsystem; thus, they don't address the complexity of the system.  
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SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS MODELING 
The objective of this chapter is to select a method to model system functional 
requirements for safety critical embedded systems such that the model abstraction 
enables direct or indirect measurement of NAT complexity.  A well-defined system 
model is critical if meaningful metrics are to be developed. 
Twelve criteria were established to help guide the selection of a modeling method. 
The selected modeling method, named Software Cost Reduction (SCR), is described 
along with its associated tool set. 
System Models 
A model is useful for abstracting a real-world entity or process so that only the 
features or characteristics of interest are shown.  Models are useful for understanding; 
they can reduce complexities by removing extraneous aspects and can afford different 
projections or viewpoints.  This becomes especially useful for complex systems because 
these systems are often multidimensional.  A complex system can Alook@ different 
depending on the dimension captured by the projection.  For instance, viewpoints can 
capture structural or behavioral aspects, or they can capture a user's perspective by 
modeling human interactions with the system.  There are numerous types of models; 
some argue that there are too many modeling approaches.  One reason for so many 
models is that each has different strengths, weaknesses, and capabilities; different types 
of models are needed to investigate different aspects of an entity or process. 








In the context of this work, the system model needs to enable direct or indirect 
measurement of the NAT attributes captured by the system requirements.  Generally, 
system requirements define Awhat@ the system does − the system’s behavior.  Design 
requirements and specifications define the Ahow@ − the system=s structure. 
System behavioral requirements, also called functional or operational requirements, 
specify the system inputs (stimuli), the system outputs (responses), and the behavioral 
relationships between the inputs and outputs.  Nonfunctional requirements impose 
various resource, timing, and performance constraints. 
Thus, a model must be constructed with a specific purpose or objective in mind. 
Selecting a model suitable for one=s objectives can be a time-consuming task given the 
plethora of modeling types, methods, and tools.  To simplify the selection of a model for 
our research, we limit the modeling to the system requirements phase and establish 
criteria for modeling safety critical embedded systems. 
Overview of Model Types, Methods, and Tools 
Requirements models can be categorized by three types:  natural language, semi-
formal, and formal (Loucopoulos & Karakostas, 1995).  Natural language is very flexible 
but it is very difficult to precisely define the system because of language ambiguities.  
Semiformal models include diagrams and tables.  These have fewer ambiguities and 
interpretations.  Formal methods are very exacting and have a rigorous mathematical 
foundation. 
A categorization of functional requirements modeling and analysis is depicted in 
Figure 4-1 (Easterbrook, 2001) where the most well-known semiformal and formal 
methods for functional requirements modeling. 
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Figure 4-1.  An overview of requirements modeling methods. Source:  Adapted and 
extended from Easterbrook, 2001. 
Requirements Modeling Criteria 
Models have different strengths, weaknesses, and purposes; different types of 
models are needed to investigate different aspects of an entity or process (Easterbrook, 
2001).  Therefore, criteria are established for selecting a modeling method that is 
consistent with the objectives and delimitations of this dissertation.  The criteria guide the 
selection of an appropriate modeling method and are not utilized as a means to determine 
the optimal modeling method for the research. 
Specific Criteria 
• Abstraction Level:  The model must be applicable to the level of the system not just 
the subsystem of software, because safety and complexity are emergent properties 
of the entire system. 
• Availability:  The modeling technique and associated tools should be widely 
available to researchers and practitioners. 
• Learning Curve:  It should be relatively easy to learn so that resources can focus on 
the research and not learning the method and tools. 
• Life cycle phase:  The modeling technique and associated tools must be applicable 
to the requirements phase. 








• Projection:  The projection needs to capture the end-user’s viewpoint in order to 
investigate the externally visible behavior of the system. 
• Time:  Often, safety-critical embedded systems are real-time, so the model should 
be able to incorporate timing constraints. 
• Real-world applicability:  The model should be of Aindustrial@ strength so that it 
can handle the complexity and size of real-world problems as evidenced by a 
history of real-world utilization. 
• Safety:  Undesirable or unexpected system behavior can create a hazard.  This type 
of behavior can occur during normal system operation or abnormal conditions. 
System accidents can occur when the end-user improperly responds to or fails to 
respond to normal or abnormal conditions.  Therefore, the model must be able to 
model behavior for normal and abnormal conditions.  
• Simulation:  Capabilities should exist to interactively execute the specification. 
This interaction should be available to the model developer for analysis purposes, 
and to enable human interaction with the system.  
• System Type:  The model must be applicable to safety-critical embedded systems. 
Often, these systems are reactive, so the model must capture the system=s behavior 
to external stimuli from the environment and liveware. 
• Tools:  The model should have tools, preferably computer-based, to support the 
creation, modification and analysis of the model.  
• User-interface support:  The model=s tools should support extensions for a 
graphical user-interface to enable end-user interaction with the system. 
Of the methods depicted by Figure 4-1, only unified modeling language (UML) and 
SCR were able to meet most of these criteria.  UML is a well-known language for object-
oriented analysis and design.  UML was not selected because it did not meet the “learning 
curve” criterion concerning the ease of learning.  As whole, UML is complex.  The UML 
1.3 specification has over 800 pages and UML has numerous modeling diagrams: 
• Use case diagrams 
• Class diagrams 
• Sequence diagrams 
• Component diagrams 
• Statechart diagrams 
• Collaboration diagrams 








UML also has several limitations (Glinz, 2000) concerning use case diagrams.  
These diagrams are used in the early requirements stages to describe how the system 
interacts with the external actors.  Lastly, UML does have commercially available tools; 
however, these tools are not free as is the SCR set of tools.  Although UML has several 
limitations, this does not infer that UML is unsuitable to model system requirements; all 
modeling languages have some limitations.  UML models have been successfully used to 
analyze software quality and architectural risks (Yacoub, Ammar, & Mili, 2000). 
The SCR method was chosen because of the Navel Research Laboratory’s (NRL) 
interest in this research and their willingness to give access to SCR knowledge, 
experience, and SCR tools at no cost. 
Software Cost Reduction (SCR) for Requirements 
SCR was originally used for documenting and specifying the functional 
requirements of the A-7-E aircraft's Operational Flight Program (Queins et al., 2000). 
SCR is a powerful method for the formal specification, analysis, and validation of 
complex, embedded systems for a variety of systems including telephone networks, 
avionics, safety-critical control systems for nuclear power plants, and the International 
Space Station.  During the mid 1990's, SCR was extended from software requirements to 
system requirements; these extensions included the incorporation of nonfunctional 
requirements such as timing and accuracy constraints.  Additionally, NRL developed 
support for integrated tools called the SCR* tool set.  
The SCR method formalizes functional behavior as mathematical relations.  These 
relations are part of the Parnas Four-Variable Model.  This is a model of requirements 
that is essentially a black box view of system inputs, outputs, and external behavior; thus, 








the model captures the required external behavior, devoid of implementation or structural 
aspects of the design.  SCR also employs tables with a relatively simple formal notation 
to define mathematical functions; hence, SCR tables facilitate industry utilization because 
the tables and the notation are easily created and understood (Heninger, Parnas, Shore, & 
Kallander, 1978).  
SCR Four-Variable Model 
The Four-Variable Model partitions a system into four elements:  the environment, 
input devices, software, and output devices.  The model's projection captures 
synchronous behavior, as viewed externally, and hardware/software interfaces to the 
environment.  The external behavior is from the perspective of the user, although the 
model does not explicitly depict the user as part of the system as in the SHEL model.  
Because, in the context of this work, complexities are from the user's perspective, we 
extend the Parnas Four-Variable Model to include the liveware element of the SHEL 
model.  This model extension is depicted by Figure 4-2. 
 
 
Figure 4-2.  The SCR Four-Variable Model extended to incorporate the SHEL model 








The required behavior is formalized by the Four-Variable Model as follows (Heninger et 
al., 1978): 
The Four-Variable Model  . . .  describes the required system behavior, including 
the required timing and accuracy, as a set of mathematical relations on four sets of 
variablesCmonitored and controlled variables and input and output data items.  A 
monitored variable represents an environmental quantity that influences system 
behavior, a controlled variable [is] an environmental quantity that the system 
controls.  A black-box specification of required behavior is given as two relations, 
REQ and NAT, from the monitored to the controlled quantities.  NAT, which 
defines the set of possible values, describes the natural constraints on the 
system behavior, such as constraints imposed by physical laws and the 
system environment.  REQ defines additional constraints on the system to 
be built as relations the system must maintain between the monitored and 
the controlled quantities. 
 
In the Four-Variable Model, input devices (e.g., sensors) measure the 
monitored quantities and output devices set the controlled quantities; 
input and output data items represent the values that the devices read and 
write.  
 
SCR represents monitored and controlled quantities as variables.  The dependent 
variables are the controlled variables, mode classes, and terms; the independent variable 
is the monitored variable.  
To summarize the flow through the Four-Variable Model, monitored and controlled 
quantities are within the environment=s domain; input devices transform monitored 
quantities to input data that are represented by SCR models as monitored variables; 
output devices transform output data, represented by SCR models as controlled variables, 
such that the controlled quantities are manipulated. 








The system's behavioral requirements are defined by the NAT and REQ relations 
for ideal behavior.  These relations can be extended to non-ideal behavior encountered in 
the real world.  Non-ideal behavior specifies the response to undesired events.  Sources 
for non-ideal behavior include hardware malfunctions or incorrect human interactions 
with the system.  The non-ideal behavior combined with the ideal behavior is defined by 
the NAT  relation. 
SCR Terminology and Notation 
The basic concepts of SCR have been presented.  SCR terminology and notation 
(Heitmeyer, 1996) is presented in order to establish a common understanding of SCR 
specifications. 
Condition:  A condition c is a logical expression for an input or output variable, mode, or 
term.  Conditions may be simple or compound. 
Condition Table:  This table defines a given controlled variable or term as a function of 
the possible modes and associated conditions for each mode.  Thus, it defines the value of 
controlled variables or terms for all conditions. 
Event:  An event e is an instance in time when a mode, term, or variable changes value. 
For instance, an input event occurs when a monitored quantity changes; an output event 
occurs when a controlled quantity changes. 
 e = @T(c); a basic event where condition c changes to true  
 e = @F(c) = @T(¬c); a basic event where condition c changes to false  
 e = @T(c) WHEN d = a v aN; an event where a = next state, aN = old state 
 
Event Table:  This table defines a given controlled variable or term as a function of the 
possible modes and associated events for each mode.  Thus, it defines the response of 
controlled variables or terms to input events. 
Mode:  A state of the environment as represented by monitored variables. 
Mode Class:  A type of deterministic synchronous finite state machine comprised of 
modes that partition the state of the environment.   Complex systems have multiple mode 
classes operating in parallel. 








Mode Transition Table:  A "state table" consisting of “source modes" (present state), 
"destination modes" (next state), and events that cause a transition.  Each row of this 
table is disjoint. 
System: A system 3 is a 4-tuple 
 
  3= (Em, S, s0, T)         (4-1) 
where: 
 Em =  set of input events, 
 S =   set of system states, 
 s0 =  set of initial states where s0 f S 
 T =   the system transform 
 
Term:  An internal variable defined by the SCR user.  A term's value is defined by 
condition and event tables.  A frequently used expression can be assigned to a term to 
simplify an SCR specification. 
SCR Requirements Specification  
Requirements are commonly conveyed and documented by a requirements 
definition document written in prose.  The SCR methodology translates this prose into a 
formal SCR specification.  The major components of an SCR specification are depicted 
by Figure 4-3.  The SCR specification consists of three tables, five dictionaries, and 
miscellaneous information. 
 
Figure 4-3.  The elements of an SCR specification. 
SCR specifications use condition, event, and mode transition tables to define 
functions.  The dictionaries define variables, types, constants, mode classes, and 








assertions.  Scenarios are composed of input event sequences and are used for simulation 
purposes.  Assertions define properties that must hold for the system.  Typically, these 
are safety and security properties. 
Time and performance constraints can be incorporated into the SCR specification 
(Heitmeyer, 1996).  Time is represented by a monitored variable and is a non-negative 
integer initialized to zero. 
SCR*toolset  
The NRL created the SCR*toolset (Maurer, 2000) to support the SCR 
methodology.  The tool set is an integrated suite of CASE tools publicly available from 
NRL.  The tool set has found relatively widespread use; it has been installed at over 100 
organizations in industry, government, and academia, according to Heitmeyer (personal 
communication, 2000). 
The components of the SCR*toolset are shown in figure 4-4.  This figure also 
depicts the basic process of using the tool set to translate a requirements specification to 
an SCR specification, analyze the specification, and validate the external behavior by 
simulation.  










Figure 4-4.  The SCR tools integrated with the various steps to analyze and validate   
system requirements. 
The editor tool is used to create, view, and modify an SCR specification.  Analysis 
of the specification is done with consistency checking and model checking tools.  The 
consistency checking tool is used to identify specification ambiguities, including 
incompleteness or inconsistencies, and also problems with syntax, types, and circular 
dependencies.  Model checking is used for verification of the specification and properties. 
The simulator tool is used to create a graphical user interface (GUI) and to run a 
simulation.  The simulator is also used to validate the requirements and system 
properties. 








A second type of analysis is possible by utilizing SCR visualization tools.  The 
dependency graph browser, Figure 4-5, displays the dependencies between SCR model 
variables (the controlled and monitored variables, modes, and terms) and gives a 
graphical overview of the specification.  It also provides a mapping of controlled 
variables to monitored variables.  The graph depicts each SCR variable as a node; a 
dependency between nodes is represented by an arrow where the variable’s value at the 
tail depends on its value at the head of the arrow. 
A second graph is called the mode transition graph which is much like a state 
transition diagram.  A mode transition graph exists for each mode class.  
The vertices or nodes represent modes and the directed arcs represent transitions. 
Figure 4-6 shows an example mode transition graph, comprised of the modes (states) 
Low, Normal, Voter Failure, for a mode class named M_Pressure.  
 






Figure 4-5.  An SCR dependency graph. Source:  Navel Research Laboratories 










Figure 4-6.  A mode transition graph for the mode class “M_Pressure” Source:  Navel 
Research Laboratories 
Summary 
One of the first steps in the measurement process is to define the object or process 
to be measured.  Next, a systematic method is needed to determine what needs to be 
measured and what abstraction or model can enable measurements.  This chapter 
established 12 criteria to help guide the selection of a modeling method.  Based on these 
criteria, the SCR method was selected.  SCR and the supporting set of tools were 
described in detail.   
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Chapter 5:  Complexity Metrics 





 A graph-theoretical approach was used to operationalize NAT.  Our objective was 
to define multiple, graph-theoretical metrics to measure or indicate specific NAT 
attributes of a system.  The specific NAT attributes to operationalize are identified by a 
three-step, systematic process. 
Our approach also addresses the limitations of NAT and of other metric research, 
described in the literature review of Chapter 3, by using multiple system abstractions and 
perspectives to obtain metrics that can be precisely defined and quantified.  Three levels 
of system abstraction and three projections are used capture the multidimensional aspects 
of complexity.  
As a result, fifteen graph-theoretical metrics are proposed as measures or indicators 
of specific NAT attributes of complex systems.  
Graph Theory 
Background information on graph theory is presented to establish terms and 
definitions.  Graph theory is useful for modeling and analyzing a variety of empirical 
systems such as electrical circuits, communication networks, and transportation 
scheduling networks.  Graphs depict connections and relationships between a system’s 
elements and subsystems thus enabling quantification of a system’s logic structure.  
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A large body of knowledge exists for graph theory.  It has been studied since the 
18th century; thus, the precise definitions, theorems, and axioms of graph theory are very 
useful for this research. 
Background information on graph theory is presented just to establish a common 
understanding of terms and definitions.  Next, examples are given showing how each 
metric was calculated from SCR dependency graphs and SCR state information. 
The SCR Dependency Graph 
The SCR dependency graph represents mathematical relations as defined by the 
SCR specification.  The dependency graph, represented as G = (V, E), satisfies the 
following: 
• V(G):  a finite, non-empty set of vertices. 
• E(G):  a finite set of ordered pairs (u,v)of vertices called edges or directed edges.   
• For E(G), no two directed edges are parallel. 
• For E(G), a self loop is an edge e = (u,u)  starting and ending at vertex u. 
 
Definitions: 
Ancestors:  The set of all ancestors anc(u) = {u ∈  U: there exists (u, v) ∈  E}. 
Cyclomatic complexity:  also known as the nullity of a graph.  The number of linearly 
independent paths;  
V (g) = e - n +2        (5-1) 
where:  
  e = number of edges 
  n = number of nodes 
 
If "n" disconnected graphs exist, the overall complexity is calculated by: 
V (g) total = V
n
1
∑ (g) n      (5-2) 
Descendent:  The set of all descendents dep(u) = {v ∈  V: there exists (u, v) ∈  E}.   
Direct ancestor:  For (u,v), u is a direct ancestor of v. 
Direct descendent:  For (u,v), v is a successor or direct descendent of u. 
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Direct edge:  An edge is represented by an arrow with a starting and ending point. A 
directed edge e = (u,v)  starts at vertex u and ends at vertex v. 
Graph degree:  The sum of the in-degree and out-degree for a graph. 
In-degree:  The number of edges ending at a vertex. The in-degree id(u) of a vertex u is 
the number of edges (v, u) for all v ∈ V (G). In-degree is also known as fan-in. 
Independent path:  A linearly independent path contains at least one new vertex or edge. 
Input vertex:  If id(v) = 0, then v is an source or input 
Local degree:  The local degree of a vertex is the sum of the in-degree and the out-
degree. 
Out-degree:  The number of edges starting at a vertex. The out-degree od(v) of a vertex v 
is the number of edges (u, v) for all v ∈  V (G). Out-degree is also known as fan-out. 
Output vertex:  If od(v) = 0, then v is an destination or output. 
 
Scenario subgraph:  A subgraph S induced by the set of vertices involved by a scenario 
as simulated by the SCR simulator. 
Self loop:  An edge e = (u,u)  starting and ending at vertex u. 
Shepard complexity (M) = (id(v) x od(v))2. 
Strict semipath:  A joining of vertex v1, to vertex vn such that they are not mutually 
reachable.  For example, in Figure 5-1, a strict semipath joins v1 and v3.  
  
Figure 5-1.  The vertices v1 and v3 are not mutually reachable because a strict semipath 
joins them. 
Subgraph:  A graph S whose vertices and edges are vertexes and edges of a graph G.   
The subgraph S is induced by a set of vertices of graph G. 
Vertex:  A vertex v is represented as a rectangle in a SCR dependency diagram. 
Specific Attributes of Normal Accident Theory (NAT) 
We revisited NAT with the objective of defining multiple, graph-theoretical metrics 
to measure or indicate specific NAT attributes of a complex system.  Specific NAT the 
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attributes to operationalize are identified by a process of deduction:  1) abstracting 
Perrow’s thirteen attributes of complexity to a generalized view of simple (linear) and 
complex (nonlinear) systems; 2) selecting a subset of NAT attributes pertaining to linear 
and nonlinear systems; 3) identifying a general set of metrics to measure or indicate the 
subset of NAT attributes. 
First, the definition of complexity is established.  Webster's dictionary defines 
complexity as follows: 
Complexity: (a) having many varied interrelated parts, patterns, or elements and 
consequently hard to understand fully; (b) marked by and involvement of many 
parts, aspects, details, notions, and necessitating earnest study or examination to 
understand or cope with (Gove, 1996). 
This definition supports the structural and psychological aspects of NAT 
complexity.  Part (a) addresses the structural components of interconnections and 
coupling; part (b) concerns the psychological component of comprehension and 
confusion.  Our primary interest is in the structural aspects of complexity evident in SCR 
dependency graphs. Next, we review NAT attributes. 
Perrow lists these thirteen attributes of complex systems (Perrow, 1999):   
• close proximity 
• common-mode connections 
• many interconnections 
• limited substitutions 
• many feedback loops 
• poor information quality 
• limited or incorrect comprehension 
• strict time-dependencies 
• invariant sequences 
• inflexible 
• limited slack 
• limited substitutions 
• interacting control parameters 
 
Perrow also draws a major distinction between simple and complex systems:  
simple systems are linear; nonlinear systems are complex.  
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Linear and Nonlinear Systems  
Simple systems are linear; they do not have multiple branching paths 
interconnecting system components and subsystems.  A linear path is physically and 
logically separated from other system parts; so, the path follows a predictable, sequential 
order.  A linear system is given involving a single line of dominos.  A single disturbance 
of a domino starts a linear chain of events where one domino pushes over the next.  This 
chain of events follows a highly observable, predictable, and linear sequence.   
Nonlinear systems are complex because they are highly interconnected and 
interactive.  A single input or failure can generate many nonlinear branching paths 
between system components and subsystems.  These interactions can be unexpected, 
unplanned, and incomprehensible to system users.  A nonlinear system example is given 
involving a car windshield.  A single disturbance, such as a stone hitting the windshield, 
causes a multitude of nonlinear, interconnected cracks.  The chain of events from a single 
stone, with respect to the cracks, is highly unpredictable and nonlinear because the stone 
does not create a single, isolated crack. 
A subset of NAT attributes 
We used the high-level NAT abstraction of linear and nonlinear systems to focus 
the scope of the problem of operationalizing NAT.  As stated earlier, we are interested in 
the structural aspects of complexity.  Linearity is a structural aspect of system; therefore, 
we determine a subset of Perrow’s thirteen NAT attributes pertaining to linearity.  More 
specifically, we select the NAT attributes present in SCR dependency graphs. 
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The resulting NAT attributes for linearity are as follows: 
• Interconnectivity 
• Common-mode connections 
• Multiple, interacting control parameters 
NAT attribute metrics 
The third step of our process was to identify multiple metrics to measure or indicate 
the specific NAT attributes of interconnectivity, common-mode connections, and 
multiple, interactive control parameters.  
We used graph theory to formally define metrics for interconnectivity.  Figure 5-2 
depicts a simple linear system.  The linearity of this system can be quantified by 
measuring the interconnectivity between vertices.  In this example, the interconnectivity 
is established by the path v1, v2, v3, and v4.  More formally, the cyclomatic complexity 
metric V (g) is indicative of the system’s interconnectivity.  V (g) quantifies the number 
of linearly independent paths where, for Figure 5-2, V (g) = 1.  
 
Figure 5-2.  A simple linear system with one linear path v1, v2, v3, and v4. 
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Figure 5-3 depicts a nonlinear system with the same set of vertices {v1, v2, v3, v4}; 
however, this system is highly interconnected.  The cyclomatic complexity of Figure 5-3 
is V (g) = 5. 
 
Figure 5-3.  A nonlinear system. This system has the same vertices {v1, v2, v3, v4} as the 
linear system of Figure 5-2; however, it has five linearly independent paths. 
The process of operalization necessitates identification of multiple metrics for each 
variable to be operationalized.  We identified three metrics in addition to cyclomatic 
complexity: the graph degree, number of paths, and Shepard complexity.  Next, we 
addressed the attribute of common-mode connections. 
Vertices v2, v3, and v4 of Figure 5-3 have a common-mode connection established 
by vertex v1.  Vertex v2 is another common-mode connecting v2 to v3, v4, and to itself 
via a self loop.  The out-degree metric quantifies a common-mode connection.  The out-
degrees of vertices v1and v3 are od(v1) = 3  and od(v2) = 3.  We quantify the common-
mode connections for a graph by summing the out-degree of each vertex.  Next, we 
addressed the third NAT attribute: multiple, interacting control parameters. 
Control parameters are used to determine the paths of control in a graph.  For 
instance, vertex v2 of Figure 5-3 has two output paths and two inputs.  The output path is 
determined by the parameters associated with inputs from v1 and v2.  The number of 
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vertex inputs is indicative of the quantity of control parameters for that vertex; thus, the 
in-degree was used as an indicator of the number of control parameters.  We quantify the 
number of control parameters for a graph by summing the in-degree of each vertex.  The 
graph of Figure 5-3 depicts the edges connecting vertices, but not the actual values 
associated with each edge.  This graphical abstraction does not contain enough detail, so 
we look at other aspects of an SCR model to identify two more metrics:  the number of 
unique control conditions and the number of critical state changes.  These metrics 
required a more fined-grained abstraction so they are explained in a subsequent section. 
 In summary, we identified three NAT attributes and proposed seven general 
metrics as depicted by Figure 5-4. 
 
Figure 5-4.  The NAT attributes and the proposed metrics of system linearity. 
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Metric Descriptions 
Our approach to operationalize NAT addressed limitations of NAT and other 
metric research as described in the literature review of chapter 3 by using: 
• multiple metrics to quantify each NAT attribute 
• three system abstractions for the metrics.  
• three projections for each system abstraction 
Three system abstractions  
Three system abstractions were used in the process of determining metrics for NAT 
attributes.  The rational was that it was unlikely a single abstraction would contain all the 
metrics because complexity is a multi-dimensional.  Therefore, multiple abstractions 
were needed.  The following abstractions were created:  
• the scenario subgraph, a course-grained abstraction;  
• the critical-state subgraph, a medium-grained abstraction;  
• the critical-vertex subgraph; a fine-grained abstraction. 
 
Scenario subgraph abstraction 
The first level of abstraction is named the scenario subgraph.  This course-grained 
abstraction of an SCR dependency graph was defined by the subgraph induced by the 
edges and vertices used during a scenario; therefore, unused edges and vertices are 
eliminated.  For example, Figure 5-5 depicts an SCR dependency graph of a system.  The 
highlighted (darkened) vertices are those used during a given scenario.  Figure 5-6 
depicts the resulting scenario subgraph of only the vertices and edges used for a given 
scenario. 
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Figure 5-5.  An SCR dependency graph of all dependencies for a given system.  The 




Figure 5-6.  The scenario subgraph induced from the graph of Figure 5-5. 
Chapter 5:  Complexity Metrics 
John J. Sammarco, P.E. 5-11 
Critical-state subgraph abstraction 
A critical-state subgraph is induced from the vertices of a critical state.  These 
vertices are determined from inspection of an SCR log file; an ASCII file generated by 
the SCR Simulator.  We explain the SCR log file before describing a critical state.  
The SCR log file contains a listing of initial state conditions and a sequential list of 
all state changes during an SCR simulation.  Table 5-1 lists an excerpt of the fourth and 
fifth state from an SCR log file and serves to explain the log file contents.  Note that all 
input variables are listed on the left and all other variables are listed on the right side of 
the log excerpt.  Also note that each variable of the log file is a dependency graph vertex.  
Table 5-1.  An SCR log file listing the variables that changed at state four and five. The 
input variables, listed on the left, caused the sate changes. 
Input variables     All other variables 
--- State 4 ----------------------------------------------- 
iChosenLSVal = 4307                          mChosenLSVal = 4307 
                                            tCurrentLSVal = 4307 
                                            tRemLL = 4307 
                                           cWindowLL = 4307 
                                            oDimmerWindow = 86 
                                            oWindowOutput = 86 
 
 
--- State 5 ----------------------------------------------- 
iChosenLSVal = 7591                        mChosenLSVal = 7591 
                                           tCurrentLSVal = 7591 
                                            tRemLL = 7591 
                                           cWallLL = 2591 
                                            oDimmerWall = 51 
                                            oWallOutput = 51 
                                            cWindowLL = 5000 
                                            oDimmerWindow = 100 
                                            oWindowOutput = 100 
 
State changes occur when the value of an SCR input variable changes.  Table 5-1 
lists the fourth and fifth state change; state four occurred when the input variable 
iChosenLSVal changed to a 4307; state five occurred when the input variable 
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iChosenLSVal changed to 7591.  Nine other SCR variables, listed on the right side of 
Table 5-1, changed values when iChosenLSVal changed at state five.   
We now explain the concept of a critical state.  Table 5-2 contains a partial listing 
of two log files.  The log file listing in the left column was generated by an SCR 
simulation of an SCR specification named treatment A; the other log file listing in the 
right column is from an SCR simulation of an SCR specification named Treatment B.   
Table 5-2. A comparative listing of state 5 from two SCR log files. 
Log file from treatment A Log file from treatment B. 
Input variables                All other variables Input variables                All other variables 
--- State 5 ------------------------------------------ 
iChosenLSVal = 7591                                       
                                                mChosenLSVal=7591 
                                                tCurrentLSVal=7591 
                                                tRemLL =7591 
                                                cWallLL = 2591 
                                                oDimmerWall = 51 
                                                oWallOutput = 51 
                                                cWindowLL = 5000 
                                                oDimWindow =100 
                                                oWindowOut=100 
--- State 5 ---------------------- 
iChosenLSVal = 7591  
                                               mChosenLSVal= 7591 
                                                tCurrentLSVal = 7591 
                                                tRemLL = 7591 
                                                cWindowLL = 5000 
                                                oDimWindow = 100 
                                                oWindowOut = 100 
 
 
Note that all other state information up to state five was identical for both log files. 
This state information was redundant so, it is of little use.  State 5 is named the critical 
state because as we investigated which is more complex, treatment A or B, it was critical 
to focus on the information for states that differed.  Hence, state 5 was a critical state.  
The SCR variables for the critical state comprise the vertices of the critical-state 
subgraph.  For example, state 5 is a critical state for two SCR specifications and is 
depicted by Table 5-2.  Each variable of Table 5-2 defines a vertex of the critical-state 
subgraph.  For instance, Figure 5-7 depicts the critical-state subgraph for state 5 of SCR 
specification treatment A.  Observe that a single input variable change of iChosenLSVal 
= 7591 caused nine other SCR variables to change as shown by Figure 5-7.   
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Figure 5-7.  The critical-state subgraph for state 5 of SCR specification treatment A.  The 
subgraph is defined by the variable changes listed by the log file of Table 5-2. 
Critical-vertex subgraph abstraction 
The third abstraction is named the critical-vertex subgraph.  This fine-grained 
abstraction is defined by critical vertices of the scenario subgraph.  The critical vertex 
uses the same concept as the critical state; eliminate redundant information to reveal the 
critical information.  Hence, critical vertices are those that differ between two scenarios.  
Comparing the SCR specification files of two systems enabled identification of 
critical vertices.  The SCR specification file can be opened as ASCII text by using a word 
processor.  Next, using the word processor’s document compare function, we identified 
the differences between two SCR specifications as shown by Figure 5-8. 
 
 
Figure 5-8.  A comparison of two SCR specifications, used to identify critical vertices.  
The comments show deletions; differences are underlined text. 
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 In this example, we see that condition functions cWallLL and cWindowLL differ; 
event function cWallLights also differs.  Thus cWallLL, cWindowLL, and CWallLights 
define the critical vertices as shown by Figure 5-9. 
 
 
Figure 5-9.  The scenario subgraph showing three critical vertices highlighted (darkened). 
 
The SCR tool can display more detailed information about a critical vertex.  For 
instance, the control parameters and output assignments for critical vertex cWallLL are 
shown by Figure 5-10. 
 
Figure 5-10.  The conditions and assignments defining cWallLL. 
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Three Model Projections  
Complex systems are multidimensional; thus, multiple projections (perspectives) 
are needed.  The problem of determining the proper projections for this research is 
addressed by a simple partitioning of the system into the inputs and the outputs.  We used 
these partitions to define three projections for a given subgraph:  1) the all dependencies 
projection; 2) the input projection; 3) the output projection. 
The first projection named all, views all dependencies for a given subgraph.  The 
input projection views all descendents; the output projection views all ancestors.  For 
example, Figure 5-11 depicts a critical-vertex subgraph of the critical vertex mDefLSOpt. 
 
 
Figure 5-11.  The critical-vertex subgraph abstraction for vertex mDefLSOpt.  
The input projection affords a view of dependencies with respect to inputs.  We see 
in Figure 5-11 that mDefLSOpt depends on two input vertices.  Input vertices can change 
values when environmental input conditions change or when users use the GUI to change 
input parameters.  For this example, the value of variable iOLSmalfuntion is determined 
by a sensor malfunction; the value if variable iDefLSOpt is set by a human using a GUI. 
The output projection enables a view of dependencies with respect to the outputs.  We see 
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in Figure 5-11 that the critical vertex is a descendent of two output vertices as well as 
three intermediate vertices.   
The all projection looks at all dependencies associated with a given subgraph.  In 
the case of Figure 5-11, the all projection includes all dependencies of critical vertex 
mDefLSOpt. 
In summation, the input project enables a view of which inputs will affect the 
critical vertices while the output projection enables a view of the outputs affected by the 
critical vertices.  The all projection is a collective view of all dependencies 
Scenario Subgraph Metrics 
The four metrics associated with the scenario subgraph are listed by Table 5-3.  
Table 5-3. Coarse-grained metrics for the scenario subgraph abstraction. 
Metric Independent variable Projection 
Cyclomatic complexity X1 all 
Output cyclomatic complexity X2 output 
All paths X3 all 
Graph degree X4 all 
 
Each metric is described as follows: 
X1 Cyclomatic complexity:  McCabes cyclomatic complexity is calculated for the entire 
scenario subgraph.  The subgraphs are weakly connected because dependency 
graphs are not connected from the output vertices to the input vertices.  Adding a 
virtual edge from the output to input vertices will make the graph strongly 
connected (Vakil, 2000).  Cyclomatic complexity is calculated as: 
V (g) = e – n + (t +1)                                        (5-3) 
where: 
e = number of edges 
n = number of vertices 
t = number of output vertices 
 
X2  Output cyclomatic complexity:  This metric is an indicator of the common-mode 
connectivity of the output vertices.  For instance, the output vertices of Figure 5-12 
have common-mode connections because each output vertex is connected to the 
same input vertex.   
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The process to determine X2 begins by creating a subgraph for each output vertex.  
The subgraph is output vertex induced where the vertices are descendents of a 
single output vertex.  X2 is the summation of cyclomatic complexities for each 




V (g) n      (5-4) 
where:  
n = number of output vertices 
V (g) n = cyclomatic complexity of the subgraph induced by the 
descendents of output vertex n.  
 
For example, Figure 5-12 is a graph with two output vertices v2 and v5 and a 
cyclomatic complexity of 4 as calculated using the “all” projection.  We now 
calculate output cyclomatic complexity by using the “output” projection.  Figure 5-
13 is a subgraph of Figure 5-12.  The subgraph is induced by the output vertex v2; 
the cyclomatic complexity is three.  The subgraph induced by output vertex v5 is 
similar, and has a cyclomatic complexity of three.  Thus, using Equation 5-4, the 
output cyclomatic complexity X2 is six.  
 
 
Figure 5-12.  A graph with two output vertices and a cyclomatic complexity of four, and 
an output cyclomatic complexity of six. 
 
 
Figure 5-13.  A subgraph of Figure 5-12 as induced by output vertex v2.  The cyclomatic 
complexity is three. 
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Figure 5-14 is another example; note that the graph has the same number of 
vertices and it also has two output vertices.  The cyclomatic complexity is 4 and is the 
same as Figure 5-12.  However, we see that output vertices do not have common-mode 
connections so the cyclomatic complexity does not serve to measure the common-mode 
connections for output vertices.  The output cyclomatic complexity Figure 5-14 is two; a 
significant reduction as compared to Figure 5-12. 
 
Figure 5-14.  A graph with two output vertices and a cyclomatic complexity of four, and 
an output cyclomatic complexity of two. 
 
X3 All paths:  the maximum number of different directed paths.  Each directed path 
begins at an input vertex and ends at an output vertex.  Additionally, each directed 
path must not be a strict semipath. 
X4 Graph degree:  the total number of graph edges because it equals the sum of all edges 
into and out of each vertex. 
Critical-state Subgraph Metrics 
The five metrics associated with the critical state subgraph, listed by Table 5-4, are 
considered medium-grained metrics.  
Table 5-4.  The medium-grained metrics from the critical-state subgraph abstraction. 
Metric Independent variable Projection 
Critical state changes X5 all 
In-degree X6 input 
Out-degree X7 output  
Cyclomatic complexity X8 all 
Sheppard complexity metric X9 all 
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X5 Critical-state changes:  The critical-state subgraph is used to determine this metric. 
This metric indicates the number of nonlinear branching or interconnections where 
X5 is the number of variables that change for a single change of an input variable. 
Figure 5-7 serves as an example where X5 = 9. 
X6 In-degree:  The value of X6 is the summation of all edges going into the critical state 
subgraph vertices.  For example, X6 = 9 for Figure 5-7.  The X6 metric is from an 
input projection because looking from input to output vertices, we first encounter 
edges going into vertices. 
X7 Out-degree:  The value of X7 is the summation of all edges going out of the critical 
state subgraph vertices.  For example X 7 = 9 for Figure 5-7.  The X7 metric is from 
an output projection because looking from output to input vertices, we first 
encounter edges leaving vertices. 
X8 Cyclomatic complexity:  Metric X8 is calculated the same as metric X1.  The 
difference is X8 is calculated from the critical state subgraph. 
X9 Sheppard complexity metric:  Metric X9 is a metric for interconnections where:     
 
X9 =   ( 6X  x   X )7 2       (5-5) 
where: 
X5 = out-degree; X6 = in-degree. 
 
Critical-vertex Subgraph Metrics 
The six metrics associated with the critical-vertex subgraph are listed by Table 5-5.  The 
metrics are described as follows: 
 
Table 5-5.  Fine-grained metrics from the critical-vertex subgraph abstraction. 
Metric Independent variable Projection 
In-degree X10 input  
Out-degree X11 output 
Sheppard complexity metric  X12 all 
Input cyclomatic complexity  X13 input 
Output cyclomatic complexity X14 output 
Vertex unique conditions X15 all 
 
X10 In-degree; X11 Out-degree; X12 Sheppard complexity:  The metrics X10, X11, and 
X12 are calculated the same as metrics X6, X7, and X9 respectively.  Only the 
abstraction is different. 
X13 Input cyclomatic complexity:  The input projection is used to determine input 
cyclomatic complexity.  The general process is the same as for the determination of 
output cyclomatic complexity.  The input cyclomatic complexity is an indicator of 
common-mode connections for the input vertices. 
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X14 Output cyclomatic complexity:  The metric is calculated by the same process used by 
metric X2.  Only the abstraction is different. 
X15 Critical-vertex conditions:  Metric X15 is based on the SCR condition function.  This 
is at the SCR specification level; therefore, it contains information that is not 
apparent with the dependency graph.  Figure 5-15 shows the condition function for 
the critical vertex cWallLL.  The value of cWallLL is based on meeting one of five 
conditions.  For instance, “cWallLL=0” when the fifth condition “tCurrenLS0pt = 
window and tRemLL≤5000” is satisfied. 
The X15 metric is equal to the number of unique variable assignments.  It is 
important that unique assignments are counted because programming style can 
distort the metric.  Counting all the conditions of Figure 5-15 resulted in X15 = 5.  
Notice that two assignments are the same value of zero. We can change the 
programming style by combining these two conditions into one condition.  This 
results in four unique assignments for cWallLL; hence X15 = 4.   
 
 
Figure 5-15.  The condition function for the SCR term cWallLL. Four unique 
assignments for cWallLL are shown.  
Summary 
Chapter described a set of 15 metrics that were proposed as measures or indicators 
of three NAT complexity attributes.  These NAT attributes were system 
interconnectivity, command-mode connectivity, and control parameter interactivity.  The 
metrics of these NAT attributes are based on graph-theoretical measures of SCR 
dependency graph nonlinearity. 
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Complexity is multidimensional; therefore, multiple metrics system abstractions, 
and system projections were used.  Three abstractions of SCR system dependency graphs 
were used; three system projections were used for each system abstraction.  These 
projections were based on the external view of the system’s inputs, outputs, and a view of 
all dependencies; thus, a hierarchy of system abstraction and projections were used for 
the set of 15 metrics proposed in this chapter. 
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RESEARCH VEHICLE: THE LIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM (LCS) 
The LCS is a formalized system originally used to for requirements engineering 
seminars.  It is a moderately complex, real-world system that includes human-computer 
interaction and safety requirements for normal and abnormal conditions.  
The system is described in detail; this includes system functions, graphical user-
interface, and modifications to the system to correct a safety hazard and three ‘bugs” in 
the original specification uncovered in this research.  Additional modifications were 
made to create six versions of the system needed for the research design described in the 
next chapter.  
Background 
The LCS was devised by the Fraunhofer Institute for Experimental Software 
Engineering in Kaiserslautern (Queins et al., 2000) for a seminar on Requirements 
Capture, Documentation and Validation.  The seminar was organized by E. Börger 
(Universita di Pisa, I), B. Hörger (Daimler-Benz, Ulm, D), D. Parnas (McMaster 
University, CAN), D. Rombach (Universität Kaiserslautern, D), with the objective to 
compare different approaches for requirements elicitation and specification.  The LCS 
case study was used by the seminar as a vehicle to compare various requirements 
engineering methods.  The  results were published in a special issue on Requirements 
Engineering for the Journal of Universal Computer Science (Maurer, 2000). 
The LCS specification, listed in Appendix A was based on the original version 
created in 1995, and a subsequent 1999 version used in an earlier seminar on 
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Requirements Capture, Documentation, and Validation.  The LCS specification created 
for the 2000 seminar contains various improvements and refinements.  The LCS 
specification takes the form of an informal requirements document as created by the 
customer.  The requirements described functional requirements - the interactions between 
the environment, humans, and the hardware/software of the system.  The requirements 
also state nonfunctional requirements - the constraints for the system such as timing and 
performance restrictions. 
System Description 
The LCS was formulated as a moderately complex, real-world system to control the 
interior lighting of a building consisting of various offices, laboratories, hallways, and 
staircases.  The system’s purpose is to efficiently control ambient lighting and to maintain 
a safe environment.  Seven requirements specifically concern safety aspects for normal 
and abnormal conditions.  For the purposes of this research, the control targets a single 
office. The control other offices and laboratory spaces would be identical. 
The operation of the LCS is detailed in the test subject instructions of Appendix E. 
Briefly, the LCS controls light near the window and a light mounted near the wall.  The 
control enables the user to set two light scenes named occupied and vacant: 
• Occupied light scene:  Automatically maintains a user-defined lighting intensity 
and configuration when the office is occupied. 
• Vacant light scene:  Automatically provides a user-defined light intensity and 
configuration when someone enters the office after the vacant light scene time 
delay has expired. 
Lastly, the LCS provides manual lighting control:  Manual pushbuttons enable 
on/off control of the lights.  The manual controls enable users to over-ride the LCS  
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The LCS configuration for a single office is depicted by Figure 6-1.  The system 
components consist of sensors, a logic solver, wall and window light actuators, and a 
user-interface panel.  Five sensors are used; a motion sensor detects an occupied or 
vacant office; an analog sensor measures natural light in the office; a door closed contact 
indicates the door is open or closed; two status-line sensors indicate if the lights are 
turned on or off.  The logic solver is PC-based and it provides control functions and a 
user-interface.  Pushbutton switches enable manual and independent control of each light. 
 
Figure 6-1.  The Light Control System block diagram. 
The LCS User-Interface 
The PC-based user-interface, depicted by Figure 6-2, is used to set lighting scenes 
and display system information.  The user selects the lighting configuration (wall, 
window, or both) and dimmer levels for the occupied and vacant light scenes.  The user 
also sets the time delay associated with the vacant light scene.  The following status 
information is displayed: 
• Digital displays show the output for each light.  No light is produced at 0 watts 
output; the maximum light is produced at 100 watts output.  
• A digital displays shows elapsed time. 









Figure 6-2.  The graphical user interface for the Light Control System. 
The researcher created the user-interface by using the SCR simulator’s object 
palette.  Custom graphics for the door icons, background, and pushbuttons were created 
using Photoshop.  Multiple refinements of the user interface resulted from pilot testing, 
described in chapter 7, and from reviews by NIOSH human factors researchers.  
SCR Specification Modifications 
The LCS requirements were written as an SCR specification and obtained from the 
Naval Research Laboratory (NRL).  The SCR specification file dinreqdout.ssl was NRL’s 
version 1.7 modeling the non-ideal LCS behavior (Heitmeyer & Bharadwaj, 2000) and is 
listed in Appendix B.  This version of the specification served as the starting point for 
this research.   The researcher modified the NRL SCR specification to correct three 
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undesirable behaviors found in the version 1.7 specification, and to obtain the required 
behaviors for the test scenarios of this research.  
The new SCR specification of this research consists of 15 monitored variables, 28 
terms, eight controlled variables, one mode class, 24 conditioned functions, and 12 event 
functions; thus, it was a moderately large specification. 
The researcher's SCR specification modifications included two new output 
variables named oWallOutput and oWindowOutput, were added to reduce system 
complexity by mitigating inferential information for wall and window light outputs.  
Perrow describes inferential information as a characteristic of a complex system.  For 
instance, the original SCR specification uses variable oDimmerWall to represent the wall 
light intensity where zero watts gives no light and 100 watts gives maximum light.  When 
oDimmerWall equals 100 watts, it infers that light is producing the maximum light 
output.  However, the actual wall light output could be 0 watts.  The oDimmerWall data 
is inferential because important information is missing; specifically, the pulse signal 
status as shown in Figure 6-2.  
Each light is controlled by a dimmable light module that receives lighting demand 
intensity from the dimmer input, and receives a pulse input enabling the light to be turned 
off or on.  The pulse is represented by the SCR variable oPulseWall.  Therefore, if 
oDimmerWall equal 100watts and oPulseWall equals 0 watts, no light is produced; if 
oDimmerWall equals 100 watts and oPulseWall equals 1, and then light is produced. 
Evidence of user confusion surfaced during LCS pilot testing.  The pilot test GUI 
used a virtual 4-digit LCD to show the values of oDimmerWall and oDimmerWindow.  
The GUI also displayed on/off indicator lights for oPulseWall and oPulseWindow.  The 
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research observed that some pilot test subjects focused on the LCD’s and did not observe 
the state of oPulseWall or oPulseWindow indicator lights.  For instance, pilot test 
subjects found the externally visible behavior of the wall and window lights during the 
wall and window light pushbutton scenario to be very confusing.  This scenario used the 
manually operated wall and window light pushbuttons to override the LCS control of 
lighting.  Users could manually shut off the wall or window light even though the LCS 
was controlling the light at the desired intensity.  The source of confusion is rooted in the 
interrelationships between the manual pushbuttons and the variable pairs oDimmerWall 
and oPulseWall, and oDimmerWindow and oPulseWindow.  Table 6-1 summarizes the 
nature of the relationships between oDimmerWindow, oPulseWall and the wall light 
pushbutton.  The relationships are identical for oDimmerWindow, oPulseWindow and the 
window light pushbutton. 
Table 6-1.  Actual light output with respect to pulse and dimmer signal values. 
Wall light 
 pushbutton state 
oDimmerWall oPulseWall Actual wall 
 light output 
Off 100 0 (off) 0 
Off 100 1 (on) 100 
On 100 1 (on) 0 
 
The actual wall light output is 0 regardless of the dimmer value specified by 
oDimmerWall when the pulse signal oPulseWall is in the off state.  Note also 
oDimmerWall is independent of signal oPulseWall; this also caused user confusion 
because pilot test subjects expected the dimmer value to equal zero if the pulse value was 
zero.  Therefore, the researcher created new variables, oWallOutput and 
oWindowOutput, to represent the actual light output values.  This eliminated subject 
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confusion during pilot test by using the same virtual 4-digit LCD to display the values of 
oWallOutput and oWindowOuput on the GUI.   
The researcher discovered a safety issue with the specified LCS behavior, and three 
bugs with the NRL specification.  These were discovered during the process of executing 
the complexity assessment methodology of this research. 
The safety issue concerns the fault tolerance requirement NFI, section (3.2.1.) of 
the LCS problem description. This requirement can put the LCS in a state that creates a 
hazard to the building’s occupants.  Specifically, the requirement is for the LCS to use 
the last known good datum from ambient light level sensor if the LCS detects a 
malfunction of this sensor.  This behavior causes a hazard because people could enter a 
dark office without the lighting coming on.  This hazard occurs when the ambient light 
sensor malfunctions during very bright ambient light levels where the naturally occurring 
light provides all the lighting requested by the user; thus, the wall and window lights are 
reduced to 0 watts output.  The specified behavior during the malfunction causes the 
system to use this high light level because it was the last known value before the 
malfunction. Hence, users entering an office at night after a malfunction has occurred 
during these high level lighting conditions will find the office dark because the LCS 
system believes ambient light is providing all the lighting needed.  The researcher 
collaborated with experts from the NRL to correct this problem.  The first correction was 
to modify the indoor lighting level monitoring function so that it assumes it is dark 
outside in the case of a malfunction lighting sensor.  This essentially would be a failsafe 
state because lighting would always be available.  The second fix to this problem was to 
have the ambient light sensor re-read after an ambient light sensor malfunction so that the 
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latest reading can be used.  Without this, the value before the failure would remain in the 
system until the sensor reading changed again and the malfunction was cleared.   
The three bugs with the SCR specification are not safety related but, do cause 
undesirable behavior that could confuse the occupants of the building.  The first and 
second problems are related to the initial state of the system.  The third bug concerns the 
ambient light level sensor. 
The first problem concerns the light status of the room when someone first enters 
the room.  The LCS problem description specified that upon the first time a room is 
entered that the default light scene should be on.  This did not occur during the execution 
of the LCS specification by NRL.  The second problem is also related to this initial state.  
This problem however does have safety implications.  Under the right conditions, the 
LCS control system would shut off all the lights in the office even though the office was 
occupied and lighting was called for.  The system will erroneously go to an unoccupied 
state two minutes after a person enters an office for the first time.  At this point, the 
system is in a temporarily empty state classification.  Therefore a timer associated with 
the temporary empty state begins counting, and once this timer elapses, the lighting will 
be shutoff to the office even though an operator or a user is in the room. The third 
problem that occurs is that the current dimmer outputs do not correctly account for the 
natural light entering the room for any given state. 
Again the researcher collaborated with NRL personnel to correct these three 
problems.  At this point, this brings us to the SCR specification, designated as treatment 
A, containing the corrections for the three NRL bugs and the undesirable safety behavior 
specified in the LCS specification. 








Three scenarios were designed to exercise all of the major LCS functions.  More 
importantly, the scenarios are based on LCS behavior the researcher found to exhibit 
NAT characteristics of confusion, transparency, and unpredictable system behavior.  
Therefore, the researcher began with the complex system, designated as treatment A, then 
simplified the system and designated this as treatment B.  Two treatments are needed to 
test the research hypotheses.  The next chapter details the research methodology for 
treatments A and B.  
The Vacant Light Scene Scenario 
The vacant light scene is used to maintain safety and save energy.  It provides a 
minimal lighting level when a user enters an office.  The scene helps save energy by 
reducing the lighting once the office has been vacated for longer than a user-defined time 
delay; therefore, if a person does not shut off the lights when leaving the office, the LCS 
will automatically reduce the lighting level once the time delay expires.  The vacant light 
scene settings are defined and set by the user 
Appendix E contains the detailed subject instructions for the vacant light scene 
scenario.  Subjects are instructed to set the vacant light scene to the window light at 20 
watts, with a time delay of five minutes.  After the scene is set, the subject leaves the 
office, and advances time from zero to seven minutes while watching the state of the 
vacant light scene.  The subject reoccupied the office at seven minutes and observed the 
vacant light scene settings. 
 The vacant light scene scenario for treatments A and B is summarized by Table 6-
2. The items of primary interest are in bold.  The first critical time is at five minutes, the 
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time delay setting.  Note that the LCS behavior for treatments A and B are identical up to 
the time delay setting of five minutes.  The vacant light scene activated at five minutes 
and remained activated for treatment B, the less complex system.  Therefore, the vacant 
light scene was on when the subject reoccupied the office.  The behavior for treatment A 
differed in that the vacant light scene did not activate until the subject re-entered the 
office at seven minutes.  
Table 6-2.  Vacant light scene scenario values for treatment A and B. The items of 













0 occupied occupied disabled disabled 
1 temp. 
empty 
occupied disabled disabled 
2 temp. 
empty 
occupied disabled disabled 
3 temp. 
empty 
occupied disabled disabled 
4 temp. 
empty 












enabled @ 20 watts 
6 temp. 
empty 
vacant disabled enabled @ 20 watts 
7 occupied vacant enabled @ 20 watts enabled @ 20 watts 
 
The Lighting Options Scenario 
This scenario demonstrates the operation of the lighting options.  The lighting 
options are wall lights, window lights, or both lights.  The lighting options are selected by 
the user.  Appendix E contains the detailed subject instructions for the lighting options 
scenario.   
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Section 4 is the dictionary of terms for the LCS requirements.  The operation of 
each lighting option is defined within the definition of the light scene term.  The light 
scene definition follows; italics were added for emphasis: 
A light scene is a predefined setting of the ambient light level and a description that 
determines in which way the ceiling light groups should be used to achieve this 
ambient light level.  A light scene is given by: 
1.  name of the light scene 
2.  the desired ambient light level in a room 
3.  one of the following three options: window, wall, or both 
Window means that at first the ceiling light group near the window should be used 
to achieve the desired ambient light level and then the other ceiling light group. 
Wall means that at first the ceiling light group near the wall should be used to 
achieve the desired ambient light level and then the other ceiling light group. 
Both means that both ceiling light groups should be used equally to achieve the 
desired ambient light level (Queins et al., 2000). 
If the requested level of light can not be supplied by a single light, then the LCS 
automatically supplies power to the other light in order to meet the request.  Each light 
provides up to 100 watts.  So, if the wall light is selected, and the requested light level is 
150 watts, then the LCS automatically controls the window light to provide 50 watts, 
even though the user requested only the wall light.  The outputs for treatment A are listed 
by Table 6-3, and depict the situation when the dimmer is set to 7,500.  Treatment B 
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Table 6-3.  Lighting options scenario values for treatment A and B. The items of primary 
interest are in bold. 
Dimmer Settings 
 















0 0 0 0 0 0 
2,500 0 50 0 50 0 
5,000 0 100 0 100 0 
7,500 0 100 50 100 0 
10,000 0 100 100 100 0 
7,500 0 100 50 100 0 
5,000 0 100 0 100 0 
2,500 0 50 0 50 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
The Wall and Window Light Pushbutton Scenario 
This scenario demonstrates the operation of the light pushbuttons.  The manually 
operated wall and window light pushbuttons are used to override the LCS.  Manual 
override of the LCS control occurs when the window pushbutton state is “on.” Appendix 
E contains the detailed subject instructions for the wall and window light pushbutton 
scenario.  
Requirement 2 of section 2.1 of the LCS problem description, defines the behavior 
for the pushbuttons.  It states: 
Each office is equipped with: 
1.  one motion detector (imd), so that the room is fully covered. 
2.  two ceiling light groups (window and wall).  
The luminaries in a ceiling light group in any room are turned on or off only as a 
group.  Each ceiling light group is controlled by one push button on the wall (pb1 
and pb2, respectively), which toggles the ceiling light group if pushed. 
A ceiling light group in a room shows the following behavior if the corresponding 
push button is pushed: 
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(i)  if the ceiling light group is completely on, it will be switched off 
(ii) otherwise it will be switched on completely (Queins et al., 2000). 
Table 6-4 depicts the operation of the window light pushbutton for treatments A 
and B.  Note that both treatments behave identically until the last table entry (in bold).  
Treatment A did comply with the specification although this is not intuitive; also, it does 
not follow the functional mental model most people have concerning a pushbutton switch 
found in homes and offices. 
 When the prior state is window output = 50 watts, the window light is not fully on. 
So, when the window pushbutton changes to the on state, the current state becomes 
window output’ = 100 watts. For treatment B, window output’ = 0 watts; this behavior 
follows the typical functional mental model for a pushbutton light switch. 
Table 6-4.  Wall and Window light pushbutton scenario outputs for treatments A and B. 
The items of primary interest are in bold. 
Treatment A 
 
Treatment B  
Window 








off 0 0 0 0 
on 0 100 0 100 
off 100 100 100 100 
on 100 0 100 0 
off 50 50 50 50 
on 50 100 50 0 
Note:  Window output’ is the current state value while window output is the prior state value 








The research test vehicle is the LCS, a formally documented system used as a case 
study for requirements engineering seminars.  The function behavior of the LCS was 
described as well as the GUI created for human interaction with the LCS.  This research 
modified the LCS behavior to mitigate a safety hazard and three bugs in the original LCS 
as constructed as an SCR specification.  Next, the LCS specification was modified to 
generate two treatments for three scenarios named the vacant light scene, the lighting 
options scenario, and the wall and ceiling light push button scenario.  Treatment A of 
these scenarios follows the LCS specifications.  Treatment B is made to be more intuitive 
and to match typical functional mental models.  The treatments and scenarios are used to 
test the research hypotheses.  The next chapter explains how these treatments and 
scenarios are used in the research methodology. 
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This chapter describes the specific tasks, sequences, and research methodology 
needed to realize the research objective: to develop a complexity assessment 
methodology for system requirements of safety-related e computer systems by 
operationalizing NAT. 
A multiple data source approach was taken to increase construct validity.  The 
research included the use of the Discount Usability Engineering method to evaluate 
system usability, and a crossover research design to obtain multidimensional data from 
two sources:  a questionnaire instrument for the test subjects and observer notes  
Thirty-two convenience subjects from the NIOSH Pittsburgh Research Laboratory 
used PC-based simulations of the LCS described in chapter 6.  The subjects were 
randomly assigned to execute scenarios that used the main functions of the LCS.  The 
nine-part questionnaire instrument of Appendix D was used for the collection of 
dependent variable data.  Three dependent variables were measured using a five-point 
Likert scale.  
Lastly, six subjects were used to conduct pilot tests.  This resulted in improvement 
and refinement of the subject instructions and the GUI; specifically, the instructions were 
shorter, easier to follow, and easier to understand; the GUI was simplified to make it 
more intuitive. 
 








This experiment consisted of two major parts having a total of six steps.  The first 
part was to teach subjects about the LCS.  This was achieved in three steps: 
• Watch a short instructional video concerning the operation of the LCS; 
• Read a description of the GUI and the operating instructions for the LCS; 
• Receive “hands-on” training by using the basic LCS functions during a 10minute 
warm-up session. 
 
For the second part, the subjects: 
• Followed a one page set of instructions to run a scenario; 
• Answered the questionnaire after running each scenario; 
• Take a one-minute break after running each scenario. 
 
Research Design 
The research used the Discount Usability Engineering method to evaluate the 
usability of the LCS.  The usability was evaluated for a warm-up session and six 
scenarios of LCS operation. 
The research design uses a crossover design.  The main advantages of using 
standardized designs and methods are pre-established validity and a prior knowledge of 
strengths and limitations.  
Discount Usability Engineering 
The Discount Usability Engineering method was used to evaluate system usability: 
one of our dependent variables.  A strong point of this method is that it can maximize 
data significance given small sample population sizes.  Nielsen's research shows that 
three to five subjects achieves the maximum benefit-cost ratio for this method (Nielsen, 
1994).  Secondly, the method's simplicity was an advantage.  It was much less likely that 
error and biases are introduced from misapplication of complex methods. 
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The Discount Usability Engineering method uses three techniques: scenarios, 
simplified thinking aloud, and heuristic evaluation.  A scenario contains a set of events, 
tasks, and operations typically encountered in the system operation.  A scenario can 
consist of normal or abnormal situations.  The simplified thinking aloud technique 
encourages the subjects to vocalize their thoughts as they perform typical tasks. 
Researchers record these thoughts and encourage the users to vocalize their thoughts and 
provide user feedback.  
A crossover design was used to compare difficult and easy scenarios using within 
subject comparisons and allowing for multiple evaluations per subject.  This research 
design is commonly used for clinical drug studies.  
Crossover Design 
The crossover design has a significant advantage because the subjects serve as their 
own control.  The other advantages include greater sample size efficiency with 
randomization of treatment order and all subjects receive all the treatments.  The basic 
structure of a crossover design is depicted by Figure 7-1.  Randomly, half of the subjects 
received treatments in a given order while the other half received the same treatments in 
reverse order.  A washout or waiting period was established between treatments to 
minimize carryover or residual learning effects from the prior treatments.  The washout 
duration varies with respect to the specific study.  For example, drug studies could have 
washout periods ranging from hours to days depending upon how quickly a drug leaves 
the bloodstream.  Lengthy or unknown washout periods are a disadvantage; however, the 
washout period used in this research was just a few minutes because the residual effects 
are not physiological.  Short washout periods are needed because of practicality.  
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Specifically, there are six washout periods; therefore, the total time for washout periods 
was relatively short.  Lengthy washout periods could otherwise confound data from 
fatigue or boredom. 
 
Figure 7-1.  The basic structure of a crossover design consists of two treatments and two 
washout periods. 
For this study, the basic crossover design structure was kept intact in that two 
treatments are used.  We add three scenarios of LCS operation: the scenarios are a 
component of the Discount Usability Engineering method. 
The experiments used two versions of the LCS to facilitate hypothesis testing.  The 
first version, treatment A, was a complex version of the LCS; the independent variables 
were manipulated to increase NAT complexity.  The second version, treatment B, had the 
independent variables manipulated to decrease complexity.   
Each subject was given the same set of written instructions in order to establish 
experimental consistency.  There was also a warm-up session to familiarize subjects with 
operation of the PC-based simulation.  
The same set of scenarios was used for treatments A and B.  After each scenario 
was completed, subjects answered the questionnaire of Appendix D, designed to elicit 
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their perceptions of the system.  The responses were assumed to depend on the assigned 
treatment. 
Two structured test sequences of scenarios and treatments were used to establish 
known test patterns; one test sequence was used by half of the subjects and the other test 
sequence was used by the other half.  The test sequences of scenarios and treatments were 
optimized for the crossover design (Jones & Kenward, 1998).  Tables 7-1 and 7-2 list the 
test sequences with their associated scenarios and treatments. . 
Table 7-1.  Sequence 1 ordering of the 
scenarios and associated 
treatments. 
Order  Scenario Treatment  
0 warm-up session 
1 washout period 
2 1 A 
3 washout period 
4 2 B 
5 washout period 
6 3 A 
7 washout period 
8 2 A  
9 washout period 
10 1 B 
11 washout period 
12 3 B  
Table 7-2.  Sequence 2 ordering of the 
scenarios and associated 
treatments. 
Order Scenario Treatment  
0 warm-up session 
1 washout period 
2 3 B 
3 washout period 
4 1 B 
5 washout period 
6 2 A 
7 washout period 
8 3 A  
9 washout period 
10 2 B 
11 washout period 
12 1 A 
 The two sequences were useful for detecting and limiting learning effects by 
reducing the potential learning effects to a subset of known scenario and treatment 
ordering.  A totally randomized sequence of scenarios could potentially have a wider 
range of learning effects thus making it more difficult to address.
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Internal Validity Threats 
The research methodology was also designed to reduce potential threats to internal 
validity.  Compromises of internal validity result in biases that cloud inferences 
concerning the observed effects that the independent variables may have on the 
dependent variables.  Internal validity considerations included construct validity and 
unintended treatment effects.  The following steps were made integral to the research to 
increase internal validity: 
• Construct validity: 
o Used multidimensional data; 
o Used multiple data sources; 
• Unintended non-experimental effects (a.k.a. Hawthorn effect):  Independent 
observers were used to proctor tests and collect data 
Warm-up Session 
All subjects receiving treatments A and B conducted the same warm-up session 
prior to conducting the LCS test.  The warm-up served as a hands-on practice session. 
The objectives of this session were to help subjects become familiar with running a 
scenario and become familiar with using the GUI.  The subjects answered a set of 
questions concerning each of these objectives after they completed the warm-up session. 
Test Sequence Summary 
The test sequences are summarized using the appropriate statistical terminology as 
follows: 
• 2 Sequences:  Tables 7-1 and 7-2 describe the sequences.  
• 2 Treatments:  Treatment A (more complex), Treatment B (less complex) 
• 3 Periods:  Scenarios 1, 2, 3 (each scenario was a set of typical user tasks) 








Three volunteers from the NIOSH Pittsburgh Research Laboratory were test 
observers:  they were used to administer the tests and collect data.  The observers did not 
know the purpose of the research or understand the operation of the LCS.  This was an 
intentional part of the design so as to reduce the potential for observer-induced biases. 
Observers took notes about each subject; the notes contained observations on the 
subject’s verbal comments, actions, and body language during the test. 
Subjects 
The research includes the use of human subjects; therefore, the methodology 
required review by the West Virginia University Institutional Review Board (IRB) for the 
protection of human subjects.  Due to the minimal risk of the tests, an exemption was 
requested and granted.  Appendix C contains the exception request and IRB approval. 
 A total of 41 subjects from the NIOSH Pittsburgh Research Laboratory 
volunteered to participate in this study.  Six of these subjects participated in pilot testing; 
32 subjects participated in the LCS tests; three served as test observers.  All subjects were 
recruited as volunteers by word of mouth from researchers from NIOSH, Pittsburgh 
Research Laboratory. 
Measurement Methods  
Two methods are used to collect dependent variables:  the think-aloud protocol of 
Discount Usability Engineering method and the questionnaire instrument of Appendix D. 
Questionnaire Instrument 
Table 7-3 maps the dependent variables to the specific questionnaire sections.  
Portions of the questionnaire are from two respected and validated instruments: the 
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Questionnaire for User Interaction Satisfaction (QUIS) and the Software Usability 
Measurement Inventory (SUMI). 
Table 7-3.  The dependent variables and corresponding sections of the questionnaire. 
Dependent Variable Questionnaire Sections 
Predictability (p) 3.1.1, 3.1.2, 3.1.3, 3.2 
Observability (o) 3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6 
Usability (u) 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, 3.10 
 
QUIS is used to Aprovide researchers with a validated instrument for conducting 
comparative evaluations, and serve as a test instrument in usability labs@ (Human 
Computer Interaction Laboratory, 2002). 
SUMI is Aa rigorously tested and proven method of measuring software quality 
from the end user's point of view@ and Aas the de facto industry standard questionnaire” 
(Human Factors Research Group, 2002).  The international standard ISO 9241 recognizes 
the SUMI method to test user satisfaction. 
The validity of the QUIS and SUMI surveys was kept intact by using a two-step 
adaptation process.  The first step Afilters@ for questions pertaining to this research.  The 
second step Afocuses@ the questions explicitly to this research.  For instance, a question 
with Athis software@ was reworded to Athis system@. 
Each subject completes the questionnaire to elicit their perceptions.  The 
questionnaire uses multiple choice and open-ended questions.  The multiple-choice 
questions are based on a five-point Likert scale.  Open-ended questions are used to 
collect post-experimental data for the experiment at the conclusion of the entire sequence. 
Observer Notes 
The think-aloud technique yielded qualitative data as recorded by an observer 
during subject testing.  The data was recorded in the form of written observations of the 
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subject’s verbal and nonverbal communications during the tests.  This qualitative data 
was another component assumed to be dependent on the treatment, adding another 
dimension to dependent variable data from the perspective of the observer. 
Pilot Testing  
The main objective of pilot testing was to identify and correct the weaknesses and 
shortcomings with the LCS instructions, test scenario instructions, and the graphical user 
interface (GUI) before conducting LCS tests with 32 subjects.  Six convenience subjects 
volunteered to conduct pilot testing: these subjects did not participants in LCS tests. 
 The pilot testing proved to be very beneficial.  It resulted revising the instructions 
to make them shorter and easier to follow and understand.  It also resulted in a simpler, 
more intuitive GUI. 
Subject Instructions 
Subjects received written instructions for the operation of the LCS and for 
executing the tasks of each scenario.  There was considerable variation in subject 
comprehension, subject errors, and with the expected subject actions and behaviors.  
Many instruction-related issues were found to be dependent on the form or method of 
delivering instructions.  It was also evident that using written instructions alone would 
not suffice for a group of 32 subjects because of the variability in the way people learn.  
For instance, some people learn best by reading while others learn by listening; yet others 
learn by doing.  Realistically, people learn in various combinations of these.  Hence, 
instructions were delivered by multiple methods as described: 
• LCS instruction improvements:  The information was presented in four forms to 
accommodate subjects who learn by reading, watching, listening, and by doing. 
First, subjects watched a PowerPoint presentation having pre-recorded narratives.  
The presentation gave an overview of the process and the operation of the LCS, 
which also contained a video file of the researcher executing the warm-up sessions.  
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These provided a dynamic example of using the LCS GUI, and using the read-
aloud and think-aloud techniques. 
• Scenario instruction improvements:  The researcher observed that errors of 
omission were predominant and that most subjects had difficult comprehending the 
scenarios.  Subjects were merely following instructions so they did not closely 
observe or understand LCS behavior.  Changing the instructions in two ways 
provided an improvement.  The first was to rewrite the scenario instructions 
changing from a sequence of operator tasks to a set of instructions that establish an 
objective within the context of a story.  Therefore, each instructed task had more 
meaning for subjects because they could place the tasks within the context of the 
scenario’s objective.   
• Subject comprehension and errors of omission improvements:  It appeared that 
subjects were reading instructions too quickly.  To remedy this, subjects were 
asked to read the instructions out loud.  This activity slowed down and focused the 
subject’s thoughts on the instructions.  The researchers observed these benefits: 
o eliminated errors of omission; 
o improved subject comprehension; 
o increased subject vocalizations during the think aloud technique; 
o facilitated observer data collection because it was easier to follow and 
record subject observations; 
o facilitated observations because it gave observers an additional data 
source; for example, as the subject read the instructions, an observer could 
infer as source of confusion to be with the instructions.  
 The researcher’s “read-aloud” technique was an effective solution for the scenario 
instruction issues, and it provided additional benefits.  The read-aloud technique had 
merit for this research.  Additional investigation into the effectiveness of the read-aloud 
technique is needed.  
Graphical User Interface Improvements (GUI) 
 The original user interface grouped interface controls by categories.  For instance, 
the dimmer slide controls were grouped together and the lighting option pull down menus 
were grouped together.  Subjects found this cumbersome and non-intuitive. 
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The researcher’s solution was to group interface controls by LCS functions.  
Specifically, the user interface groupings were the occupied light scene, vacant light 
scene, and window and wall light groups. 
Data Preparation 
Dependent Variables 
Each dependent variable has a quantitative component:  obtained from the subject 
questionnaire ratings, and a qualitative component:  obtained from written observations 
of each subject during tests. 
The raw dependent data for the three scenarios was entered from the questionnaire 
into a single Excel spreadsheet.  Columns were also added for each dependent variable. 
These columns contained the mean subject ratings of predictability, observability, and 
usability for each subject. 
Qualitative Data 
  Qualitative data was quantified by using a process of categorizing and mapping 
the data to a five-point Likert scale as used by the subject questionnaire.  This process is 
depicted in figure 7-2.  Once the observer data was quantified, the mean values for each 
category was weighted by 30%, then combined with questionnaire data for dependent 
variables p, o, and u. 








Figure 7-2.  The process of quantifying qualitative data from observer notes. 
Variable Naming Conventions 
Dependent Variables:  
Example:  Y1AP = predictability variable for Treatment A of the vacant light scene.  
• Position 1: Y = Dependent Variable 
• Position 2: Scenario identifier where 1 = Vacant light scene, 2 = Lighting options, 
and 3 = Wall & window light push button scenario. 
• Position 3: A = Treatment A (complex); B = Treatment B (less complex) 
• Position 4: Category identifier; P = Predictability, O = Observability, U = Usability 
Independent Variables: 
Example: X1A1 = variable 1 for the Treatment A of the lighting options scenario. 
• Position 1: X - Independent Variable 
• Position 2: Scenario identifier where 1= Vacant Light Scene, 2= Lighting Options, 
and 3= Wall & window light push button scenario. 
• Position 3: A = Treatment A (complex); B = Treatment B (less complex) 
• Position 4: Sequential numeric identifier 
Warm-up Variables: 
• W1 - the mean value for the subject’s ease of following and understanding the 
warm-up. 
• W2 - the mean value for the subject’s ease of using the GUI to run the warm-up.  








The experimental method and plan were presented.  The research design was based 
on a cross-over design; a standard design with an established validity.  The research also 
used a standard usability evaluation method: the Discount Usability Engineering method.  
Our research methodology and plan addresses the test subjects, measurement methods, 
data collection and preparation, and the statistical analyses.  Lastly, the threats to internal 
validity are recognized and addressed.   
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DATA ANALYSES AND HYPOTHESES TESTING 
The previous chapter described the research methodology used to conduct tests. 
This chapter details the analysis of test data and the hypotheses testing.  Descriptive 
statistics of median and mode, and histograms were used to characterize the test subjects, 
the results of warm-up tests, and the main test results.  Next, data validity was addressed 
by analyzing subject data for outliers, by conducting data reliability estimates, and by 
investigating data trends for evidence of data confounding.  
Once data validity was established, nonparametric statistical methods were used to 
test the hypotheses.  Canonical correlation analysis and structure correlations were used 
determine what linear combination of dependent variables was most strongly correlated 
with a linear combination of independent variables.  The results pertain to null 
hypotheses 1 through 3 − the dependent variables predictability, observability, and 
usability do not correlate with our NAT metrics of complexity.  The Wilcoxon signed-
rank test was used to test hypotheses 4 through 6 − increasing NAT complexity does not 
decrease system predictability, observability, and usability. 
Lastly, the results of statistical tests were determined through the calculation of p-
values, standard errors, and 95% confidence intervals.  
Subject Profiles 
Thirty-two volunteer subjects from the National Institute for Occupational Safety and 
Health, Pittsburgh Research Laboratory participated in testing.  The subjects had no prior 
knowledge or involvement of this research.  Each subject responded to all questions for 
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Part 1 of the questionnaire instrument of Appendix D.  The typical subject is 
characterized as follows based upon subject data collected during pre-test activities:  
• 78.1% - technical job classification; 
• 71.8% - 45-65 years old; 
• 87.3% - male; 
• 100%  - no prior involvement in the research; 
• 84.4% - no knowledge of the light control system test vehicle; 
• 84.4% - PC experience rated at 4 or 5 (expert). 
 
Figure 8-1. characterizes subjects in more detail.  Each x-axis item represents a question 


















































































































Involved in this research?
LCS Knowledge: 1 =
none, 5 = expert
PC Experience : 1 = none,
5 = expert
 
Figure 8-1  Subject profile data from the subject questionnaire of Appendix D.  
Subject Responses for the Warm-Up Session 
Two measurements were used to characterize the subject’s perceptions of the 
overall warm-up session.  W1 is a measure of the subject’s ease of following and 
understanding the warm-up instructions.  W1 was calculated as the mean of 28 subject 
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ratings for questions 2.1.1 to 2.1.4 of the questionnaire.  Figure 8-2(A) depicts the 
histogram for W1.  W2 represents the subject’s ease of using the GUI.  W2 measures the 
subject’s ease of using the GUI to run the warm-up.  W2 was calculated as the mean of 
28 subject ratings for questions 2.2 to 2.6 of the questionnaire.  Figure 8-2(B) depicts the 
histogram for variable W2. 





































Figure 8-2.  Mean subject responses for the warm-up session. Graph (A) depicts the 
subjects understanding of session tasks.  Graph (B) depicts the subject’s ease 
of using the GUI. 
Test Data Characterizations 
A more detailed depiction of subject responses is presented by a series of 
histograms.  The frequency of responses for each scenario and treatment are depicted by 
the histograms of Figures 8-3, 8-4, and 8-5  
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Figure 8-3.  The mean predictability, observability, and usability responses for the vacant 
light scene scenario.  Graphs (A), (E), and (D) depict treatment A responses; 
graphs (C), (B), and (F) depict treatment B responses.  N = 28 subjects. 
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Treatment A     Treatment B 




















































































































Figure 8-4.  The mean predictability, observability, and usability responses for the 
lighting options scenario.  Graphs (A), (E), and (D) depict treatment A 
responses; graphs (C), (B), and (F) depict treatment B responses.  N = 28 
subjects. 
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Treatment A     Treatment B 





















































































































Figure 8-5.  The mean predictability, observability, and usability for the wall and window 
light pushbutton scenario.  Graphs (A), (E), and (D) depict treatment A 
responses; graphs (C), (B), and (F) depict treatment B responses.  N = 28 
subjects. 
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In general, the treatment B histograms for predictability, observability, and 
usability are skewed to the right more than the histograms for treatment A.  This indicates 
treatment B was perceived as having better predictability, observability, and usability 
than treatment A.  
Table 8-1 lists the median and mode subject responses for predictability, 
observability, and usability for treatment A and B.  Observations of these values leads us 
to infer treatment B was more predictable, observable, and usable because the median 
and mode values for treatment B all greater than treatment A with only one exception; the 
mode values are equal for observablility of the lighting option treatments. 
Table 8-1.  Mean and mode of each dependent variable.  
 






















































Usability mode 4.25 5.0 4.0 5.0 4.5 5.0 
 
Analysis of Internal Validity Threats 
All subjects answered all questions of the questionnaire (Appendix D) each time 
they completed a scenario  The questionnaire data was checked for internal validity to 
identify invalid data, to assess data reliability, and to evaluate learning effects and subject 
fatigue effects.  








Data from two subjects receiving treatment A and two subjects receiving treatment 
B were determined to be outliers by using three criteria.  First, subject data sets having 
unusually high values were identified.  Next, those data sets were compared to the 
observer’s data to identify major discrepancies.  For instance, observer data indicated 
subject frustration and confusion; however, the subject data indicated the opposite.   
Data Reliability 
Cronbach’s Alpha is widely used to estimate data reliability when data are items in 
a scale; our data is of a five-point Likert scale.  The calculated Cronbach’s alpha is a 
reliability coefficient estimate of the data consistency or repeatability given the scale. 
Chronbach’s Alpha values range from 0 to 1; a value of .70 or higher is a typical 
acceptability benchmark.  This was exceeded with Cronbach’s Alpha value of .811. 
Data Confounding 
The subject responses for each dependent variable and treatment are generalized 
and depicted by line graphs of Figures 8-6 and 8-7.  These graphs allow inspection of 
data trends with respect to the time progression for each scenario as ordered by 
treatments A and B.  The data, as presented in this form, are useful for determining if 
there might be any confounding from learning effects and subject fatigue.  A positive-
sloped trend could be an indication that subjects are learning more as time progresses so, 
they would rate dependent variables with a higher value.  A negative-sloped trend could 
be an indication of subject fatiguing as time increases, so they would rate dependent 
variables with a lower value.  The interpretations of these graphs are given in chapter 9. 








Figure 8-6.  The mean dependent variables values for the sequence 1.  N = 14.              
 



















1 = Vacant Light Scene
2 = Lighting Options
3 = Wall and Ceiling Light Push Button
A = More Complex Version





















1 = Vacant Light Scene
2 = Lighting Options
3 = Wall and Ceiling Light Pushbutton
A = Treatment A
B = Treatment B








Hypotheses 1 through 3 testing used canonical correlation analysis (CCA) was and 
structure correlations were used to determine linear relationships between the 
independent and dependent variables.  Hypotheses 4 through 6 testing used a one-tailed 
Wilcoxon signed ranks test to determine the sign and magnitude of differences between 
treatments A and B.  Statistical significance measures for hypotheses tests 1 through 3 
was determined by using estimates, via boot-strap re-sampling, of the 95% confidence 
interval and standard errors.  The statistical significance measure for hypotheses tests 
four through six was determined by using 1-tailed p-values. 
Table 8-2 summarizes the hypotheses and the associated statistical methods and 
statistical significance measures.  Subsequent sections detail the inferential statistics. 
Table 8-2.  Summary of hypotheses and the associated statistical tests. 






Hypotheses 1 to 3 
 
Explore relationships 
between the independent 












- Distribution  unknown 
- Multiple independent     
variables 
- Small sample size 
- Same subjects 
- Interval & ratio-scaled   
data 
Hypotheses 4 to 6 
 
Test the hypotheses  
by comparing the 
directional difference 
between dependent 
variables of LCS 
treatment A (more 
complex) and treatment  
B (less complex). 





α = .05 
 
- Distribution unknown 
- Small sample size 
- Related groups 
- Same subjects 
- Interval-scaled data 
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Canonical Correlation Analysis  
Canonical correlation analysis (CCA) is one of many multivariate analysis 
techniques.  Other multivariate techniques include multiple regression analyses, 
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA), principle component analysis (PCA), and 
factor analysis.  Each technique has a specific purpose, strengths, weaknesses, and a set 
of underlying assumptions concerning the type and distribution of data.  
CCA was selected for this research because the variables are distinctively and 
logically grouped as independent and dependent variables as described in chapter 5.  
CCA is used to identify multiple correlations between sets of the independent and 
dependent variables.  This is in contrast to using PCA for analyzing a single data set that 
does not differentiate between independent and dependent variables.  PCA has been 
effectively used in prior complexity metrics research. Munsen used PCA to explore 35 
complexity metrics and concluded it is realistic to believe that software complexity can 
be characterized with just a few variables (Munsen & Khoshgoftaar, 1989).  Ammar 
(Ammar, Nikzadeh, & Dugan, 1997) also successfully employed PCA for software 
complexity metrics.  
CCA produces a set of paired canonical variates (a variate is a linear combination 
of variables) representing the sets of independent and dependent variables where the 
linear combinations are chosen to maximize the correlation.  The independent canonical 
variate consists of a weighted set of the original independent variable set.  The 
weightings of the set’s elements are called canonical coefficients.  The values of 
canonical coefficients determine each element’s contribution to the independent 
canonical variate.  Likewise, the dependent canonical variable consists of a linear 
combination of dependent variables. 
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 CCA finds the maximum correlation between the independent and dependent 
canonical variates and designates this as the first canonical correlation.  This first 
correlation explains the most of the relationship correlation between the independent and 
dependent canonical variates.  The subsequent canonical correlations are ordered in 
decreasing values of correlation.  They are orthogonal to the first set and have a different 
interpretation.  The number of canonical correlations is equal to the number of variables 
of the smaller set.  In this research, the dependent variable set contains three elements; so, 
only three canonical correlations are estimated. 
In summary, the canonical correlation results in two canonical variates, which are 
linear combinations of elements from the original sets of variables such that a maximum 
correlation exists between the two canonical variates.  Although the result is useful, it is 
desirable to look at structure correlation coefficients that are the Pearson correlation 
coefficients between the canonical variates and the original variables.  
Canonical Correlation Analysis Process 
The canonical correlation analysis involved multiple analyses steps to complete 
tests of hypotheses 1 through 3.  The process steps are summarized: 
1. Dependent variable correlation analysis 
2. Initial correlation analysis to identify highly correlated independent variables;  
3. Canonical correlation analysis to determine structure correlations; 
4. Bootstrap resample the data to obtain the standard error and to estimate the 95% 
confidence interval 
 
Step 1:  Dependent variable correlation analysis 
 A Spearman rank-order correlation analysis was conducted on the dependent 
variables.  The Spearman rank-order correlation is a non-parametric test of the strength 
and significance of bivariate correlations.  Both variables may be ordinal scale.  The 
spearman method calculates a coefficient rho (rs) as,  
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      (8-1)          
where N is the number of observations and d is the difference between each pair of  
variable rankings.  A perfect positive correlation results in rs = 1 while a perfect negative 
correlation results in rs = -1. 
The significance level for the Spearman rank-order correlation coefficient statistics 
is α = .05.  The p-value is used as the test statistic. 
Dependent variable correlation analysis results 
Table 8-3 depicts the correlation matrix of dependent variables.  The results show a 
medium to high levels of association between the dependent variables.  All correlations 
were significant at < .001 level (1-tailed). 
Table 8-3.  A matrix of Spearman rank-order correlation coefficient statistics to measure 

















































*** Correlation is significant at the .001 level (1-tailed)  
 
Step 2: Initial correlation analysis 
The original set of independent variables consisted of 15 metrics and are listed in 
Appendix G.  The purpose of step 2 was to first filter out redundancies in this data set.  
This initial step involved conducting canonical correlation analysis for one independent 
variable at a time to the set of dependent variables.  The results are listed in Table 8-4.  
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The five highest correlations are in bold.  This set of independent variables {X13, X7, X5, 
X2, X6} was used in step 3 that determined the structure correlation coefficients.  
Table 8-4.  Independent variable correlations to a vector of the three dependent variables. 




X13 Critical-vertex input cyclomatic complexity 0.354 
X7 Critical-state out-degree 0.209 
X5 Critical-state changes 0.208 
X2 Output cyclomatic complexity 0.195 
X6 Critical-state in-degree 0.181 
X4 Graph degree 0.139 
X14 Critical-vertex output cyclomatic complexity 0.137 
X8 Critical-state cyclomatic complexity 0.132 
X3 All paths 0.120 
X15 Critical-vertex unique conditions 0.116 
X9 Critical-state Sheppard complexity 0.180 
X12 Critical-vertex Sheppard complexity 0.101 
X10 Critical-vertex in-degree 0.092 
X11 Critical-vertex out-degree 0.090 
X1 Cyclomatic complexity 0.754 
 
Step 3: Structure Correlation  
The raw canonical coefficients can be difficult to interpret.  Structure correlations 
are very useful to facilitate their interpretations (Cliff, 1987; Shafto, Degani, & Kirlik, 
2003; Degani, 1996).  Structure correlations are derived from the raw canonical 
coefficients and represent the Pearson correlation of each original variable to the 
canonical variate.  
The structure correlations for the first pair of canonical variates are graphically 
depicted by Figure 8-8 to emphasis the negative correlation between the dependent and 
independent variates.  Table 8-5 lists the structure correlation values.  These were the 
final results. 




































Figure 8-8.  A graphical depiction of structure correlations for the first pair of canonical 
variates. Note the negative correlation between the canonical variates  
Table 8-5.  Structure correlation values for the first pair of canonical variates. 
 
Dependent Independent Variables 
Structure 
correlation 
√  Predictability (p) -0.993 
√  Observability (o) -0.585 
√  Usability (u) -0.455 
 √ X13 0.542 
 √ X7 0.316 
 √ X3 0.315 
 √ X2 0.294 
 √ X6 0.272 
 
Step 4: Bootstrap Re-sampling 
 The bootstrap re-sampling method (Efron & Tibshirani, 1993) was used to obtain 
the estimates of standard error estimate and the 95% confidence limit for the structure 
correlations.  The reason for using bootstrap is that we have no formula for the standard 
error of a complicated statistic such as the structure correlation.   
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This method re-samples the data with replacement repeatedly to compute estimates 
of the desired statistic (structure correlation).  In other words, the bootstrap method takes 
repeated samples to approximate the distribution of the original population.  The re-
sampling was done preserving the treatment group sample sizes.  Thus the re-sampling 
was stratified by treatment A and B to ensure that each bootstrap sample had 14 
observations for treatment A and B (28 total observations)  
The results of 1,000 bootstrap samples are listed in Tables 8-6 and 8-7.  The mean 
values listed in Table 8-6 were used as a diagnostic tool to check problems with re-
sampling.  The mean values from re-sampling are very close to the observed values, thus 
suggesting the re-sampling was acceptable.   
Table 8-6.  Statistics from 1,000 bootstrap re-samples of the structure correlations. 
Variable Observed value Mean value Standard error 
Predictability (p) -0.9925 -0.9854 0.01293 
Observability (o) -0.5848 -0.5830 0.08435 
Usability (u) -0.4552 -0.4551 0.09648 
X13 0.5417 0.5361 0.07596 
X7 0.3159 0.3129 0.08953 
X5 0.3153 0.3097 0.08834 
X2 0.2936 0.2917 0.08835 
X6 0.2722 0.2696 0.09122 
 
Table 8-7.  Structured correlation confidence limits statistics from 1,000 bootstrap 
replications of the structure correlations. 
Variable 5% 95% 
Predictability (p) -0.999 -0.976 
Observability (o) -0.712 -0.433 
Usability (u) -0.597 -0.280 
X13 0.420 0.665 
X7 0.175 0.463 
X5 0.174 0.461 
X2 0.148 0.438 
X6 0.127 0.421 
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Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test 
The Wilcoxon signed-rank test (Hollander & Wolfe , 1973) is a nonparametric 
statistical significance test of the equality of central tendency (median) for two related 
samples of interval scale.  It is used to test the direction and magnitude of difference 
between a related pair of samples.  The Wilcoxon signed rank is calculated as follows, 
assuming no ties in the data groups: 
   
( ) ( )( )
T R





















24     (8-2) 
where 
     T = test statistic; 
     R2 = ranked sum of negative data group differences; 
     n = number of nonzero data group differences; 
If there are ties in the data groups, the Wilcoxon signed rank test is calculated as follows: 
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24 2    (8-3) 
where 
      ti = number of differences of equal absolute values in the ith tied group; 
      g = number of tied data groups; 
If T > Z1-α/2 then reject Ho, else accept Ho. The p-value is calculated by 
     ρ = 2 x [1-Φ(T)]    (8-4) 
 Z is a standard normal (Gaussian) random variate (with mean 0 and variance 1) 
and Phi is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. 
 The related pair of samples has a significant difference if the calculated value of T 
is equal or less than the critical Wilcoxon’s T value.  The software program SPSS, used 
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in this research, calculates a Z-test statistic for the Wilcoxon signed rank test.  The critical 
value of Z is ±1.645 for a significance level of .05. 
The Wilcoxon signed-rank test is used to test hypothesis 4 through 6.  The 
dependent variable data for predictability, observability, and usability from all scenarios 
using treatment A was compared to dependent variable data for predictability, 
observability, and usability from all scenarios using treatment B, the less complex version 
of treatment. Table 8-8 lists the results. 
Table 8-8.  Wilcoxon signed ranks test results of all scenarios. 
Wilcoxon 




B - A 
Observability 
Treatments 
 B - A 
Usability 
Treatments  
B - A 
Z -7.230a -6.014a -5.574a 
p-value .000*** .000 *** .000 *** 
a. Based on negative ranks 
*** Correlation is significant at the .001 level (1-tailed). 
 
A more detailed analysis was conducted to strengthen the validity of hypothesis 4 
through 6 test results.  Wilcoxon signed ranks test were conducted to test hypothesis 4 
through 6 for each scenario.  The results, listed by Table 8-8, showed that subjects 
perceived the test scenario outcomes on the complex system (treatment A) as less 
predictable, observable, usable in comparison to the simpler system (treatment B). 
Table 8-9.  Wilcoxon signed ranks test results for each scenario. 
Scenario Wilcoxon 




B - A 
Observability 
Treatments  
B - A 
Usability 
Treatments 
B - A 
1) Vacant light scene Z -4.339a -3.581a -3.140 a 
 p-value .000 *** .000 *** .001 
2) Lighting 0ptions Z -4.073a -2.987a -3.019a 
 
 
p-value .000 *** .002 .002 










 p-value .000 *** .000 *** .000 *** 
a.  Based on negative ranks. 
***  Correlation is significant at the .001 level (1-tailed). 








Descriptive statistics were presented to describe the subject characteristics data and 
subject response data for warm-up tests and the scenario tests.  Next, an internal validity 
threat analysis was conducted to target invalid data, data reliability, and data confounding 
from learning effect and subject fatigue.  The results do not show significant internal 
validity threats from these sources.  Hypotheses testing commenced once data validity 
was verified. 
Canonical correlation analysis and structure correlations were used to test 
hypotheses 1 through 3 − the dependent variables predictability, observability, and 
usability correlate with our NAT metrics of complexity.  The results showed structure 
correlations exceeding .25 for five metrics, standard errors of less than .10, and a 
statistically significant 95% confidence interval.  The five NAT metrics that correlated 
with our dependent variables were: X15, the critical-vertex input cyclomatic complexity; 
X7, the critical-state out-degree; X5, the number of critical state changes; X2, the output 
cyclomatic complexity; X6, the critical state in-degree.  A Wilcoxon signed ranks test 
was used to test hypotheses 4 through 6 and the results were also statistically significant.  
The results showed that subjects perceived the test scenario outcomes of the complex 
system (treatment A) as less predictable, observable, usable in comparison to the simpler 
system (treatment B).  
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This chapter addresses two core questions of this research:  Does the data support 
the research hypotheses and, what is the meaning and significance of the results. 
The acceptance or rejection of each research hypotheses is based on inferences 
from two parts:  1) the analysis and interpretation of internal validity threats common to 
all hypotheses; 2) the statistical test criteria for acceptance.  Following this is a discussion 
of the implications, limitations, and future areas of research.  
Relevant Data for all Hypotheses 
The acceptance or rejection of a research hypothesis based solely on statistical test 
criteria results in a weakly supported inference.  Potentially, numerous threats to internal 
validity can exist so, type I or II errors could result.  This section discusses the steps 
taken to reduce internal validity threats.  
Internal Validity Threats 
Each potential threat is listed and discussed as follows: 
• Data confounding from the scenario instructions:  Subject responses for the 
dependent variables predictability, observability, and usability could be biased due 
to subjects having difficulty following and understanding scenario instructions. 
This seems unlikely based on the warm-up data for variable W1− the mean value 
for the subject’s ease of following and understanding the warm-up instructions.  Of 
28 subjects, 24 rated W1 very favorably with a greater than 3.94 out of a maximum 
of 5.0.  The distribution for W1 had a positive skew to the right (the highest score) 
as depicted by Figure 9-1(A).  
• Data confounding from the GUI:  Biased responses for the dependent variables 
predictability, observability, and usability could be due to subjects having difficulty 
with the GUI. 
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This seems unlikely based on the warm-up data for variable W2− the mean value 
for the subject’s ease of using the GUI to run the warm-up.  Of 28 subjects, 24 
rated W2 greater than 3.58 out of a maximum of 5.0 score.  The distribution forW2 
had a positive skew to the right (the highest score) as depicted by Figure 9-1(B).   





































Figure 9-1.  Mean subject responses for the warm-up session. Graph (A) depicts the ease 
following and understanding the warm-up instructions. Graph (B) depicts the 
GUIs ease of use. 
• Invalid data:   Data from four subjects was eliminated because of consistent strings 
of high ratings and because this data was inconsistent with observer’s data.  For 
instance, out of 36 questions, 34 were rated 5.0 and two questions near the end of 
the questionnaire were rated 4.0. 
• Data reliability:   The data reliability was accepted given Cronbach’s Alpha = .811. 
An alpha of .70 or higher is a typical benchmark of acceptability. 
• Learning effects or subject fatigue:   From inspection of data trends, one can infer 
learning effects and fatigue.  A positive-sloped trend could be an indication that 
subjects are learning more as time progresses so, they would rate dependent 
variables with a higher value.  A negative-sloped trend could be an indication of 
subject fatiguing as time increases, so they would rate dependent variables with a 
lower value.  The data trends of Figures 9-2 and 9-3 were used to infer data 
confounding from learning effects or fatigue for treatments A or B.  We failed to 
detect trends indicating data confounding.  








Figure 9-2.  The mean values of each dependent variable for the sequence 1 test order.     
N = 14 subjects                    
 
 
Figure 9-3.  The mean values of each dependent variable for the sequence 2 test order.     
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1 = Vacant Light Scene
2 = Lighting Options
3 = Wall and Ceiling Light Push Button
A = More Complex Version





















1 = Vacant Light Scene
2 = Lighting Options
3 = Wall and Ceiling Light Pushbutton
A = Treatment A
B = Treatment B
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Hypotheses 1 Through 3 
The first three research hypothesis concern the existence of correlations between 
subject perceptions of the system (the dependent variables of predictability, observability, 
and usability) and NAT metrics of system complexity (the independent variables).  
Fifteen NAT metrics of system complexity comprised the set of independent variables. 
The hypotheses are summarized as follows: 
Hypothesis 1:  
 H0: There is not a correlation between NAT metrics and system predictability.  
 H1: NAT metrics are correlated to system predictability. 
Hypothesis 2: 
 H0: There is not a correlation between NAT metrics and system observability. 
  H1:  NAT metrics are correlated to system observability. 
Hypothesis 3: 
 H0: There is not a correlation between NAT metrics and system usability. 
 H1:  NAT metrics are correlated to system usability. 
Relevant Data 
Five out of 15 metrics had a statistically significant structure correlation to the set 
of dependent variables as depicted by Table 9-1.  The statistical significance was 
established from 1,000 bootstrap re-sampling calculations (as previously described in 
section “Step 4: Bootstrap Re-sampling” of chapter 8.) for standard error and a 95% 
confidence interval. 
 




John J. Sammarco, P.E 
 
9-5 
Table 9-1.  Structure correlations and statistical significance measures for the first pair of 








        5%         95% 
X13 0.542 0.07596 0.420 0.665 
X7 0.316 0.08953 0.175 0.463 
X5 0.315 0.08834 0.174 0.461 
X2 0.294 0.08835 0.148 0.438 
X6 0.272 0.09122 0.127 0.421 
 
Generally, structure correlations less than .30 are dropped because the contribution 
to the canonical variate is minimal (Shafto, Degani, & Kirlik, 2003);  This benchmark 
was relaxed to .25; hence, the entire set of independent variables {X13, X7, X5, X2, X6} 
were included for the first canonical variate.  The benchmark was relaxed because this 
portion of the research is largely exploratory, and because the information content of the 
independent data was limited. as compared to the dependent variable data.  The 
independent variable data contained only 16 unique values; the dependent variable data 
has 168 unique values.  
Next, the standard error and confidence interval are calculated for each structure 
correlation.  A standard error less than .100 is acceptable for exploratory research; all the 
standard errors listed in Table 9-1 meet these acceptance criteria.  The 95% confidence 
limit is exampled as follows: 
A confidence interval gives an estimated range of values which is likely to include 
an unknown population parameter, the estimated range being calculated from a 
given set of sample data. 
If independent samples are taken repeatedly from the same population, and a 
confidence interval calculated for each sample, then a certain percentage 
(confidence level) of the intervals will include the unknown population parameter. 
Confidence intervals are usually calculated so that this percentage is 95% … 
Confidence limits are the lower and upper boundaries / values of a confidence 
interval, that is, the values which define the range of a confidence interval.  The 
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upper and lower bounds of a 95% confidence interval are the 95% confidence 
limits (Easton & McColl, 2003). 
None of the confidence intervals in Table 9-1 include zero; therefore, the estimates 
of structure correlations confidence levels are statistically significantly different from 
zero (alpha = 0.05). 
Null Hypotheses Rejection 
The null hypothesis was rejected hypothesis 1, 2, and 3.  This was based on 
hypotheses test results of structure correlations exceeding .25 as shown by Table 9-1, 
standard errors of less than .10, confidence intervals that are statistically significant as 
shown by Table 9-2, and the steps to reduce internal validity threats.  
Hypotheses 4 Through 6  
The last three research hypothesis concern the existence of decreasing directional 
differences between subject perceptions of LCS treatment A (more complex) and LCS 
treatment B (less complex).  The hypotheses are summarized as follows: 
Hypothesis 4: 
 H0:  Increasing interactive complexity does not decrease system predictability. 
H1:  Increasing interactive complexity decreases system predictability. 
Hypothesis 5: 
 H0:  Increasing interactive complexity does not decrease system observability. 
 H1: Increasing interactive complexity decreases system observability. 
Hypothesis 6: 
 H0: Increasing interactive complexity does not decrease system usability.  
 H1:  Increasing interactive complexity decreases system usability. 
 
 








The resulting Wilcoxon signed-ranks test results listed by Table 9-2 show highly 
negative differences between the dependent variables of treatments A and B.  This means 
the median of the population distribution from treatment A was less than the median of 
the population distribution from treatment A; simply, treatment A was more complex 
than treatment B.  Secondly, the differences between treatment medians are very highly 
statistically significant with p-values less than 0.001 (one-tailed).  P-values are explained 
as follows: 
The probability value (p-value) of a statistical hypothesis test is the probability of 
getting a value of the test statistic as extreme as or more extreme than that observed 
by chance alone, if the null hypothesis H0, is true. 
It is the probability of wrongly rejecting the null hypothesis if it is in fact true. 
It is equal to the significance level of the test for which we would only just reject 
the null hypothesis.  The p-value is compared with the actual significance level of 
our test and, if it is smaller, the result is significant.  That is, if the null hypothesis 
were to be rejected at the 5% significance level, this would be reported as "p < 
0.05". 
Small p-values suggest that the null hypothesis is unlikely to be true.  The smaller it 
is, the more convincing is the rejection of the null hypothesis.  It indicates the 
strength of evidence for say, rejecting the null hypothesis H0, rather than simply 
concluding "Reject H0' or "Do not reject H0" (Easton & McColl, 2003). 
Table 9-2.  Wilcoxon signed-ranks test results an aggregation of all scenarios. 
Wilcoxon 
Signed-ranks test (1-tailed) 
Predictability 
Treatments B - A
Observability 
Treatments B - A
Usability 
Treatments B - A
Z -7.230a -6.014a -5.574a 
p value .000*** .000 *** .000 *** 
b. Based on negative ranks 
*** Statistical significance   < .001 (one-tailed) 
 
The results depicted by Table 9-2 indicate that treatments are different with regard 
to predictability, observability and usability, and the directional differences indicate that 




John J. Sammarco, P.E 
 
9-8 
treatment A has the larger median values.  Wilcoxon signed-ranks test were conducted to 
test hypothesis 4 through 6 for each scenario.  The results are listed by Table 9-3.   
Table 9-3.  Wilcoxon signed-ranks test results for each scenario. 
Scenario Wilcoxon 




B - A 
Observability 
Treatments  
B - A 
Usability 
Treatments 
B - A 
Z -4.339a -3.581a -3.140 a 1) Vacant light scene 
 p value .000 *** .000 *** .001** 
     
Z -4.073a -2.987a -3.019a 2) Lighting 0ptions 
p value .000 *** .002** .002** 
     
Z -4.373a -4.017a -3.194a 3) Wall and window 
light pushbuttons p value .000 *** .000 *** .000 *** 
a. Based on negative ranks. 
**  Statistical significance ≤ .01 (one-tailed) 
*** Statistical significance ≤ .001 (one-tailed) 
 
The results showed a significant directional difference and that treatment A has the 
larger median value for each scenario.  These are very highly significant statistical 
differences with p values less than < .001 (one-tailed) except for observability and 
usability for the Lighting options scenario that has a highly significant statistical 
difference with a one-tailed p-value of 0.002.  The results of this in-depth analysis also 
support rejection of the null hypotheses. 
Lastly, the hypotheses testing results for research hypotheses 1 through 3 give 
added insight.  Specifically, the graphical depiction of structure correlations for the first 
pair of canonical variates, depicted by Figure 9-4, shows very strong negative structure 
correlations for the canonical variate composed of the original dependent variables (note 
that a perfect negative correlation is -1); therefore, as the independent variables X13, X7, 
X5, X2, and X6 increase, the dependent variables of predictability, observability, and 
usability decrease.  
 








Figure 9-4.  A graphical depiction of structure correlations for the first pair of canonical 
variates. Note the negative correlation between the canonical variates.  
Null Hypotheses Rejection 
The null hypotheses are rejected for research hypothesis 4, 5, and 6.  The rejection 
was based on the Wilcoxon hypotheses test results of Tables 9-2 and 9-3 showing that 
treatment A was perceived by subjects as more complex than treatment B; also, the p-
values of these results exceeded the statistical significance level of 05.  Secondly, the 
strong negative correlations between independent and dependent structure correlations, 
depicted by Figure 9-4, supported the decision to not accept the null hypotheses.  
Implications 
This research can be used as a practical tool for addressing system-level hazards in 
embedded-computer based systems.  Specifically, the hazards are those resulting from 
NAT complexities.  Mitigation of these hazards is very important because computer-
based systems are proliferating in many safety-critical applications and many incidents 
have occurred.  Over 400 computer-related incidents have been documented (Neumann, 
X13
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1995).  In 1995, about 2000 deaths were determined to be computer-related (MacKenzie, 
1994).  In the mining sector, 82 computer-related incidents from 1995 to 2001 were 
documented (Sammarco, 2003).  The mining incidents involved the hazard of unexpected 
movement.  This is a significant hazard so NIOSH research is addressing this by 
developing best practice recommendations and the NAT complexity assessment 
methodology of this research (Sammarco, 1999).  The existence of this safety issue is 
troubling, but more troubling is that our traditional tools do not effectively handle 
complexity-related hazards (Leveson, 2000).  
This research enables quantification of NAT complexities of system-level 
requirements.  This enables NAT complexities impacting safety to be identified, 
analyzed, and mitigated before they are propagated to subsequent life cycle phases.  
Safety is an emergent property of the system so safety must be addressed at the system-
level as done by this research.  This is in contrast to other approaches that quantify 
attributes of the software subsystem.  Obviously, these approaches do not address the 
system but they also take place much later in the system life cycle where the software is 
already written.  Thus, it is more costly to correct. 
The implications of this research are discussed in detail through means of a 
practical example addressing the important issue of requirements errors. 
Requirements Engineering 
The vacant light scene scenario, first described in chapter 6, serves to illustrate a 
practical engineering application involving an incompletely defined function.  The 
practicality and importance of this research is strengthened by this illustration because of 
the nature of requirements errors; most errors occur in the requirements (Davis, 1993) 
(Lutz, 1996); errors are much less costly to correct  at the requirements phase than later 
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(Davis, 1993) (Nelson, Clark, & Spurlock, 1999); requirement errors propagate to cause 
errors in later life cycle phases (Kelly, Sherif, & Hops, 1992). 
Requirement specification errors fall into two categories: errors of omission and 
errors of commission.  Requirements errors are common.  A study of primary causes of 
failure for 34 industrial accidents found that 44.1% of the causes were attributed to the 
requirements specification (UK Health and Safety Executive, 1995).  Similar results were 
found for the mining sector (Sammarco, 2003). 
Secondly, it is very beneficial to address requirements issues early in the 
requirements phase, where most of the errors occur, because it is less costly to correct 
them compared to later development stages (Davis, 1993; Jones, 1994).  
The vacant light scene scenario provides an example of an error of omission 
because the functionality is incompletely specified.  The vacant light scene scenario is 
now described. 
The vacant light scene 
The vacant light scene for treatments A and B is summarized by the listings in 
Table 9-4.  The behaviors for treatments A and B are identical up to the time of five 
minutes.  At that time, the vacant light scene activates and remains activated for treatment 
B (the less complex system).  Treatment A differs in that the vacant light scene does not 
activate until the subject re-enters the office at seven minutes. 
The LCS requirement U4 of section 3.1.1 of the LCS problem description, defines 
the behavior for the vacant light scene (Queins et al., 2000).  It states: 
“If the room is reoccupied after more than T1 minutes after the last person has left 
the room, the default light scene has to be established.” 
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Both treatments meet the LCS requirements for the vacant light scene because for 
treatments A and B, the vacant light scene is “on” when the subject reoccupies the office 
after the time delay expired.  The requirements defining the vacant light scene operation 
are incomplete, thus there is an error of omission. 
 
Table 9-4.  Vacant light scene scenario values for treatment A and B. The items of 













0 occupied occupied disabled disabled 
1 temp. empty occupied disabled disabled 
2 temp. empty occupied disabled disabled 
3 temp. empty occupied disabled disabled 
4 temp. empty occupied disabled disabled 
5 








enabled @ 20 watts 
6 temp. empty vacant disabled enabled @ 20 watts 
7 occupied vacant enabled @ 20 watts enabled @ 20 watts 
 
The complexity assessment methodology of this research can be used as a tool to 
help decide which design, treatment A and B, is less complex.  In less complex designs 
the end-user is not likely to create a hazardous situation because the system is less 
predictable, observable, and useable (the dependent variables of this research).   
This research can be used as a tool to help improve system safety early in the 
requirements phase where interventions are the most cost-effective. 
Limitations 
Three primary limitations of this research are listed in order of priority and 
discussed.  The last two limitations concerning human subjects and external validity are 
interrelated. 








The complexity assessment methodology of this research involves relative 
comparisons of systems under development or of existing systems.  At this point, it has 
limited use as a prediction tool or system.  A prediction system is defined to clarify this 
limitation: 
“A prediction system consists of a mathematical model together with a set of 
prediction procedures for determining unknown parameters and interpreting 
results.” (Littlewood, 1989) 
This research is useful for relative assessments but it lacks mathematical models 
and inference procedures to identify and assign a probability to future outcomes.  This 
research does not establish benchmarks for the independent variables X13, X7, X5, X2, 
and X6.  Thus, at this point, one cannot infer with a great degree of certainty that the 
value of any independent variable should not exceed a specific benchmark.  If the 
research did establish these benchmarks, then one could use them to target specific areas 
for simplification.  Hence, additional research is needed to realize a predictive tool.  The 
complexity assessment methodology of this research can serve as a solid basis for 
predictive research.  
Limited subject diversity  
The data from our volunteer subject characterizations indicates a relatively 
homogenous group of people.  The potential exists that subjects had similar perceptions 
because of the homogenous makeup of the group.  Therefore, this can potentially be a 
threat to external validity with respect to generalizations to other populations. 
 Subject data was collected during pre-test activities.  Analysis of subject data 
shows that there were very small numbers of people with non-technical backgrounds, 
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people in the 18 to 35-age range, and women.  The most predominate characteristics are 
as follows:  
• 78.1% - technical job classification; 
• 71.8% - 45-65 years old; 
• 87.3% - male; 
• 84.4% - PC experience rated at 4 or 5 (expert). 
 
There is a positive aspect to the sample population limitations.  We infer that it was 
more difficult to elicit negative subject perceptions of system predictability, 
observability, and usability (the dependent variables) because the typical subject had 
considerable experience with technical systems and PC’s.  This was an advantage 
because their mental models of the system most likely included a more complete 
structural model of the system because they had researched, designed, and analyzed other 
complex, technical systems at NIOSH.  Some subjects commented they had figured out 
how the more complex LCS (treatment A) was designed. 
 The dependent variable measurements are based upon user perceptions.  Human 
perceptions are affected by many factors including age, race, gender, education, and 
social factors; hence, perceptions can potentially contain a large degree of variability.  
The subjects are a limited sample of the population.  This can be a threat to external 
validity; however, the years of technical experience could have given the volunteer 
subjects an advantage over more generalized sample populations. 
External validity 
The research is externally valid if it can be generalized to other populations or to 
other embedded computer systems.  The external validity limitations that could affect 
generalization to other populations were addressed.  It is not known if the resulting set of 
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independent variables is useful for other systems, or if the same inferences concerning the 
six research hypotheses would pertain to other systems. 
There is a potential lack of generalization to other systems; however, this is not an 
obvious or intrinsic threat to external validity because this research focuses on a 
complexity assessment methodology and not the specific results with respect to the 
specific metrics comprising the set of independent variables.  More importantly, the 
methodology can be generalized to other systems.  Specifically, the SCR tools have been 
successfully used to model a wide variety of complex, real-time embedded systems 
including avionics systems, a submarine communications system, and safety-critical 
portions of a nuclear power plant (Heitmyer, Jeffords, & Labaw, 1996).  Secondly, the 
metrics of this research are not specific to a given system but can be determined from any 
SCR dependency graph.  
More research using other subject samples and systems is needed to verify the 
extent of external validity with respect to the specific results.  However, it can be stated 
that the complexity assessment methodology of this research can be generalized to other 
systems and subject populations. 
Summary 
Canonical correlation analysis and structure correlations were used to test null 
hypotheses 1 through 3 −the dependent variables predictability, observability, and 
usability do not correlate with our NAT metrics of complexity.  The results showed 
structure correlations exceeding .25 for five metrics, standard errors of less than .10, and 
a statistically significant 95% confidence interval.  The five NAT metrics that correlated 
with our dependent variables were:  X15, critical-vertex input cyclomatic complexity; X7, 
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critical-state out-degree; X5, number of critical state changes; X2, output cyclomatic 
complexity; X6, critical state in-degree.  
 A Wilcoxon signed ranks test was used to test null hypotheses 4 through 6  − 
increasing NAT complexity does not decreases system predictability, observability, and 
usability.  The results showed that subjects perceived the test scenario outcomes of the 
complex system (treatment A) as less predictable, observable, usable in comparison to the 
simpler system (treatment B).  
Based on hypotheses test results and the steps to guard internal validity, the null 
hypotheses were rejected for research hypotheses one through six.  
Lastly, the primary limitations of this research concern the research’s limited use as 
a predictive tool and potential threats to validity because continence subjects were used 
and because this research is just one empirical study.  More empirical research is needed 
to address these limitations.  
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Summary of Research 
Normal Accident Theory (NAT) explains that complex system accidents are 
inevitable because complex systems, such as computer-based systems, are highly 
interconnected, highly interactive, and tightly coupled.  For example, over 400 computer-
related incidents occurred between 1976 and 1963 (Neumann, 1995).  From 1995 to 
2001, 11 computer-related mining incidents in the U.S. were reported by the Mine Safety 
and Health Administration; from 1995 to 2002, 71 computer-related mining incidents 
were reported in Australia (Sammarco, 2003).  The National Institute for Occupational 
Safety and Health (NIOSH) has recognized the hazards associated with complex 
computer-based mining systems; hence, it is developing a complexity assessment 
methodology for programmable-electronic mining systems (Sammarco, 2002). 
We are ill-equipped to understand and manage these complexities because we have 
not had a scientific methodology to identify and quantify the safety-related complexities 
of a system.  More specifically, NAT has not been operationalized for computer-based 
systems.  Our research addresses this limitation.  Our specific objective was to define 
graph-theoretical metrics to measure or indicate specific NAT attributes of complexity in 
the system requirements of computer-based systems.  
We theorized there are two types of system complexity.  The first is internal − the 
complexity of a system’s internal structure.  The second is external − the unfamiliar, 
unplanned, or unexpected system behaviors as viewed by the human interacting with the 
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system.  External, complex behaviors can be difficult to observe and not immediately 
comprehensible by the end-user (Perrow, 1999).  We characterized external complexity 
with three variables: predictability, observability, and usability  the dependent 
variables for our research.  We characterized internal complexity by modeling a system’s 
specified behavior, and quantifying its NAT attributes with multiple graph-theoretical 
metrics  our independent variables.  
The first challenge was to formally model the specified behavior (requirements) of 
a computer-based system such that the model enabled direct or indirect measurement of 
internal complexity.  Twelve criteria were established to help guide the selection of a 
modeling method.  The Software Cost Reduction (SCR) method was selected and 
successfully used to translate system requirements into dependency graph models to 
which we could apply our graph-theoretical metrics.   
The next challenge was to define multiple, graph-theoretical metrics to measure or 
indicate specific NAT attributes.  This was accomplished by deduction  abstracting the 
thirteen attributes of NAT complexity, as conceptualized by Perrow (Perrow, 1999), to a 
generalized view of simple (linear) and complex (nonlinear) systems;  selecting a subset 
of NAT attributes pertaining to system requirements; deriving multiple metrics for the 
subset of NAT attributes.  As a result, fifteen metrics were proposed.  
Next, the light control system (LCS) was selected as research test vehicle because it 
represented a complex, real-world system that afforded human-computer interaction.  The 
LCS was devised by the Fraunhofer Institute for Experimental Software Engineering as a 
case study for requirements engineering seminars.  With the research test vehicle in 
place, we addressed our research methodology. 
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The research methodology was based on a cross-over design.  We chose a standard 
design because its validity was established, and the strengths and weaknesses were well 
known.  Our methodology included having 32 volunteer subjects run simulations of the 
LCS in order for us to obtain dependent variable data.  The data were collected from a 
questionnaire each subjected answered after running a simulation.  Once data were 
collected, we conducted an internal validity threat analysis.  Significant internal validity 
threats were not evident so we prepared the data for hypotheses testing.  
Canonical correlation analysis and structure correlations were used to test null 
hypotheses 1 through 3 − the dependent variables predictability, observability, and 
usability do not correlate with our NAT metrics of complexity.  The results showed 
structure correlations exceeding .25 for five metrics, standard errors of less than .10, and 
a statistically significant 95% confidence interval.  The five NAT metrics that correlated 
with our dependent variables were: X15, critical-vertex input cyclomatic complexity; X7, 
critical-state out-degree; X5, number of critical state changes; X2, output cyclomatic 
complexity; X6, critical state in-degree.  A Wilcoxon signed ranks test was used to test 
null hypotheses 4 through 6 − increasing NAT complexity does not decrease system 
predictability, observability, and usability.  The results showed that subjects perceived the 
test scenario outcomes of the complex system (treatment A) as less predictable, 
observable, usable in comparison to the simpler system (treatment B).  Based on 
hypotheses test results and the steps to guard internal validity, the null hypotheses were 
rejected for research hypotheses one through six as summarized by Table 10-1. 
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Table 10-1.  A summary of the research hypotheses and associated rejection criteria 




Rejection criteria  
1) There is not a correlation between 




2) There is not a correlation between 




3) There is not a correlation between 
NAT metrics and system usability. 
 X 
Structure correlation ≥ .250 
 
Standard error ≤.100  
 
95% Confidence interval     
does not cross zero 
4) Increasing interactive complexity 
does not decrease system 
predictability 
 X 
5) Increasing interactive complexity 
does not decrease system 
observability 
 X 
6) Increasing interactive complexity 
does not decrease system usability 
 X 
Wilcoxon sign-ranks test      
Z ≤ -1.645 
 
p value ≤ .05  
 
 
We reflect on the implications of this research.  Our research quantified NAT 
complexities of system-level requirements.  This enables an early assessment of NAT 
complexities impacting safety before they are propagated to other life cycle phases.  Our 
research can be used as a requirements engineering tool to compare NAT complexity 
impacts from various system requirements.  Armed with this knowledge, one can target 
requirements to simplify, and measure their simplification efforts. 
In subsequent sections, we draw a number of conclusions about the research; 
identify the research limitations, and the opportunities for future research. 
Conclusions 
Several conclusions emerge from this research; these conclusions are based on data 
and what was observed and learned.  We conclude that this work is a promising and 
significant step in meeting our research objective:  to operationalize NAT for the system-
level requirements of safety-related computer systems.  Several other conclusions are 
drawn with respect to the four specific aims of the research, and lastly, it was concluded 
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that this research has several limitations and that there are opportunities for future 
research.   
Conclusion 1 
The research objective was partially realized.  We qualify this claim as partial 
because the research was limited to one system and 32 test subjects; more empirical 
research is needed to validate the findings.  Nonetheless, we have carried out the first 
steps to take NAT from theory to practice.  Two arguments support this claim.  First, 
there was a statistically significant, negative correlation between five NAT metrics of 
complexity and the externally visible system attributes of predictability, observability, 
and usability.  Secondly, we realized each of the specific aims for operationalizing NAT 
with respect to the research objective. 
• Specific Aim 1:   Identify the NAT attributes to operationalize with respect to 
system requirements.  
We conclude we have addressed this aim.  We used a process of deduction that 
enabled us to ascertain that three of 13 NAT attributes can be observed in SCR 
dependency models of system requirements.  Our premise was that NAT attributes 
could be generalized to linearity where complex systems are nonlinear; simple 
systems are linear.  From this premise, our reasoning led us to identify three NAT 
attributes to operationalize: interconnectivity, common-mode connections, and 
multiple control parameters.  
• Specific Aim 2:  Identify a formal modeling method for system requirements that 
will afford quantification of the potential metrics. 
We conclude the SCR models and simulations successfully served our research 
needs so, this aim was satisfied.  We have shown that the formal system model 
created with the SCR tool is useful for modeling, simulating, and analyzing human-
computer interactions in the context of NAT.  The SCR dependency graphs 
accommodated multiple levels of system abstraction and multiple projections 
needed for specific aim 3.  Secondly, the SCR toolset successfully supported 
simulation of our model.  A PC-based GUI for the simulation was created using 
SCR simulation tools.  Volunteer subjects were able to quickly learn (in about 10 
minutes) to run the simulation and effectively understand the simulation such that 
useful data were collected. 
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• Specific Aim 3:  Identify potential metrics for each NAT attribute to be 
operationalized.  At least one metric, and ideally four metrics, should be identified 
for each of these NAT attributes. 
We conclude that this aim was satisfied as evidenced by 15 metrics proposed to 
measure or indicate the three NAT attributes from specific aim 1.  We infer a 
degree of validity to the proposed metrics because our selection process addressed 
the limitations of NAT and of other metric research, and our selection process 
addressed the multidimensional aspects of complexity.  We used multiple system 
abstractions and multiple perspectives to obtain our metrics.  Three levels of system 
abstraction formed a hierarchy of SCR dependency graphs that modeled system 
requirements in increasing detail.  For each abstraction, we applied a projection 
from the system’s input environment, from the output environment of system 
behaviors visible to humans interacting with the system, and from a collective 
projection of all the system’s internal dependencies.  This process was an effort to 
address the multidimensional aspects of complexity. 
• Specific Aim 4:  Determine which, if any of the potential metrics operationalize the 
NAT attributes for system requirements. 
We conclude this aim was satisfied. This is evidenced by data obtained from 
hypotheses testing and the steps to reduce internal validity threats.  Hypotheses test 
results showed five out of the 15 proposed metrics had structure correlations 
exceeding .25, standard errors of less than .10, and statistically significant 
confidence intervals.  
Conclusion 2 
We conclude the research is not without limitations; additional research is needed 
to address these limitations and to advance our knowledge.  This conclusion is based on 
four research limitations.  
• Predictive limitations:  The research did not develop mathematical models and 
inference procedures to identify and assign a probability to future outcomes.   More 
specifically, this research did not establish benchmarks for the complexity metrics; 
so one cannot make predictions based solely on the metric values.     
• NAT operalization limitations:  We have operationalized three NAT attributes: 
interconnectivity, common-mode connections, and multiple, interacting control 
parameters.  This is a small subset; thus, the research is limited to a narrow segment 
of the 13 NAT attributes of NAT. 
• Limited subject diversity:  The data from our volunteer subject characterizations 
indicates a relatively homogenous group of people.  The potential exists that 
subjects had similar perceptions because of the homogenous makeup of the group. 
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Therefore, this can potentially be a threat to external validity with respect to 
generalizations to other populations. 
• Unknown external validity:  This section addresses generalization to other systems.  
The resulting set of independent variables X13, X7, X5, X2, and X6 and the 
rejection of the null hypotheses were based on statistically significant test results 
specific to the data set.  It is not known if these independent variables are useful for 
other systems, or if the same inferences concerning the six research hypotheses 
would pertain to other systems. More empirical research is needed to determine 
external validity. 
Future Work 
Predictive system research 
The research has limitations for use as a predictive tool or system.  Much empirical 
research is needed to develop accurate models and inference procedures so that NAT 
complexity-related hazards can be identified and predicted.   Probabilistic mathematical 
models are needed as well as a large body of empirical data.   
External validity 
Thirty-two volunteer subjects were used in this research.  This is a limited group in 
terms of the quantity and the homogenous make-up of subjects.  Therefore, more 
empirical research needed study other populations and other computer-based systems.   
NAT attribute completeness 
Perrow theorized that accidents are inevitable in complex, tightly coupled 
technological systems (Perrow, 1999).  He characterized complex systems by describing 
thirteen attributes.  Our research suggests there attributes missing from Perrow’s list of 
thirteen attributes of complex systems.  We theorize that multiple modes of system 
operation are also a NAT attribute.  The hazards associated with complex, multi-mode 
systems are documented and research has begun  (Degani, 1996; Vakil, 2000; Leveson, 
Pinnel, Sandys, Koga, & Reese, 1997) but the research is not in the context of NAT 
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complexity.  Mode confusion is a hazard of multi-mode systems.  Mode confusion is 
exhibited by system behaviors similar to those as seen in our research:  the systems 
become less predictable, observable, and usable to the human. 
Concluding Remarks 
The major contribution of this work is fundamental to scientific research – to gain 
knowledge through the discovery of relationship between the variables of interest.  
Specifically, NAT has been advanced by defining and quantifying complexity measures, 
and showing their inverse relationship to system predictability, observability, and 
usability. 
This research has taken the first steps to operationalize NAT for computer-based 
systems. We have also identified and discussed research opportunities that could advance 
NAT operationalization and the general knowledge base. We trust this research will 
stimulate and facilitate future research endeavors.  
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 APPENDIX A 
LIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM: PROBLEM DESCRIPTION 
 
The Light Control System: Problem Description (Queins et al., 2000) is reprinted 
with the permissions of the authors and Professor Hermann Maurer, Editor-in-Chief of 
the Journal of Universal Computer Science. 
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Abstract: This document contains a range of needs and requirements concerning the construction
of a light control system for a floor of a university building. A description of the building architec-
ture and of some pre-installed (light-)hardware is included. This problem description was the com-
mon input for all participants of the requirements engineering case study “Light Control”.
Key Words: requirements engineering, building automation, problem description
Introductory Note
This document gives an informal description of the problem “Light Control System”,
that is the subject of the considered case study. It is based on two previous versions that
have been used in the Sonderforschungsbereich 501 “Development of Large Systems
with Generic Methods”, a large project at the Computer Science Department of the Uni-
versity of Kaiserslautern. The initial version was created in 1995 by Stefan Queins and
Gerhard Zimmermann. The second version (reported in [Fe+99]) integrates several
changes by Martin Becker and Martin Kronenburg. This version was also used in a Dag-
stuhl Seminar on “Requirements Capture, Documentation, and Validation” that took
place in June 1999.
Finally, the version presented here is the result of repeated revisions by Martin Kronen-
burg and Christian Peper in agreement with Rolf Merz and Jürgen Schäfer from the Elec-
trical Engineering Department of the University of Kaiserslautern, who were acting as
customers in the light control case study (LCCS). Some additional improvements are
based on input received from Daniel Berry, Vincenzo Gervasi, Julio Leite, and Vinicius
da Silva Almendra.
Thus, the basic intention of providing a customer document as the basis for the case
study has been preserved. The revisions were intended to reduce the need for customer
feedback during the LCCS. Furthermore, to achieve solutions that are better comparable,
all interactions between the customer and the participants of the case study have been
published on the web [CF99].
The problem description “Light Control” is divided into 4 parts. [Part 1] is a brief intro-
duction. [Part 2] describes the architecture of the 4th floor of a university building in Kai-
Journal of Universal Computer Science, vol. 6, no. 7 (2000), 586-596
submitted: 3/7/00, accepted: 18/7/00, appeared: 28/7/00  Springer Pub. Co.
serslautern, which is the subject of the informal needs given in [Part 3]. Finally, [Part 4]
lists and explains technical terms that are used in the document.
Note that this is a reformatted version of the original LCCS problem description [PD99].
To support the traceability of any references into the original layout, the former page
numbers are included here in the format (n). The original paragraph numbering now
appears at the end of the paragraphs as [n], most line breaks are preserved.
(3)
1   Introduction
The main motivation for the development of a new light control system are the disadvan-
tages of the currently existing system. Since all lights are controlled manually, electrical
energy is wasted by lighting rooms which are not occupied and by little possibilities to
adjust light sources relative to need and daylight. [1]
In the following document,
- keywords are marked at their first occurrence and listed in the additional dictio-
nary [Part 4]. [2]
- Words written in emphasis are names of physical sensors/actuators. [3]
- Paragraphs are numbered for easier reference. [4]
(4)
2 Floor Description
In this part, the architecture and the installation of the given sensors and actuators of Build-
ing 32, 4th floor is described. [5]
The fourth floor of Building 32 consists of three sections and shares two staircases, stair-
case east (SCE) and staircase west (SCW), with other floors of the building, as shown in Fig-
ure 1. Each section is divided into some hallway sections (H) and rooms, each of which
may be an office (O), a computer lab (CL), a hardware lab (HL), a peripheral room (P), or
(5)
a meeting room (M). All rooms in a section are accessible via a connected hallway section.
There are three hallway sections and 22 rooms to control. [Figure 1] shows also the six out-
door light sensors (ols1 - ols6) and the major compass directions. The sensors cover the six
directions of the different walls. The label in a room indicates the type of the room and gives
a unique number, see [Figure 1]. [6]
2.1   Office Description
Each office (shown in [Figure 2]) has one door (d1) to the hallway section and can have up to
two doors (d2, d3) leading to its adjacent rooms. Each door is equipped with a door closed
contact, named dcc<n>, where n is the number of the door in the room. [7]
Each office is equipped with [8]
1. one motion detector (imd), so that the room is fully covered.
2. two ceiling light groups (window and wall). The luminaries in a ceiling light
group in any room are turned on or off only as a group.
Each ceiling light group is controlled by one push button on the wall (pb1 and
pb2, respectively), which toggles the ceiling light group if pushed.
587Queins S., Zimmermann G., Becker M., Kronenburg M., Peper Ch., Merz R., Schaefer J. ... 
A ceiling light group in a room shows the following behavior if the corresponding
push button is pushed:
(i) if the ceiling light group is completely on, it will be switched off
(ii) otherwise it will be switched on completely.
3. Each ceiling light group can be dimmed with its own dimmer-actuator.
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2.2   Computer Lab Description
Same as office. [9]
2.3   Hardware Lab Description
Same as office, but with more than one door leading to the hallway section. [10]
2.4   Meeting Room Description
Same as office. [11]
2.5   Peripheral Room Description
The peripheral rooms will not be controlled by the control system, and thus they are not
described here! [12]
2.6   Hallway Section Description
Each hallway section is limited by two doors, each of which is leading to an adjacent hall-
way section or to an adjacent staircase. The associated names of the doors (d1, d2, d3, d4)
are shown in Figure 1. Each door is equipped with a door closed contact, named dcc<n>,
where n is derived from the label of the door. [13]
Each hallway section is equipped with [14]
1. two motion detectors (imd1 and imd2), placed above the doors at each end of the
hallway section to determine the presence of a person near a door,
(6)
2. one motion detector to cover the whole section (imd3),
3. one hallway section ceiling light group. The luminaries in a hallway section ceil-
ing light group are turned on or off only as a group.
Each ceiling light group is controlled by several push buttons (pb<i>) each of
which toggles the ceiling light group if pushed.
A hallway section ceiling light group shows the following behavior if a push but-
ton is pushed:
(i) if the hallway section ceiling light group is on, then it will be switched off
(ii) otherwise it will be switched on
4. one status line (sll1) that shows the status of the hallway section ceiling light
group.
2.7   Staircase Description
Each staircase connects several floors. [15]
At the landing of each staircase at each floor, the staircase is equipped with [16]
1. one motion detector (imd1) above the door of the landing that leads to the adjacent
hallway section to detect motion in the staircase near the door.
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(7)
2.8   Sensor Description
Analog sensors typically have an exponential response time. Conversion time is the time
to convert the analog value to a digital one that can be accessed by the control system.
Reaction time is the time from a change of the sensed property to the time when the sensor












0, 1 10 ms
It is placed above the door and is 1 if
the door is fully closed, 0 otherwise
motion
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0, 1 1 s
If set to 1, a person is moving, even
very slowly, in the range of the
detector.
status line 0, 1 10 ms
Senses if the light voltage is turned
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Figure 2:  Office Architecture
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2.9   Actuator Description
Actuators have a linear response time. Reaction time is therefore defined as the time to
change from 0 to 100% respectively 100 to 0%, if different. [18]
(8)
2.10   Dimmable Light
The structure of a dimmable light is shown in [Fig. 3]. Inputs to a dimmable light are created
by a pulse to toggle the light, by a dimmer to set the current dim value, and by control system
active to show the status of the control system. If this signal is not sent every 60 s, the dimma-
ble light switches to fail safe mode, i.e. dim value is assumed to be 100%. Outputs of a dim-
mable light are generated by a status line to show the current state (on or off) of the light: [19]







0, 1 10 ms
If the control system sends a 1 within
every 60 s, the control system is still alive.
dimmer 0-100% 10 ms
Controls light between 0 (off) and 10-
100% (on).
pulse 0, 1 10 ms
If the value changes from 0 to 1, the light
changes from on to off or from off to on.
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(9)3   Informal Needs
This part contains the needs for a new light control system for the fourth floor of Building 32
of the University of Kaiserslautern. [20]
In [Sec. 3.1], functional needs are listed and in [Sec. 3.2] non-functional needs are listed. [21]
3.1   Functional Needs
The functional needs are split into two groups, user needs and facility manager needs,
depending on the person who has expressed them. [22]
3.1.1   User Needs
The user needs are labelled by U<number>. [23]
At first, general user needs are listed, which are demanded for each kind of room: [24]
U1 If a person occupies a room, there has to be safe illumination, if nothing else is
desired by the chosen light scene.
U2 As long as the room is occupied, the chosen light scene has to be maintained.
U3 If the room is reoccupied within T1 minutes after the last person has left the room,
the chosen light scene has to be reestablished.
U4 If the room is reoccupied after more than T1 minutes since the last person has left
the room, the default light scene has to be established.
U5 For each room, the chosen light scene can be set by using the room control panel.
U6 For each room, the default light scene can be set by using the room control panel.
U7 For each room, the value T1 can be set by using the room control panel.
U8 If any outdoor light sensor or the motion detector of a room does not work cor-
rectly, the user of this room has to be informed.
U9 The room control panel for an office should contain at least:
(i) a possibility to set each ceiling light group
(ii) a possibility to set the chosen and the default light scene
(iii)a possibility to set T1
The user needs concerning the offices are: [25]
U10 The ceiling light groups should be maintained by the control system depending on
the current light scene.
U11 A room control panel in an office should be movable as is a telephone.
The user needs for the remaining rooms are: [26]
U12 In all other rooms, the room control panel should be installed near a door leading
to the hallway section.
The user needs for the hallway sections are: [27]
U13 When a hallway section is occupied by a person, there has to be safe illumination.
U14 Before a person enters one hallway section from another one or from a staircase,
the hallway section ceiling light group in the section being entered has to be on.
(10)3.1.2   Facility Manager Needs
The facility manager needs are labelled by FM<number>.[28]
FM1 Use daylight to achieve the desired light setting of each room and each hallway
section whenever possible.
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FM2 The ceiling light group in each hallway section has to be off when the hallway
section has been unoccupied for at least T2 minutes.
FM3 The ceiling light groups in a room have to be off when the room is unoccupied for
at least T3 minutes.
FM4 For each hallway section, the value T2 can be set by using the facility manager
control panel.
FM5 For each room, the value T3 can be set by using the facility manager control panel.
FM6 The facility manager can turn off the ceiling light groups in a room or hallway
section that is not occupied.
FM7 If a malfunction occurs, the facility manager has to be informed.
FM8 If a malfunction occurs, the control system supports the facility manager in
finding the reason.
FM9 The system provides reports on current and past energy consumption.
FM10 All malfunctions and unusual conditions are stored and reported on request.
FM11 Malfunctions that the system cannot detect can be entered manually.
3.2   Non-Functional Needs
The non-functional needs are split into several groups according to the aspect they are dealing
with. They are labelled by NF<number>. [29]
3.2.1   Fault Tolerance
In any case of failure, the system shall provide a stepwise degradation of functionality down
to manual operability. [30]
Needs in the case of a malfunction of the outdoor light sensor: [31]
NF1 If any outdoor light sensor does not work correctly, the control system for rooms
should behave as if the outdoor light sensor had been submitting the last correct
measurement of the outdoor light constantly.
NF2 If any outdoor light sensor does not work correctly, the default light scene for all
rooms is that all ceiling light groups are on.
NF3 If any outdoor light sensor does not work correctly and a hallway section is occu-
pied, the ceiling light group in this hallway section has to be on.
Needs in the case of a malfunction of the motion detector: [32]
NF4 If any motion detector of a room or a hallway section does not work correctly, the
control system should behave as if the room or the hallway section were occupied.
Needs in a worst-case failure of the control system: [33]
NF5 If the ceiling light group in a hallway section is controllable neither automatically
nor manually, the ceiling light group of this hallway section has to be on.
3.2.2   Safety and Legal Aspects
NF6 All hardware connections are made according to DIN standards.
NF7 No hazardous conditions for persons, inventory, or building are allowed.
3.2.3   User Interface
NF8 The control panels are easy and intuitive to use.
NF9 The system issues warnings on unreasonable inputs.
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4   Dictionary of Terms
Keyword Description
actuator
device that can be used by the control system to control an
environmental quantity
ambient light level illumination in a room
analog sensor a sensor that measures an analog value
architecture structure of a building, floor, or room
ceiling light group luminary under or in the ceiling,
chosen light scene
a light scene chosen by a user using the room control panel for the
case that a room is occupied
computer lab
room with a pool of terminals and workstations, open to all users and
temporarily to students of a class
control panel
small device with a keyboard, LEDs for important states, and a sim-
ple display for textual messages
control system
hard- and software system that controls indoor climate, lighting,
safety and security
current light scene the light scene currently established by the control system
default light scene a light scene for the case that a room is not occupied
desired light setting
the setting of a ceiling light group in a room or a hallway section
desired by the control system
dimmable light luminary that can be dimmed
dimmer-actuator actuator controlling the output of a luminary
door connection between rooms and hallway sections
door closed contact electrical or magnetic gadget to determine the state of a door
facility manager person responsible for running a building on a daily basis
facility manager
control panel
a control panel for the facility manager
floor part of a building
hallway section part of a section between several rooms to connect them to each other
hallway sections
ceiling light group
ceiling light group in a hallway section
hardware lab room with terminals and other electronic devices
illumination amount of light falling on a surface, measured in lux
Table 3: Dictionary of terms of the application domain
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Keyword Description
installation equipment belonging to a building
light scene
a light scene is a predefined setting of the ambient light level and a
prescription that determines in which way the ceiling light groups
should be used to achieve this ambient light level. A light scene is
given by:
1. name of the light scene
2. the desired ambient light level in a room
3. one of the following three options: window, wall, both
window means that at first the ceiling light group near the window
should be used to achieve the desired ambient light level and then
the other ceiling light group
wall means that at first the ceiling light group near the wall should
be used to achieve the desired ambient light level and then the
other ceiling light group
both means that both ceiling light groups should be used equally to
achieve the desired ambient light level
malfunction incorrect behavior of a device
meeting room a room open to all users
motion detector
sensor detecting motion of a person or animal in its range, state is on
during positive detection
office room for one or two users with terminals and/or workstations
outdoor light sensor
sensor measuring the illumination in a half sphere perpendicular to
its  flat  bottom
peripheral room room for computer peripherals, copy machines; open to all users
push button
an actuator for switching on and off a ceiling light group; it is on, as
long as pushed manually
room part of a section
room control panel a control panel in a room
safe illumination illumination greater than 14 lux
section part of a floor
sensor device that can sense something
staircase part of a building connecting several floors
status line wire that has the status of a device as value
user person occupying a room or a hallway section
Table 3: Dictionary of terms of the application domain, cont.
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SCR SPECIFICATION FILE 
Appendix B lists the SCR specifications for treatment B of the wall and window 
light pushbutton scenario; this serves as an example of an SCR specification for a given 
scenario.  SCR specifications were also created for each treatment (A and B) for each of 
the three scenarios. This resulted in creating six SCR specifications.   The following SCR 
specification is based on the file dinreqout.ssl created by the Navel Research Laboratory 
(NRL Heitmyer). 
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// This is the SCR specification file for the wall and window light 
pushbutton scenario, treatment B. It is based on the NRL dinreqdout.ssl 
specification. J. Sammarco identified three specification errors and 
collaborated with T. Grimm for the corrections. T. Grimm implemented 
three changes:  
 
1. mIndoorLL made to use the new value of iOLS instead 
   of the old value (a prime was added to the asignement) 
   \ "Light Control Example: mIndoorLL value is set to old iOLS value\" 
 
2. The tNeverOccupied term was added and used in the  
   tCurrentLSOpt and tCurrentLSVal functions to make it  
   properly use the default settings for the first occupant 
   even though the duration result shortly after the  
   initial state is not yet at or beyond mT1 (in other words 
   it assumes the room has been unoccupied starting in the initial 
   state). \"Light Control Example: Duration Initial State Issue\" 
 
3. Add WHEN (NOT iMD) to the end of the second event expression,     
preventing the error in both cited cases of resetting the room to 
unoccupied when it really is occupied. 
   \"Light Control Example: Another Duration Initial State  
    Problem plus a Related Problem\" 
 
J Sammarco implemented additional changes for the scenario: 
 
1) oWallOuput and oWindowOutput terms created for display purposes. 
Display = 0 if pulse is off.  This reduces confusion because prior 
version displayed oDimmerWall & oDimmerWindow at some value even though 
oPulseWall and oPulseWindow were off. 
 
2) Pushbutton behavior changed to behave like traditional dimmer switch 
Changes to oPulseWall & oPulseWindow"; 
 
 
// This section contains all of the items in the  
// Type Dictionary. 
TYPE "yAmbientLevel"; BASETYPE "Integer"; UNITS "n.a."; 
  VALUES "[0,100]"; 
  COMMENT "In %"; 
TYPE "yLight"; BASETYPE "Enumerated"; UNITS "n.a."; 
  VALUES "off, on"; 
TYPE "yLightLevel"; BASETYPE "Integer"; UNITS "n.a."; 
  VALUES "[0,10000]"; 
  COMMENT "in lux"; 
TYPE "yMalfcnLight"; BASETYPE "Enumerated"; UNITS "n.a."; 
  VALUES "green, red"; 
  COMMENT "red indicates a malfunction"; 
TYPE "yOption"; BASETYPE "Enumerated"; UNITS "n.a."; 
  VALUES "wall, window, both"; 
  COMMENT "Light scene options"; 
TYPE "yTimer"; BASETYPE "Integer"; UNITS "n.a."; 
  VALUES "[0,30]"; 
  COMMENT "in minutes"; 
 
 
// Mode Class Dictionary. 
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MODECLASS "mcStatus"; MODES "unoccupied, occupied,\ntemp_empty"; 
  INITMODE "unoccupied"; 
 
 




// Variable Dictionary. 
TERM "cMDmalfunction"; TYPE "yMalfcnLight"; INITVAL "green"; 
  ACCURACY "n.a."; 
TERM "cOLSmalfunction"; TYPE "yMalfcnLight"; INITVAL "green"; 
  ACCURACY "n.a."; 
TERM "cWallLL"; TYPE "yLightLevel"; INITVAL "0"; 
  ACCURACY "n.a."; 
TERM "cWallLights"; TYPE "yLight"; INITVAL "off"; 
  ACCURACY "n.a."; 
TERM "cWindowLL"; TYPE "yLightLevel"; INITVAL "0"; 
  ACCURACY "n.a."; 
TERM "cWindowLights"; TYPE "yLight"; INITVAL "off"; 
  ACCURACY "n.a."; 
MON "iChosenLSOpt"; TYPE "yOption"; INITVAL "wall"; 
  ACCURACY "n.a."; 
MON "iChosenLSVal"; TYPE "yLightLevel"; INITVAL "200"; 
  ACCURACY "n.a."; 
MON "iDCC"; TYPE "Boolean"; INITVAL "FALSE"; ACCURACY  
 "n.a."; 
MON "iDefLSOpt"; TYPE "yOption"; INITVAL "wall"; 
  ACCURACY "n.a."; 
MON "iDefLSVal"; TYPE "yLightLevel"; INITVAL "100"; 
  ACCURACY "n.a."; 
MON "iFMOverride"; TYPE "Boolean"; INITVAL "FALSE"; 
  ACCURACY "n.a."; 
MON "iMD"; TYPE "Boolean"; INITVAL "FALSE"; ACCURACY "n.a."; 
MON "iMDmalfunction"; TYPE "Boolean"; INITVAL "FALSE"; 
  ACCURACY "n.a."; 
MON "iOLS"; TYPE "yLightLevel"; INITVAL "0"; ACCURACY  
 "n.a."; 
MON "iOLSmalfunction"; TYPE "Boolean"; INITVAL "FALSE"; 
  ACCURACY "n.a."; 
MON "iSLLWall"; TYPE "Boolean"; INITVAL "FALSE"; 
  ACCURACY "n.a."; 
MON "iSLLWindow"; TYPE "Boolean"; INITVAL "FALSE"; 
  ACCURACY "n.a."; 
MON "iT1"; TYPE "yTimer"; INITVAL "10"; ACCURACY "n.a."; 
MON "iT3"; TYPE "yTimer"; INITVAL "15"; ACCURACY "n.a."; 
TERM "mChosenLSOpt"; TYPE "yOption"; INITVAL "wall"; 
  ACCURACY "n.a."; 
TERM "mChosenLSVal"; TYPE "yLightLevel"; INITVAL "200"; 
  ACCURACY "n.a."; 
TERM "mDefLSOpt"; TYPE "yOption"; INITVAL "wall"; 
  ACCURACY "n.a."; 
TERM "mDefLSVal"; TYPE "yLightLevel"; INITVAL "100"; 
  ACCURACY "n.a."; 
TERM "mFMOverride"; TYPE "Boolean"; INITVAL "FALSE"; 
  ACCURACY "n.a."; 
TERM "mIndoorLL"; TYPE "yLightLevel"; INITVAL "0"; 
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  ACCURACY "n.a."; 
TERM "mMDmalfunction"; TYPE "Boolean"; INITVAL "FALSE"; 
  ACCURACY "n.a."; 
TERM "mOLSmalfunction"; TYPE "Boolean"; INITVAL "FALSE"; 
  ACCURACY "n.a."; 
TERM "mOccupied"; TYPE "Boolean"; INITVAL "FALSE"; 
  ACCURACY "n.a."; 
TERM "mT1"; TYPE "yTimer"; INITVAL "10"; ACCURACY "n.a."; 
TERM "mT3"; TYPE "yTimer"; INITVAL "15"; ACCURACY "n.a."; 
TERM "mWallLights"; TYPE "yLight"; INITVAL "off"; 
  ACCURACY "n.a."; 
TERM "mWindowLights"; TYPE "yLight"; INITVAL "off"; 
  ACCURACY "n.a."; 
CON "oDimmerWall"; TYPE "yAmbientLevel"; INITVAL "0"; 
  ACCURACY "n.a."; 
CON "oDimmerWindow"; TYPE "yAmbientLevel"; INITVAL "0"; 
  ACCURACY "n.a."; 
CON "oMDmalfunction"; TYPE "Boolean"; INITVAL "FALSE"; 
  ACCURACY "n.a."; 
CON "oOLSmalfunction"; TYPE "Boolean"; INITVAL "FALSE"; 
  ACCURACY "n.a."; 
CON "oPulseWall"; TYPE "Boolean"; INITVAL "FALSE"; 
  ACCURACY "n.a."; 
CON "oPulseWindow"; TYPE "Boolean"; INITVAL "FALSE"; 
  ACCURACY "n.a."; 
CON "oWallOutput"; TYPE "yAmbientLevel"; INITVAL "0"; 
  ACCURACY "n.a."; 
CON "oWindowOutput"; TYPE "yAmbientLevel"; INITVAL "0"; 
  ACCURACY "n.a."; 
TERM "tCurrentLSOpt"; TYPE "yOption"; INITVAL "wall"; 
  ACCURACY "n.a."; 
TERM "tCurrentLSVal"; TYPE "yLightLevel"; INITVAL "100"; 
  ACCURACY "n.a."; 
TERM "tNeverOccupied"; TYPE "Boolean"; INITVAL "TRUE"; 
TERM "tOverride"; TYPE "Boolean"; INITVAL "FALSE"; 
  ACCURACY "n.a."; 
TERM "tRemLL"; TYPE "yLightLevel"; INITVAL "0"; 
  ACCURACY "n.a."; 
MON "time"; TYPE "Integer"; INITVAL "0"; ACCURACY "n.a."; 
 
 
// Assertion Dictionary. 
// none 
 
// Assumption Dictionary. 
// none 
 








 CONDITIONS "NOT mMDmalfunction", "mMDmalfunction"; 
  ASSIGNMENTS "green", "red"; 









 CONDITIONS "NOT mOLSmalfunction", "mOLSmalfunction"; 
  ASSIGNMENTS "green", "red"; 
 
CONDFUNC "cWallLL"; 
 CONDITIONS "tCurrentLSOpt = both",  
 "tCurrentLSOpt = wall AND tRemLL > 5000",  
 "tCurrentLSOpt = wall AND tRemLL <= 5000",  
 "tCurrentLSOpt = window AND tRemLL > 5000",  
 "tCurrentLSOpt = window AND tRemLL <= 5000"; 
  ASSIGNMENTS "tRemLL / 2", "5000", "tRemLL",  
 "tRemLL - 5000", "0"; 
 
EVENTFUNC "cWallLights"; 
 EVENTS "@T(mWallLights = on) WHEN (cWallLights = off) OR 
@T(mcStatus = occupied)",  
 "@T(mWallLights = off) WHEN (cWallLights = on) OR @T(mcStatus = 
unoccupied) OR\n@T(mFMOverride) WHEN (NOT (mcStatus = occupied))"; 
  ASSIGNMENTS "on", "off"; 
 
CONDFUNC "cWindowLL"; 
 CONDITIONS "tCurrentLSOpt = both",  
 "tCurrentLSOpt = wall AND tRemLL > 5000",  
 "tCurrentLSOpt = wall AND tRemLL <= 5000",  
 "tCurrentLSOpt = window AND tRemLL > 5000",  
 "tCurrentLSOpt = window AND tRemLL <= 5000"; 
  ASSIGNMENTS "tRemLL / 2", "tRemLL - 5000", "0",  
 "5000", "tRemLL"; 
 
EVENTFUNC "cWindowLights"; 
 EVENTS "@T(mWindowLights = on) WHEN (cWindowLights = off) OR 
@T(mcStatus = occupied)",  
 "@T(mWindowLights = off) WHEN (cWindowLights = on) OR @T(mcStatus 
= unoccupied) OR @T(mFMOverride) WHEN (NOT (mcStatus = occupied))"; 
  ASSIGNMENTS "on", "off"; 
 
CONDFUNC "mChosenLSOpt"; 
 CONDITIONS "true"; 
  ASSIGNMENTS "iChosenLSOpt"; 
 
CONDFUNC "mChosenLSVal"; 
 CONDITIONS "true"; 
  ASSIGNMENTS "iChosenLSVal"; 
 
CONDFUNC "mDefLSOpt"; 
 CONDITIONS "NOT iOLSmalfunction", "iOLSmalfunction"; 
  ASSIGNMENTS "iDefLSOpt", "both"; 
 
CONDFUNC "mDefLSVal"; 
 CONDITIONS "NOT iOLSmalfunction", "iOLSmalfunction"; 
  ASSIGNMENTS "iDefLSVal", "10000"; 
 
CONDFUNC "mFMOverride"; 
 CONDITIONS "true"; 
  ASSIGNMENTS "iFMOverride"; 
 








 EVENTS "@C(iOLS) WHEN (NOT iOLSmalfunction)"; 
  ASSIGNMENTS "iOLS'"; 





 CONDITIONS "true"; 
  ASSIGNMENTS "iMDmalfunction"; 
 
CONDFUNC "mOLSmalfunction"; 
 CONDITIONS "true"; 
  ASSIGNMENTS "iOLSmalfunction"; 
 
EVENTFUNC "mOccupied"; 
 EVENTS "@T(iMD) OR @T(iMDmalfunction)",  
 "@F(iMD) when ((NOT iDCC OR (duration(iDCC AND iMD) < 1))\nAND 
NOT iMDmalfunction) OR @T(duration(NOT iMDmalfunction) >= 2)\n    WHEN 
(NOT iMD)"; 
  ASSIGNMENTS "true", "false"; 
CONDFUNC "mT1"; 
 CONDITIONS "true"; 
  ASSIGNMENTS "iT1"; 
 
CONDFUNC "mT3"; 
 CONDITIONS "true"; 
  ASSIGNMENTS "iT3"; 
 
CONDFUNC "mWallLights"; 
 CONDITIONS "iSLLWall", "NOT iSLLWall"; 
  ASSIGNMENTS "on", "off"; 
 
CONDFUNC "mWindowLights"; 
 CONDITIONS "iSLLWindow", "NOT iSLLWindow"; 
  ASSIGNMENTS "on", "off"; 
 
MODETRANS "mcStatus"; 
  FROM "unoccupied" EVENT "@T(mOccupied)" TO "occupied"; 
  FROM "occupied" EVENT "@F(mOccupied)" TO "temp_empty"; 
  FROM "temp_empty" EVENT "@T(duration(NOT mOccupied) > mT3)" 
  TO "unoccupied"; 
  FROM "temp_empty" EVENT "@T(mOccupied)" TO "occupied"; 
 
CONDFUNC "oDimmerWall"; 
 CONDITIONS "TRUE"; 
  ASSIGNMENTS "cWallLL/50"; 
 
CONDFUNC "oDimmerWindow"; 
 CONDITIONS "true"; 
  ASSIGNMENTS "cWindowLL/50"; 
 
CONDFUNC "oMDmalfunction"; 
 CONDITIONS "cMDmalfunction = green", "cMDmalfunction = red"; 
  ASSIGNMENTS "false", "true"; 
 
CONDFUNC "oOLSmalfunction"; 
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 CONDITIONS "cOLSmalfunction = green", "cOLSmalfunction = 
red"; 
  ASSIGNMENTS "false", "true"; 
 
EVENTFUNC "oPulseWall"; 
 EVENTS "@T(cWallLights = on) AND (NOT iSLLWall') OR 
@T(cWallLights = off) AND iSLLWall'",  
 "@C(iSLLWall) AND (cWallLights' = off) ",  
 "@C(iSLLWall) AND (cWallLights' = on) "; 
  ASSIGNMENTS "true", "true", "false"; 
 
EVENTFUNC "oPulseWindow"; 
 EVENTS "@T(cWindowLights = on) AND (NOT iSLLWindow') OR 
@T(cWindowLights = off) AND iSLLWindow'",  
 "@C(iSLLWindow) AND (cWindowLights' = off) ",  
 "@C(iSLLWindow) AND (cWindowLights' = on) "; 
  ASSIGNMENTS "true", "true", "false"; 
 
CONDFUNC "oWallOutput"; 
 CONDITIONS "oPulseWall = true", "oPulseWall = false"; 
  ASSIGNMENTS "oDimmerWall", "0"; 
 
CONDFUNC "oWindowOutput"; 
 CONDITIONS "oPulseWindow = true", "oPulseWindow = false"; 
  ASSIGNMENTS "oDimmerWindow", "0"; 
 
EVENTFUNC "tCurrentLSOpt"; 
 EVENTS "@T(mcStatus = occupied) when (tNeverOccupied 
OR\n(duration(not(mcStatus = occupied)) >= mT1))",  
 "@C(mChosenLSOpt)"; 
  ASSIGNMENTS "mDefLSOpt", "mChosenLSOpt'"; 
 
EVENTFUNC "tCurrentLSVal"; 
 EVENTS "@T(mcStatus = occupied) when (tNeverOccupied 
OR\n(duration(NOT(mcStatus = occupied)) >= mT1))",  
 "@C(mChosenLSVal)"; 
  ASSIGNMENTS "mDefLSVal", "mChosenLSVal'"; 
 
EVENTFUNC "tNeverOccupied"; 
 EVENTS "@T(mOccupied)"; 
  ASSIGNMENTS "FALSE"; 
 
EVENTFUNC "tOverride"; 
 EVENTS "@T(mFMOverride) WHEN (NOT (mcStatus = occupied))",  
 "@T(mcStatus = occupied)"; 
  ASSIGNMENTS "true", "false"; 
 
CONDFUNC "tRemLL"; MCLASS "mcStatus"; 
  MODES "unoccupied" CONDITIONS "true", "false"; 
  MODES "occupied" CONDITIONS "mIndoorLL > tCurrentLSVal",  
 "mIndoorLL <= tCurrentLSVal"; 
  MODES "temp_empty" CONDITIONS "tOverride OR mIndoorLL > 
tCurrentLSVal",  
 "NOT tOverride AND mIndoorLL <= tCurrentLSVal"; 
    ASSIGNMENTS "0", "tCurrentLSVal-mIndoorLL"; 
 








Heitmeyer, C., & Bharadwaj, R (2000). Applying the SCR Requirements Method to the 
Light Control Case Study. Journal of Universal Computer Science; Special Issue on 
Requirements Engineering, Vol. 6, No. 7. 
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The subject questionnaire instrument was used to collect data concerning the 
subject, warm-up test, and test scenarios for treatments A and B.  The questionnaire 
consists of closed-ended questions and open-ended questions.  A five-level Likert scale is 
used for the closed-ended questions. 
Appendix D contains the subject questionnaire for those subjects conducting tests 
in the order defined by phase A.  The subject questionnaire for the phase B ordering is 
not shown, but is identical except that the test scenarios are listed in reverse order. 
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Part 1: User Profile  
          
1.1 Job Title:  
 
1.2 Age range:  
~ 18 - 24  
~ 25 - 34  
~ 35 - 44  
~ 45 - 65+ 
 
1.3 Sex:  
~ Male  
~ Female  
 
1.4 Were you involved in the development of the scenarios?  
Yes   No             
 
1.5 Rate your knowledge about the light control system.  
no knowledge      expert   
1  2  3  4  5 
             
1.6 Rate your level of experience in using a PC with Windows.   
none        expert  






Please return to the subject instructions and begin the warm-up scenario. 
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PART 2: Warm-up evaluation 
 
2.1 What is your opinion of the warm-up scenario?       
           
   2.1.1   difficult to understand     easy to understand  
1  2  3  4  5 
 
2.1.2  frustrating       satisfying  
1  2  3  4  5 
 
2.1.3  inadequate control of LCS    adequate control of LCS 
1  2  3  4  5 
  
2.1.4  complex       simple   
1  2  3  4  5 
 
PC Interface Usability 
 
2.2 What is your opinion of the user interface?      
            
   2.2.1    difficult to understand     easy to understand  
1  2  3  4  5 
 
2.2.2    inadequate control     adequate control  
1  2  3  4  5 
 
2.2.3  complex       simple 
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2.3 What is your opinion of the computer screen characters?  
hard to read      easy to read   
1  2  3  4  5    
 
2.4  What is your opinion of the screen layout? 
2.4.1  counterintuitive      intuitive  
1  2  3  4  5 
    
2.4.2  information organization  
unclear       clear  
1  2  3  4  5 
  
2.4.3  information quantity 
not enough       too much 
1  2  3  4  5 
  
2.4.4  information layout 
    illogical       logical  
1  2  3  4  5 
 
 2.5 Overall, the PC interface is complex to understand  
agree                disagree 
1  2  3  4  5  
 





Please return to the subject instructions and begin the next scenario. 
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3.1 What is your initial opinion of the system=s behavior? 
 
3.1.1  confusing       understandable  
1  2  3  4  5 
  
3.1.2  unpredictable      predictable  
1  2  3  4  5  
  
3.1.3  unstable       stable  
1  2  3  4  5 
 
3.2 How difficult is anticipating the system=s output or behavior? 
difficult       easy  
1  2  3  4  5 
 
System Observability  
 
3.3 Does the system keep you informed about its status or state?  
 
3.3.1  never        always  
1  2  3  4  5 
          
3.3.2  inappropriately      appropriately  
1  2  3  4  5 
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3.4 Recognizing a change in the system=s status is  
difficult       easy  
1  2  3  4  5  
 
 
3.5 Understanding the meaning or implications of a change in system=s status is  
difficult       easy  
1  2  3  4  5 
 
3.6 Recognizing changes in the display information is 
difficult       easy   




3.7 The ability to find information is 
difficult       easy  
1  2  3  4  5 
 
3.8 Can the scenario be performed in a straight-forward manner?  
never        always  
1  2  3  4  5 
 
3.9 Rate the scenario=s complexity. 
high        low 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
3.10 Please write any comments.  You may use the back of this page. 
 
 
Please return to the subject instructions and begin the next scenario. 
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4.1 What is your initial opinion of the system=s behavior? 
 
4.1.1  confusing       understandable  
1  2  3  4  5 
  
4.1.2  unpredictable      predictable  
1  2  3  4  5  
  
4.1.3  unstable       stable  
1  2  3  4  5 
 
4.2 How difficult is anticipating the system=s output or behavior? 
difficult       easy  
1  2  3  4  5 
 
System Observability  
 
4.3 Does the system keep you informed about its status or state?  
4.3.1  never        always  
1  2  3  4  5 
          
4.3.2  inappropriately      appropriately 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
4.4 Recognizing a change in the system=s status is  
difficult       easy  
1  2  3  4  5  
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4.5 Understanding the meaning or implications of a change in system=s status is  
difficult       easy  
1  2  3  4  5 
 
4.6 Recognizing changes in the display information is 
difficult       easy   
1  2  3  4  5 
 
System Usability 
4.7 The ability to find information is 
difficult       easy  
1  2  3  4  5 
 
4.8 Can the scenario be performed in a straight-forward manner?  
never        always  
1  2  3  4  5 
 
4.9 Rate the scenario=s complexity. 
high        low 
1  2  3  4  5 
 








Please return to the subject instructions and begin the next scenario. 
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5.1 What is your initial opinion of the system=s behavior? 
 
5.1.1  confusing       understandable  
1  2  3  4  5 
  
5.1.2  unpredictable      predictable  
1  2  3  4  5  
  
5.1.3  unstable       stable  
1  2  3  4  5 
 
5.2 How difficult is anticipating the system=s output or behavior? 
difficult       easy  
1  2  3  4  5 
 
System Observability  
 
5.3 Does the system keep you informed about its status or state?  
5.3.1  never        always  
1  2  3  4  5 
          
5.3.2  inappropriately      appropriately  
1  2  3  4  5 
 
5.4 Recognizing a change in the system=s status is  
difficult       easy  
1  2  3  4  5  
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5.5 Understanding the meaning or implications of a change in system=s status is  
difficult       easy  
1  2  3  4  5 
 
5.6 Recognizing changes in the display information is 
difficult       easy   




5.7 The ability to find information is 
difficult       easy  
1  2  3  4  5 
 
5.8 Can the scenario be performed in a straight-forward manner?  
never        always  
1  2  3  4  5 
 
5.9 Rate the scenario=s complexity. 
high        low 
1  2  3  4  5 








Please return to the subject instructions and begin the next scenario. 
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6.1 What is your initial opinion of the system=s behavior? 
 
6.1.1  confusing       understandable  
1  2  3  4  5 
  
6.1.2  unpredictable      predictable  
1  2  3  4  5  
  
6.1.3  unstable       stable  
1  2  3  4  5 
 
6.2 How difficult is anticipating the system=s output or behavior? 
difficult       easy  




6.3 Does the system keep you informed about its status or state?  
 
6.3.1  never        always  
1  2  3  4  5 
          
6.3.2  inappropriately      appropriately  
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6.4 Recognizing a change in the system=s status is  
difficult       easy  
1  2  3  4  5  
 
6.5 Understanding the meaning or implications of a change in the system=s status is  
difficult       easy  
1  2  3  4  5 
 
6.6 Recognizing changes in the display information is 
difficult       easy   




6.7 The ability to find information is 
difficult       easy  
1  2  3  4  5 
 
6.8 Can the scenario be performed in a straight-forward manner?  
never        always  
1  2  3  4  5 
6.9 Rate the scenario=s complexity. 
   high        low 
1  2  3  4  5 
 




Please return to the subject instructions and begin the next scenario. 
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7.1 What is your initial opinion of the system=s behavior? 
 
7.1.1  confusing       understandable  
1  2  3  4  5 
  
7.1.2  unpredictable      predictable  
1  2  3  4  5  
  
7.1.3  unstable       stable  
1  2  3  4  5 
 
7.2 How difficult is anticipating the system=s output or behavior? 
difficult       easy  
1  2  3  4  5 
 
System Observability  
 
7.3 Does the system keep you informed about its status or state?  
 
7.3.1  never        always  
1  2  3  4  5 
          
7.3.2  inappropriately      appropriately  
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7.4 Recognizing a change in the system=s status is  
difficult       easy  
1  2  3  4  5  
 
7.5 Understanding the meaning or implications of a change in system=s status is  
difficult       easy  
1  2  3  4  5 
 
7.6 Recognizing changes in the display information is 
difficult       easy   




7.7 The ability to find information is 
difficult       easy  
1  2  3  4  5 
 
7.8 Can the scenario be performed in a straight-forward manner?  
never        always  
1  2  3  4  5 
 
7.9 Rate the scenario=s complexity. 
high        low 
1  2  3  4  5 
 




Please return to the subject instructions and begin the next scenario. 
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8.1 What is your opinion of the system=s behavior? 
 
8.1.1  confusing       understandable  
1  2  3  4  5 
  
8.1.2  unpredictable      predictable  
1  2  3  4  5  
  
8.1.3  unstable       stable  
1  2  3  4  5 
 
8.2 How difficult is anticipating the system=s output or behavior? 
difficult       easy  
1  2  3  4  5 
 
System Observability  
 
8.3 Does the system keep you informed about its status or state?  
 
8.3.1  never        always  
1  2  3  4  5 
          
8.3.2  inappropriately      appropriately  
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8.4 Recognizing a change in the system=s status is  
difficult       easy  
1  2  3  4  5  
 
8.5 Understanding the meaning or implications of a change in system=s status is  
difficult       easy  
1  2  3  4  5 
 
8.6 Recognizing changes in the display information is 
difficult       easy   




8.7 The ability to find information is 
difficult       easy  
1  2  3  4  5 
 
8.8 Can the scenario be performed in a straight-forward manner?  
never        always  
1  2  3  4  5 
 
8.9 Rate the scenario=s complexity. 
high        low 
1  2  3  4  5 
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Part 9: Questionnaire Completion 
 
Please write your comments about any aspect of the questionnaire, or any other 
portion of this experiment. Thank you for participating 
 









Appendix E contains the subject instructions for those subjects conducting tests in 
the order defined by phase B.  The subject instructions for sequence 1 ordering are not 
shown, but are identical except that the test scenarios are in reverse order. 





















The Light Control System (LCS) Study 
 
Sequence 2 
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Preface 
 
This research is being conducted to fulfill the requirements for my doctoral 
dissertation in Computer Engineering in the Department of Computer Science and 
Electrical Engineering at West Virginia University.  Your participation in this research is 
voluntary and your identity will not be documented or disclosed.  
The purpose of this research is to learn more about what makes a computer-based 
system complex, as perceived by the user.  
This portion of the research involves your running six test scenarios on a simulated 
computerized office lighting system.  Your opinions about the system are given by 
answering a questionnaire.  Also, an observer will take notes as you operate the system.  
To become familiar with the lighting system, you will follow instructions for a 
warm-up session.  After the warm-up, you follow instructions to run six pre-defined 
scenarios for the lighting system.  After running each scenario, you are to answer the 
questionnaire, take a short break, and then begin the next session until the six scenarios 
are completed.       
You are encouraged to verbalize your actions, thoughts and opinions during the 
experiment. 
 
Thank you for participating. 
 
John J. Sammarco 
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Experiment Overview 
This experiment consists of nine parts. The general process is for you to follow the 
instructions, answer the questionnaire, and take a one-minute break.  The experiment 
takes about 1 hour to complete. 
The experiment uses a light control system (LCS), a fictitious system, as a test 
vehicle to validate research theories and methodologies.  To learn about the LCS you 
will: 
• Watch a short video about the LCS; 
• Read a description of the LCS; 
• Receive  “hands-on” training using the LCS in a warm-up session. 
 
Part 1: User Profile 
Please answer the user profile questions, part 1 of the questionnaire.  Turn to the 
next page and read the light control system description once you have completed part 1. 
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The Light Control System (LCS) Description  
The LCS is used to reduce energy costs and help maintain safety.  Energy is saved 
by automatically reducing lighting intensity when the office is empty for extended 
periods, by enabling users to get the light level they need by adjusting a dimmer instead 
of using the lights fully on, and by automatically adjusting the lights with respect to 
sunlight. 
 The lighting system controls a light near the window and light near the wall as 
depicted by figure 1.  Two sensors provide data to the lighting system.  A motion sensor 
detects if people are in the office; a sunlight sensor measures the office’s natural light. 
Figure1 – The office layout for the Light Control System 
The LCS controls the office lighting for two lighting scenes:  occupied and vacant. 
The occupied light scene is used while a person is in the office.  The vacant light scene is 
used to reduce the lighting when someone leaves the office for an extended period, as set 
by a time delay.  If the person returns to the office before the time delay expires, the 
lighting remains in the occupied light scene.  If the person returns after the time delay, 
the vacant light scene is enabled and it will be on when re-entering the office.  The vacant 
and occupied light scenes are controlled with the LCS user-interface panel. 
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User-Interface Panel: 
 
Figure 2.  The graphical user interface. 
The LCS graphical user interface, shown by figure 2, is described as follows:  
• Occupied Light Scene:  The controls consist of a light selector and dimmer.  Three 
light selections are available - wall, window, or both.  
• Vacant Light Scene:  The controls are the same except for the time delay control. 
• LCS Status:  The following status information is displayed: 
o Digital displays show the output for each light.  No light is produced at 0 
watts output; the maximum light is produced at 100 watts output.   
o A digital displays shows elapsed time. 
o Office status is displayed as occupied or vacant. 
• Manual Control:  Push button switches enable manual control of each light. 
Time Simulation 
Time is simulated by using the “step” button located at the top of the user-interface panel 




Figure 3.  The SCR Simulator menu for time simulation. 
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Part 2: Warm up 
 
The warm up helps you to become familiar with the controls and status display. 
Please read the instructions out loud as you go along and talk about what you observe. 
          
1) Click the door to enter the office; observe both light outputs.   
 
 Notice that the wall light turns on at a reduced default lighting level. 
 
2)  The occupied light scene controls enable you to adjust the lighting while you are in 
the office. Set the occupied light scene as follows: 
  
  - light selector to “both”; this sets the window and wall lights “on”; 
  - dimmer between 3500 and 4500; this value is a measure of light intensity; 
 
Note:  The dimmer value is the total intensity as measured in lumen.  When the 
dimmer = 5000 the total lighting is 100watts.  If the dimmer = 10,000 the total 
lighting is 200 watts.  Remember, each light can produce up to 100 watts.  
  
3) Observe the window and wall light outputs.  Each light is producing half of the 
lighting level because both lights are on.  
 
  - dimmer between 2000 and 3000; observe both light outputs; 
 
4) Set the occupied light scene as follows: 
 
  - light selector to “window”; the window light provides all the lighting; 
  - light selector to “wall”; the wall light provides all the lighting;  
  - dimmer to 0; no lighting is provided;  
- light selector to “both”; this sets the window and wall lights “on”; 
  - dimmer to 10,000; maximum lighting is provided.    
         
5) Set the vacant light scene as follows: 
 
  - light selector to “window”; 
  - dimmer between 400 and 2000; 
  - time delay setting to 9 minutes. 
 
Note, if you return to the office before the time delay setting of 9 minutes, the 
lighting will remain in the occupied light scene.  If you return after the time delay, 
you will find the vacant light scene on. 
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6)  Click the door to exit the office. 
 
  Note, the lighting is unchanged because the clock time = 0.  
 
7) You will now simulate being out of the office for 7 minutes.  
 
  - Using the step button located at the top left of the menu bar, observe both 
light outputs while slowly advancing time to 7 minutes.   
               
The lighting is unchanged because time = 7 minutes and this is less than time delay 
setting of 9 minutes. 
    
8)  Click the door to enter the office.  
 
The lighting is unchanged because you have returned before the time delay. 
 
9)  Click the door to exit the office. 
 
10) The warm-up is completed; please answer part 2 of the questionnaire. 
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Part 3: Wall and Window Light Push Buttons  
   
This scenario demonstrates the operation of the light push buttons.  You can manually 
turn the lights off or on by pressing the buttons located beneath the light output displays. 
    
Please read the instructions out loud as you go along and talk about what you observe. 
         
  
1) Click the door to enter the office; observe both light outputs. 
 
It is evening and you need both lights on at high intensity to read a tutorial about 
new software on your PC.  Set the Occupied Light Scene as follows:  
      
  - Light selector = both;  
  - Dimmer = 10000; observe both light outputs.   
 
2) You read the tutorial's first part, then decide to try what you have learned. 
However, the lights are causing computer screen glare.  To reduce glare, 
 
  - turn the wall light off using the push button; observe both light outputs. 
  - turn the wall light on using the push button; observe both light outputs. 
  - turn the window light off using the push button; observe both light outputs. 
  
 With the window light off, the glare is reduced so you use your PC. 
 
 
3) You have finished using the computer and decide to continue reading the tutorial. 
 
  Turn the window light on using the push button; observe both light outputs. 
 
4) While reading the tutorial, you decide to use only the window light. Set the 
Occupied Light Scene as follows:  
      
  - Dimmer = between 2000 and 2500; 
  - Light selector = window; observe both light outputs.      
 
5) You are finished working.  A friend is waiting in the parking lot to give you a ride. 
Turn the window light off and on repeatedly by using the push button.  This signals 
your friend that you are ready to leave. 
    
 
6)  Answer the questionnaire. 













      
BREAK 
 





































John J. Sammarco, P.E E-12 
Part 4: Vacant Light Scene 
 
The vacant light scene is used to reduce the lighting when someone leaves the office for 
an extended period.  If you return to the office before the time delay, the lighting is 
unchanged.  If you return after the time delay, you will find the vacant light scene on 
when re-entering the office.  
 
Please read the instructions out loud as you go along and talk about what you observe.    
        
             
1) Click the door to enter the office; observe both light outputs. 
 
It is very dark outside and you decide you need both lights on at full intensity while 
you work.  Set the Occupied Light Scene as follows: 
 
  - Light selector = both;  
  - Dimmer = 10,000; observe both light outputs. 
 
2) You are working in the office and want to leave for 5 minutes to get coffee.  You 
set the vacant light scene to save energy and to make sure that you don’t return to a 
totally dark office.  Set the Vacant Light Scene as follows: 
 
  - Light selector = window; 
  - Dimmer < 2000; 
  - Time delay setting = 5 minutes. 
 
3) Click the door to leave the office; observe both light outputs. 
 
Note, the lighting is unchanged because time = 0. 
 
4) The door is closed and you are out of the office.  You will now simulate returning 
to the office seven minutes later.  This is after the time delay setting of 5 minutes. 
 
  - While observing both light outputs and the time, use the step button to 
slowly advance the time to 7 minutes 
 
  - Re-enter the office by clicking the door; observe both light outputs.  
         
5)  Answer the questionnaire. 
 
          












           
      
BREAK 
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 Part 5: Lighting Options 
               
This scenario demonstrates the operation of the lighting options.  The lighting options are 
wall lights, window lights, or both lights.  The lighting options are selected by the user. 
 
Please read the instructions out loud as you go along and talk about what you observe.  
  
1) Click the door to enter the office; observe both light outputs. 
 
It is evening and you decide to do some reading while sitting in a chair near the 
window.  Therefore, you will be using the window light.  Set the Occupied Light 
Scene as follows:  
               
  - Light selector = window; 
  - Dimmer = between 2000 - 3000; observe both light outputs.  
 
2) Your eyes become tired while reading, so you decide to increase the lighting 
intensity.  Set the Occupied Light Scene as follows:       
 
- Dimmer = between 4000 - 4800; observe both light outputs. 
  
The lighting intensity is still too low.  Set the Occupied Light Scene as follows:  
  
  - Dimmer = between 7000 - 8000; observe both light outputs. 
 
3) You have finished reading and decide to work at your desk.  You will use the wall 
light because the desk is close to the wall.  Set the Occupied Light Scene as 
follows:   
 
  - Light selector = wall; observe both light outputs. 
           
4) The lighting intensity is too high, so set the Occupied Light Scene as follows:   
 
  - Dimmer = between 4000 - 4800; observe both light outputs. 
 
5) Put both lights on to help keep you alert.  Set the Occupied Light Scene as follows:  
 
  - Light selector = both;     
  - Dimmer =10000; observe both light outputs. 
 
6)  Answer the questionnaire. 
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Part 6: Wall and Window Light Push Buttons  
   
This scenario demonstrates the operation of the light push buttons.  You can manually 
turn the lights off or on by pressing the buttons located beneath the light output displays. 
 
Please read the instructions out loud as you go along and talk about what you observe.   
 
  
1) Click the door to enter the office; observe both light outputs. 
 
It is evening and you need both lights on at high intensity to read a tutorial about 
new software on your PC.  Set the Occupied Light Scene as follows:  
      
  - Light selector = both;  
  - Dimmer = 10000; observe both light outputs.   
 
2) You read the tutorial's first part, then decide to try what you have learned. 
However, the lights are causing computer screen glare. To reduce glare, 
 
  - turn the wall light off using the push button; observe both light outputs. 
  - turn the wall light on using the push button; observe both light outputs. 
  - turn the window light off using the push button; observe both light outputs. 
  
 With the window light off, the glare is reduced so you use your PC. 
 
 
3) You have finished using the computer and decide to continue reading the tutorial. 
 
  Turn the window light on using the push button; observe both light outputs. 
     
 
4) While reading the tutorial, you decide to use only the window light.  Set the 
Occupied Light Scene as follows:  
      
  - Dimmer = between 2000 and 2500; 
  - Light selector = window; observe both light outputs.  
            
5) You are finished working.  A friend is waiting in the parking lot to give you a ride. 
Turn the window light off and on repeatedly by using the push button.  This signals 
your friend that you are ready to leave. 
    
 
6)  Answer the questionnaire. 
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 Part 7: Lighting Options 
               
This scenario demonstrates the operation of the lighting options.  The lighting options are 
wall lights, window lights, or both lights.  The lighting options are selected by the user. 
 
Please read the instructions out loud as you go along and talk about what you observe.  
  
1) Click the door to enter the office; observe both light outputs. 
 
It is evening and you decide to do some reading while sitting in a chair near the 
window.  Therefore, you will be using the window light.  Set the Occupied Light 
Scene as follows:  
               
  - Light selector = window; 
  - Dimmer = between 2000 - 3000; observe both light outputs.  
 
2) Your eyes become tired while reading, so you decide to increase the lighting 
intensity.  Set the Occupied Light Scene as follows:       
 
  - Dimmer = between 4000 - 4800; observe both light outputs. 
  
The lighting intensity is still too low.  Set the Occupied Light Scene as follows:  
  
  - Dimmer = between 7000 - 8000; observe both light outputs. 
 
3) You have finished reading and decide to work at your desk.  You will use the wall 
light because the desk is close to the wall.  Set the Occupied Light Scene as 
follows:   
 
  - Light selector = wall; observe both light outputs. 
           
4) The lighting intensity is too high, so set the Occupied Light Scene as follows:   
 
  - Dimmer = between 4000 - 4800; observe both light outputs. 
 
5) Put both lights on to help keep you alert.  Set the Occupied Light Scene as follows:  
 
  - Light selector = both;     
  - Dimmer =10000; observe both light outputs. 
 
6)  Answer the questionnaire. 
 
      












      
BREAK 
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Part 8: Vacant Light Scene 
 
The vacant light scene is used to reduce the lighting when someone leaves the office for 
an extended period.  If you return to the office before the time delay, the lighting is 
unchanged.  If you return after the time delay, you will find the vacant light scene on 
when re-entering the office.   
 
Please read the instructions out loud as you go along and talk about what you observe.    
        
             
1) Click the door to enter the office; observe both light outputs. 
 
It is very dark outside and you decide you need both lights on at full intensity while 
you work. Set the Occupied Light Scene as follows: 
 
  - Light selector = both;  
  - Dimmer = 10,000; observe both light outputs. 
 
2) You are working in the office and want to leave for 5 minutes to get coffee.  You 
set the vacant light scene to save energy and to make sure that you do not return to 
a totally dark office.  Set the Vacant Light Scene as follows: 
 
  - Light selector = window; 
  - Dimmer < 2000; 
  - Time delay setting = 5 minutes. 
 
3) Click the door to leave the office; observe both light outputs. 
 
Note:  the lighting is unchanged because time = 0. 
 
4) The door is closed and you are out of the office.  You will now simulate returning 
to the office seven minutes later.  This is after the time delay setting of 5 minutes. 
 
  - While observing both light outputs and the time, use the step button to 
slowly advance the time to 7 minutes 
 
  - Re-enter the office by clicking the door; observe both light outputs.  
         
5)  Answer the questionnaire. 
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Part 9: Experiment Completion 
 
This concludes the experiment.  Your last step is to answer Part 9 of the questionnaire. 
 
Thank you for participating. 
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Introduction 
 
These instructions provide information useful for your role as an observer.  They 
provide guidance as to what you should or should not do as an observer and a description 
of the test sequences and procedures. 
Observers do multiple tasks.  They prepare the tests by loading test files into the 
PC-based simulator, giving the subjects written instructions and questionnaires, 
observing and recording the subject's verbal and physical expressions, and collecting the 
questionnaires.  
Each subject will run a test sequence that begins with a warm-up followed by six 
test scenarios.  The warm-up helps the subject become familiar with using the PC-based 
simulator.  The subjects answer a questionnaire after the warm-up and after running each 
of the tests.       
This research uses the Think Aloud protocol.  Subjects are encouraged to verbalize 
what they are doing and thinking during the tests.  You, as an observer, are to take notes 
on verbalization, body language and facial expressions.  The data sheets are provided for 
you.        
As an observer, you are not to participate or interact with subjects while they are 
running tests.  You may help clarify the subject questions concerning the questionnaire. 
       








This experiment uses six test scenarios.  The general process is for the subject to: 
 
1.  follow the scenario instructions 
2.  answer the questionnaire 
3.  take a one-minute break  
 
Note that half of the scenarios are repeated.  In other words, there are only three unique 
scenarios.  The scenario names and sequences are listed by Tables 1 and 2. 
       
Table 1: Test sequence 1. 
Simulation File Event File Comments 
Part2-warm-up.sjr warm-up.ev  warm-up  
Part3-VerX-Vac.sjr Vac.ev Vacant Light Scene 
Part4-Lopt-VerY.sjr ---- Lighting Options 
Part5-VerX-Psb.sjr ---- Wall and Ceiling Light Push Buttons 
Part6-VerX-Lopt.sjr ---- Lighting Options 
Part7-Vac-VerY.sjr Vac.ev Vacant Light Scene 
Part 8-Psb-VerY.sjr ---- Wall and Ceiling Light Push Buttons 
     
  
Table 2: Test sequence 2. 
Simulation File Event File Comments 
Part2-warm-up.sjr warm-up.ev  warm-up  
Part3-Psb-VerY.sjr ---- Wall and Ceiling Light Push Buttons 
Part4-Vac-VerY.sjr Vac.ev Vacant Light Scene 
Part5-VerX-Lopt.sjr ---- Lighting Options 
Part6-VerX-Psb.sjr ---- Wall and Ceiling Light Push Buttons 
Part7-Lopt-VerY.sjr ---- Lighting Options 




The test files are stored on the network at K:\MIPB\LCS. There is a subfolder for 
each test sequence.  Half of the subjects will run test sequence 1, depicted by table1and 
the other half will run the test sequence 2, depicted by Table 2.  The sequence 
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information is color coded.  Sequence A material has a white cover sheet and Sequence B 
material has a gold-colored cover sheet. 
Each test sequence contains up to three files.  Files with a sjr extension are used for 
the simulation; ev extension files are event files that enable predefined events to occur 
during some of the simulations.  Lastly, the gui extension file defines the user interface.  
The gui file automatically loads when the sjr simulation file runs.  
Observer Procedures 
Pre-test Procedures:   
  
1. Open the subfolder named “Part 2" and double click the warmup.sjr file. 
2. Select “File” from the simulator menu bar shown by figure 1, and select “Clear 
Events List" to clear any prior information from the simulator. 
Figure 1 - The SCR simulator file menu. 
 
3. Select “File” from the simulator menu bar and select “Read Events File.” Select 
warmup.ev to load the warm-up scenario events.  
4. Load the PowerPoint LCS Description Tutorial.    
5. The pretest procedures are completed. 
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Test Procedures: 
1. Thank the subject for participating and let them choose a token of thanks. 
2. Read the following to the subject:  
You are encouraged to narrate what you are doing and thinking during the tests. I am an 
observer and will take notes. There are no right or wrong answers to the test. We are 
interested in your opinions about what you observed during each test.  
3. Give the subject the instructions and questionnaire for sequence 1 or 2. 
4. Instruct the subject to read the Experiment Overview section of the instructions. 
5. Instruct the subject to complete the user profile of part 1in the questionnaire.  
6. Play the PowerPoint LCS Description Tutorial for the subject. You may answer 
questions concerning this tutorial. 
7. Play the animated LCS Description Tutorial for the subject. You may answer 
questions concerning this tutorial. 
8. Instruct the subject to read the Light Control System (LCS) Description section of 
the instructions.  
9. Instruct the subject to run the scenario. During the test, record your notes on the 
data sheet. 
10. After the test is completed, instruct subject to answer the Subject Questionnaire. 
11. Once the subject finishes the appropriate section of the questionnaire, give the       
subject a break (at least 1 minute) before starting the next test.  
12. While the subject takes a break, load the next sjr simulation file, clear the events      
list, and load the ev event file as needed.  The data sheet provides a checklist for 
these steps. 
13. Repeat steps 9-13 for the remaining test scenarios.   
Post-test Procedures:  
14. Thank the subject for participating. 
15. Begin pre-test procedures for the next subject. 
 








INDEPENDENT VARIABLE DATA 
 
 
Table E-1.  Independent variable data ( X1 to X15) for all scenarios and  treatments. 










A B A B A B 
X1 Cyclomatic complexity 24.0 26.0 14.0 14.0 19.0 19.0 
X2 Output cyclomatic 











X3 All paths 428.0 495.0 32.0 32.0 78.0 34.0 
X4 Graph degree 84.0 84.0 60.0 60.0 74.0 70.0 
X5 Critical state changes 14.0 14.0 23.0 14.0 24.0 20.0 
X6 In-degree 24.0 23.0 9.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 
X7 Out-degree 24.0 23.0 9.0 6.0 8.0 6.0 
X8 Cyclomatic complexity 11.0 12.0 2.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 












X10 In-degree 3.0 3.0 8.0 8.0 9.0 8.0 
X11 Out-degree 14.0 12.0 10.0 10.0 13.0 14.0 
X12 Sheppard complexity 











X13 Input cyclomatic 











X14 Output cyclomatic 
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